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Abstract
Shortly after the introduction of Expected Utility Theory (EUT), economists
and psychologists began publishing results that showed choices made by experi-
mental subjects which apparently violate one or more of the EUT axioms. I discuss
economists’ responses to this evidence. These vary from developing new theoretical
models, models that nest EUT as a special case, such as Rank Dependent Util-
ity (RDU) and Regret Theory, as well as models that do not nest EUT, such as
Cumulative Prospect Theory, to critiques of experimental methods and scope, to
the promotion of stochastic models of choice. I discuss popular stochastic choice
models in depth and evaluate their normative coherence. I find that the “Random
Preferences” stochastic model fails to make normatively coherent statements, in
contrast to the “Random Error” and “Tremble” models, which do so. I demonstrate
a method to calculate the unconditional likelihood of choice errors for populations
of EUT-compliant and RDU-compliant agents, and show how certain character-
istics of the population relate to the likelihood of these choice errors and their
costliness in terms of forgone welfare. I find that elements of the stochastic model
that are not related to preference relations tend to have a greater influence on
unconditional welfare estimates than the preference parameters themselves. Finally,
I conduct a power analysis of the ability of a lottery battery instrument to correctly
classify experimental subjects as employing either EUT or RDU, and the effect
of this classification on the accuracy of the estimates of welfare surplus for the
subjects. For large ranges of parameter values for these models, I find that the
probability of type I and type II errors in the classification process are not trivial,
and can be very costly in terms of welfare surplus. Additionally I show that for
a hypothetical population comprising subjects employing EUT or RDU, we can
arrive at more accurate welfare surplus estimates on average by assuming that every
subject employs the RDU functional, rather than by first trying to differentiate
RDU subjects from EUT subjects.
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Chapter 1
Choice Anomalies in Experiments,
and Economists’ Reactions to
Them
1.1 “Preference Reversals” and the Grether
and Plott (1979) Experiments
Grether and Plott (1979) describes and tests for explanations of “preference re-
versal” phenomena that had been observed in previous studies by psychologists,
in particular Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971, 1973) and Lindman (1971). In these
experiments subjects were asked to directly state a preference for one of two bets,
termed a P bet and a $ bet, and then to state a price at which they would be
willing to sell each bet. These stated preferences generate an implied preference
over the two bets. The observed phenomenon was of subjects stating a preference
for either the P or the $ bet in the direct comparison, and then stating a higher
selling price for the opposite bet. This type of behavior was deemed a “prefer-
ence reversal” because the stated preferences and the implied preferences were
inconsistent. This preference reversal was said to be incompatible with Expected
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Utility Theory (EUT), which, assuming a deterministic choice process and ignoring
indifference for now, requires that a subject state a higher price for the bet which
she selected in the direct comparison. Grether and Plott (1979, p. 623) set about
to conduct “a series of experiments designed to discredit the psychologists’ works
as applied to economics” and ended up “as perplexed as the reader who has just
been introduced to the problem.” (1979, p. 624) after failing to substantially reduce
the observed inconsistencies in their own controlled experiment.
Grether and Plott (1979) identified 13 possible theoretical criticisms and/or
explanations of this phenomenon, of which 3 related to economic theory, 6 were
psychological in nature, and 4 were artifacts of experimental method. Of greatest
concern to experimental economists should be the explanations involving experimen-
tal method and economic theory. The possible explanations concerning economic
theory included misspecified incentives, income effects, and indifference. The
possible explanations involving experimental method included confusion and mis-
understanding, low frequency of errors/small sample sizes, unsophisticated subjects,
and, my favorite, that the experimenters were psychologists. Grether and Plott
then detail the ways in which each of these possibilities could potentially lead to the
observed seemingly theory-inconsistent data, discuss how the previous literature
by psychologists inadequately control for these various possibilities, and how their
experiment attempts to impose adequate controls.
In identifying these possibilities, Grether and Plott (1979) touch on aspects of
conducting economic laboratory experiments which are later codified as necessary
precepts for valid controlled experiments by Smith (1982). These precepts will be
elaborated upon later.
To better understand the nature of the preference reversal phenomenon as
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described by Grether and Plott (1979), the subsequent critiques of their method, and
potential accommodations of these seemingly inconsistent data, a description of the
relevant details of the experiment is needed. Subjects were students recruited from
economics and political science classes, promised a minimum of $5 for participation
and told that the experiment would take no longer than one hour.
The experiment entailed the subjects making 2 types of choices. The first asked
them to state either a strict preference for a P bet or a $ bet, where the terms are
defined below, or stating that they “Don’t care” across 6 pairs of P and $ bets.
The second asked subjects to state “the smallest price for which you would sell
a ticket to the following bet” (1979, p. 630) for each P bet and $ bet across the
same 6 pairs. Though each pair of P bets and $ bets were for different amounts,
the relationship between the P bets and $ bets remained similar across all 6 pairs.
The P bet, named for being a “probability” bet, is a lottery between winning a
small but positive amount of money, P1 with a high probability (never less than
29/36), and incurring a small loss, P0 on the subject’s initial endowment with a low
probability (never more than 7/36). The $ bet, named for being a “money” bet,
is a lottery between winning a large amount of money, $1, with a low probability
(never more than 18/36), and incurring a small loss, $0, on the subject’s initial
endowment with a relatively high probability (never less than 18/36).
Grether and Plott (1979) conducted two different experiments eliciting the
above choices which varied slightly in order to test one of the psychological theories
for the preference reversal phenomenon. In the first experiment the subjects were
split into two groups in which one group was asked to make a series of hypothetical
decisions, for which they would be paid a guaranteed $7, while the other group
was initially endowed $7, but told that their final earnings would depend on one of
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their choices chosen at random and being played out. Both groups were asked their
preferences for pairs 1, 2, and 3, then asked their minimum selling price for all 12
gambles, then asked their preferences for pairs 4, 5, and 6. The second experiment
was also split into two groups but both groups were paid based on their decisions
and they were also asked for “the exact dollar amount such that you are indifferent
between the bet and the amount of money” in addition to being asked for a selling
price directly. The first group was asked for a “selling price” first while the second
group was asked for the “dollar equivalent” amount first. This additional set of
questions were implemented to control for potential strategic behavior that might
be associated with the term “selling.”
All of the groups that were incentivized with real monetary rewards were told
that they would only be paid for one of their choices. This was meant to combat
the income effect of accumulating earnings across many questions. If a selling
price question was selected for payment, the experimenters would use the method
detailed in Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1964) (BDM). In this method, a subject
is asked to report the lowest price she is willing to accept to give up her right
to play a certain lottery. The experimenter then selects a “buying” price from a
uniform distribution between two feasible price intervals and if the “selling” price
reported by the subject is less than the selected buying price the subject receives
the buying price, otherwise the subject plays out the lottery; in this experiment
the random distribution was between $0.00 and $9.99. BDM explain how this type
of auction mechanism leads to the subject’s true selling price being the weakly
dominant response, at least in theory.
Despite having conducted this experiment in expectation of refuting the results
of psychologists, Grether and Plott (1979) end up confirming these results with their
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own experiment. The lack of a substantial reduction in the proportion of subjects
displaying the preference reversal phenomenon, particularly in the groups which
had monetary incentives attached to their choices, led Grether and Plott (1979) to
suggest that certain assumptions economists had held concerning the structure of
preferences may not be valid. Grether and Plott (1979, p. 623) remarked concerning
the preference reversal phenomenon “The inconsistency is deeper than the mere
lack of transitivity or even stochastic transitivity. It suggests that no optimization
principles of any sort lie behind even the simplest of human choices and that
the uniformities in human choice behavior which lie behind market behavior may
result from principles which are of a completely different sort from those generally
accepted.”
The totals of the different choices for the groups of incentivized subjects are
presented in Table 1.1 below. Experiment 1 in Table 1.1 only includes the group
which was paid with real money, while Experiment 2-1 and Experiment 2-2 in
Table 1.1 represent experiment 2 groups 1 and 2, respectively, where the differences
between the groups are detailed above. The mean difference in reported prices for
inconsistent choices from experiment 1 is reported in Table 1.2, Grether and Plott
(1979) did not report these statistics for experiment 2. In Table 1.2 the “Predicted”
preference reversal is that of selecting the P bet in the direct comparison and
stating a higher selling price for the $ bet, and the “Unpredicted” preference
reversal is selecting the $ bet in the direct comparison and stating a higher selling
price for the P bet.
In Table 1.1 two things are apparent. The first is the degree of inconsistent
choices from subjects who chose the P bet in a binary choice option and then
reported a higher price for the $ bet from exactly the same pair in the BDM
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Table 1.1: Grether and Plott (1979) - Results for Incentivized Experiments
Experiment 1
Reservation Prices
Bet Choices Consistent Inconsistent Equal %Consistent %Inconsistent
P 99 26 69 4 26.26% 69.70%
$ 174 145 22 7 83.33% 12.64%
Indifferent 3
Experiment 2-1
Selling Price
P 44 8 30 6 18.18% 68.18%
$ 72 54 15 3 75.00% 20.83%
Indifferent 4
Equivalent Price
P 44 4 34 6 9.09% 68.18%
$ 72 59 11 2 81.94% 15.28%
Indifferent 0
Experiment 2-2
Selling Price
P 44 16 27 1 36.36% 61.36%
$ 64 54 9 1 84.38% 14.06%
Indifferent 0
Equivalent Price
P 44 19 22 3 43.18% 50.00%
$ 72 51 10 3 79.69% 15.63%
Indifferent 0
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Table 1.2: Grether and Plott (1979) - Experiment 1:
Mean Values of Reversals (in Dollars)
Predicted Unpredicted
Bet Incentives No Incentives Incentives No Incentives
1 1.71 2.49 0.40 0.79
2 1.45 2.65 0.51 0.90
3 1.48 1.29 1.00 0.25
4 3.31 5.59 3.00 0.02
5 1.52 1.79 0.38 0.01
6 0.92 1.18 0.33 0.31
task. Of all the groups with incentivized choices, no fewer than 50% of those who
chose the P bet reported a selling price for the P bet that was at least 1 cent
below the selling price reported for the $ best. Table 1.2 shows that the average
difference between the elicited selling price and the expected value of the lottery in
question ranged from 1 cent to $5.59. The magnitude of these differences formed
an important part of the critique of these experiments by Harrison (1989, 1992),
to be discussed later.
The second implication from Table 1.1 is the asymmetry of the frequency
of choice inconsistencies. While the maximum proportion of inconsistency for
subjects selecting a P bet choice in the binary comparison was about 77%, the
maximum proportion of inconsistency for selecting a $ bet was only about 21%.
Also, the mean value of the reversal is larger for the “Predicted” reversal for every
bet. Subsequent critiques of these experiments ignore this asymmetry, suggest
that it is meaningless due to a failure to satisfy either the saliency or dominance
precepts initially proposed by Smith (1982), to be discussed later, or suggest that
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this asymmetry is predicted by alternative theories to EUT, such as the “Regret
Theory” of Loomes & Sugden (1982).
1.2 Theoretical Critiques of the Grether and
Plott (1979) Experiments
Holt (1986) offers an explanation of the preference reversal phenomenon which
does not require the forfeiture of transitivity. Instead, Holt (1986) proposes that
should the independence axiom not hold, subjects are not making choices which
are separable, but instead are making choices between compound lotteries. Choices
over compounded lotteries may display the preference reversal phenomenon without
being a violation of transitivity.
Take for example a three question scenario which represents the Grether and
Plott (1979) instrument, where a subject must make a choice between a P bet and
a $ bet, and the subject is asked to reveal her selling price for both the P bet and
the $ bet using the BDM mechanism. Suppose also that only one of these three
choices will be played out for real earnings. The expected utility of such a scenario
would be the following:
1
3E{u(w + x˜)}+
1
3E{u(w + b˜(r$;X$))}+
1
3E{u(w + b˜(rP ;XP ))} (1.1)
where w is the initial wealth of the subject, x˜ is the random payment determined by
the chosen lottery, X$ or XP , and b˜ is the random payment of the BDM mechanism
given the elicited selling price r for each respective lottery, X$ or XP .
Given equation (1.1) and the validity of the independence axiom, the subject
should choose the lottery in the binary comparison which she prefers most, and
reveal the minimum price for which she is willing to sell each lottery in order to
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maximize her utility. The ranking of the minimum reservation prices should also
correspond to the selection of lotteries in the binary choice. However, suppose that
the binary choice came after the selling price elicitations. Then the subject can be
said to be making a choice between two compound lotteries:
[1
3 , XP ;
1
3 , B(rˆ$;X$);
1
3 , B(rˆP ;XP )
]
and
[1
3 , X$;
1
3 , B(rˆ$;X$);
1
3 , B(rˆP ;XP )
]
(1.2)
where B(rˆ;X) is the lottery resulting from the BDM mechanism between the
reservation price rˆ and either the X$ or XP lotteries. We can rewrite the last part
of both these compound lotteries as follows:
Z ≡
[1
2 , B((ˆR)$;X$);
1
2 , B(rˆP ;XP )
]
(1.3)
and (1.2) can be rewritten as
(1
3 , X$;
2
3 , Z
)
and
(1
3 , XP ;
2
3 , Z
)
(1.4)
If independence holds, the subject would choose the left option if, and only if,
she preferred X$ to XP , and vise versa. Should the independence axiom fail, then
this relationship also fails and the subject may choose the left option even if she
doesn’t prefer X$ to XP . If such a choice is made, then the price revealed for the
chosen lottery using the BDM mechanism may be lower than the price solicited
for the alternative lottery because the impact of such a choice has been diluted by
the compound lottery.
Holt (1986) offers an explanation for the preference reversal phenomenon, but
makes no comment about the asymmetry of the phenomenon, nor does he suggest
an alternative theory to EUT other than to state that “...any theory of rational
choice in such contexts must be derived from a set of axioms that does not include
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or imply the independence axiom...” (1986 p.514) Holt (1986) does state that
since the choices are diluted by compounding the opportunity cost of an apparent
preference reversal is very low, thus the asymmetry may not be so interesting. This
point is elaborated by Harrison (1989, 1992) and will be discussed later.
Karni and Safra (1987) also state that the preference reversal phenomenon can
be explained by an alternative to EUT which doesn’t include the independence
axiom. Differing from Holt (1986) however, they propose a model that would explain
the preference reversal phenomenon which they call “Expected Utility with Rank
Dependent Utilities” (EURDU). EURDU requires that the independence axiom
not hold, that the possible outcomes of a given lottery be ranked, the probabilities
of each of the outcomes be transformed, and weights of the outcomes generated
by these transformed probabilities be dependent on the rank of the outcome. The
first axiomatization of a EURDU model was by Quiggin (1982), though it was
called “Anticipated Utility” at the time, and now is more commonly called “Rank
Dependent Utility” (RDU). Yaari (1987) independently proposed a utility theory
which replaces the independence axiom with a dual independence axiom, resulting
in a lottery valuation functional that is linear in prizes but nonlinear in probabilities,
called “Dual Theory.”
Assuming some discrete lottery, (x1, p1; . . . ;xn, pn) , that the probabilities asso-
ciated with the outcomes of the lotteries sum to 1, and that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xn,
then the following function due to Karni and Safra (1987) represents the EURDU
of such a lottery:
V (x1, p1; . . . ;xn, pn) =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)
f
 n∑
j=i
pj
− f
 n∑
j=i+1
pj
 (1.5)
The above utility structure combined with the compound lottery structure,
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necessitated by the lack of the independence axiom and the BDM mechanism, is
sufficient to generate utility maximizing choices which appear to be preference
reversals. To demonstrate this, Karni and Safra (1987) proposed a simplified
version of the BDM mechanism in which a subject must select a selling price, s,
from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and the experimenter randomly selects an buying price
from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} to determine the outcome. Recall that if the buying price
is greater than the selling price, the subject receives the buying price, otherwise she
plays out the lottery. In addition, they proposed the following candidate probability
weighting function and utility function :
f(p) =

1.1564p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 0.1833
0.9p+ 0.047, 0.1833 ≤ p ≤ 0.7
0.5p+ 0.327, 0.7 ≤ p ≤ 0.98
p10, 0.98 ≤ 1
(1.6)
u(x) =

30x+ 30, x ≤ −1
10x+ 10, −1 ≤ x ≤ 12
6.75x+ 49, 12 ≤ x
(1.7)
Given equations (1.6) and (1.7), an outcome 10 with a probability of .9 would
have a probability weight of f(0.9) = 0.5 × 0.9 + 0.327 = 0.77, and a utility of
u(10) = 10× 10 + 10 = 110.
Using two lotteries from the Grether and Plott (1979) experiments (A and B
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below), they set up the value function:
A = (−1, 136 ; 4,
35
36) and B = (−1.5,
25
36 ; 16,
11
36) (1.8)
V (A|Π(A)) ≡ V
(
A,
s
5 ; s+ 1,
1
5 ; . . . ; 5
1
5
)
= V
(
−1, s5 ×
1
36 ; 4,
s
5 ×
35
36 ; s+ 1,
1
5 ; . . . ; 5,
1
5
) (1.9)
where lottery A is a P bet, lottery B is a $ bet, and Π(A) returns the selling price
of lottery A elicited from the BDM mechanism. Solving equations (1.8) and (1.9)
for the possible values of s produces the following Table from Karni and Safra
(1987, p. 679):
Table 1.3: Karni and Safra (1987) - Values for Different Choices of Π(k), k = A,B
V (A|Π(A)) V (B|Π(B)) Value of Π(k)
1 40.65 = V (A) 40.38 = V (B) 5 < Π(k)
2 43.06 44.42 4 ≤ Π(k) ≤ 5
3 44.53 46.66∗ 3 ≤ Π(k) ≤ 4
4 45.25∗ 45.06 2 ≤ Π(k) ≤ 3
5 43.70 39.61 1 ≤ Π(k) ≤ 2
6 39.48 39.48 Π(k) ≤ 1
7 3.065 = C(A) 3.038 = C(A) 3.038 = C(B)
In row 1 of Table 1.3 the conditional values of A and B are equivalent to
the unconditional values of A and B because if a subject could have chosen a
price greater than 5 in this example the subject would have played out either
A or B with 100% probability. The asterisks indicate at which values of s the
conditional value of A or B is maximized. Row 7 indicates the certainty equivalents
A and B which are a direct result of the monotonicity of u(·) and by definition
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u(C(H)) = V (C(H), 1) for every H which is an element of the set of lotteries
offered.
From row 1 we can see that the subject prefers lottery A to B and should
choose A in the direct lottery choice. From row 7 we can see that the true certainty
equivalent of lottery A is greater than lottery B. From rows 3 and 4 we see that
when the subject is asked for a selling price for each lottery she would choose
a price between 2 and 3 for lottery A, and a price between 3 and 4 for lottery
B. The true certainty equivalent of lottery A is out of the range of selling prices
which would maximize this subject’s utility for this compound lottery, and the
utility maximizing selling price for B is greater than that of A. This subject would
therefore display a “preference reversal” by selecting A in the direct comparison
and selecting a higher price for B with the BDM mechanism.
Using the penny grid employed in the Grether and Plott (1979) experiments,
Karni and Safra (1987, p. 680) calculated the selling price that would have been
elicited from the same subject for lottery A as $3.43, and for lottery B as $4.33.
Because the unconditional values of lottery A and lottery B along with their
respective certainty equivalents are the same as in the first row and seventh row
of Table 1.3, these elicited selling prices also display a “preference reversal.” The
elicited selling prices using this penny grid are also significantly different from the
certainty equivalents as calculated in row 7.
In contrast to the critiques of Holt (1986) and Karni and Safra (1987), Loomes,
Starmer and Sugden (1989) suggest that the apparent preference reversals are in
fact violations of transitivity as Grether and Plott (1979, p. 623) had stated and
offer “Regret Theory” as a potential explanation, which predicts the apparent
preference reversal and lacks the transitivity axiom. Regret Theory was originally
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and independently developed by Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Bell (1982), then
axiomized by Fishburn (1987) and modified by Loomes and Sugden (1987) to
include a “convexity” axiom to be described below.
Regret Theory assumes that a subject has a “choiceless” utility function, which
is unique up to a linear transformation and assigns a real-valued utility number
to every conceivable outcome of an action. This utility function represents the
utility the subject would derive from the outcome of an action if she experienced
it without having chosen it (Loomes and Sugden 1982, p. 807). The “choiceless”
utility of an outcome that would occur in a particular state of the world given an
action is compared with the “choiceless” utility of an outcome that would occur in
the same state of the world given another feasible action using a “modified” utility
function:
mkij = M(cij, ckj) (1.10)
where M is the modified utility function, cij and ckj are the “choiceless” utilities
of the outcome of actions i and k, respectively, in the event that state of the world
j occurs, and mkij is the resulting modified utility of having chosen action i instead
of action k.
Loomes and Sugden (1982, p. 809) assume that the degree of regret only depends
on the difference in the “choiceless” utilities which would occur in the same state
of the world but given different actions. Thus (1.10) can be re-written as follows:
mkij = cij +R(cij − ckj) (1.11)
where R(·) is a “regret-rejoice” function. A subject would select an action which
has the greatest expected modified utility; the sum of the probability weighted
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modified utilities across all potential states of the world. Keeping with the notation
of Loomes and Sugden (1982), mkij will be rewritten as ψ(xij, xkj), where xij and
xkj are the outcomes of actions i and k, respectively, should state of the world j
occur. Thus ψ(·) incorporates the transformation of the outcomes into “choiceless”
utilities, and those “choiceless” utilities into the modified utilities.
Ai < Ak ⇔
∑
j
pj ψ(xij, xkj) ≥ 0 (1.12)
where Ai and Ak are actions i and k, respectively. Two important assumptions are
made about ψ(·): first, ψ(·) is skew-symmetric, i.e. ψ(xij, xkj) = −ψ(xij, xkj), and
second it is convex, i.e. if x3 > x2 > x1, then ψ(x3, x1) > ψ(x3, x2)+ψ(x2, x1). This
convexity allows subjects to be “regret” averse and is the basis for the prediction
of the preference reversal phenomenon.
Using this notation, Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (1989) denote the P bets and
$ bets as actions, and modify the choice of a selling price for the BDM mechanism
as a binary choice between an action which returns a constant amount of money
for certain, C, and either the P bet or the $ bet. where the columns represent
Table 1.4: Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (1989, p. 141)
Actions, States, and Outcomes
Action S1 S2 S3 S4p1 p2 p3 p4
$ a a d d
P b e b e
C c c c c
4 states of the world, S1, . . . , S4, with associated probabilities p1, . . . , p4, and the
rows represent the different actions, $ bet, P bet, and a certainty C, with potential
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outcomes a, b, c, d and e such that a > b > c > d, e. If p1 + p3 > 0.5 > p1 + p2 then
the first 2 rows correspond to the $ bet and P bet from Grether and Plott (1979).
These actions can be made into 3 pairwise choices, {P, $}, {P,C}, {$, C}, called
a “triple.” Applying the formula from (1.12) to the outcomes and probabilities of
Table 1.4 generates the following preference relations:
P < $⇔ p1ψ(b, a) + p2ψ(e, a) + p3ψ(b, d) + p4ψ(e, d) ≥ 0 (1.13)
$ < C ⇔ p1ψ(a, c) + p2ψ(a, c) + p3ψ(d, c) + p4ψ(d, c) ≥ 0 (1.14)
C < P ⇔ p1ψ(c, b) + p2ψ(c, e) + p3ψ(c, b) + p4ψ(c, e) ≥ 0 (1.15)
In the above pairwise choices, the most common preference reversal phenomenon
of the Grether and Plott (1979) experiments is observed if the P bet is chosen over
the $ bet, the $ bet chosen over the C money certainty, and the C money certainty
chosen over the P bet. The less common preference reversal is observed if the $
bet is chosen over the P bet, the P bet is chosen over the C money certainty, and
the C money certainty is chosen over the $ bet. The first of these two preference
reversals is predicted by Regret Theory when p2 = 0 and d ≥ e in equations (1.13),
(1.14), and (1.15), while the second one is not. Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (1989,
p. 143) call the first of these preference reversals the “predicted” preference reversal,
and the second the “unpredicted” preference reversal.
Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (1989) design three experiments to test whether
subjects who display the preference reversal phenomenon follow Regret Theory
instead of EUT by utilizing the special case of p2 = 0 and d ≥ e. The first two
experiments confront subjects with different sets of triples, called the “choice-only”
design, while the third experiment had some subjects face the BDM mechanism
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to elicit selling prices for each lottery as in Grether and Plott (1979), called
the “standard” design, and some subjects use the “choice-only” design. Loomes,
Starmer and Sugden (1989, p. 142) state that their null hypothesis is that subjects
make choices in accordance with EUT but make mistakes randomly such that there
should be an equal proportion of subjects who display the “predicted” preference
reversal and subjects who display the “unpredicted” preference reversal for any
given triple. They state that they will reject this EUT null hypothesis in favor
of the alternative of Regret Theory if the frequency of subjects displaying the
“predicted” preference reversal is significantly higher than subjects displaying the
“unpredicted” preference reversal to an extent that can’t be attributed to chance.
Experiment 1 had 283 subjects, 120 of which also participated in Experiment 2
which was held a few days later and had some chance of loosing money. Experiment
3 had 186 subjects. All subjects were randomly assigned to different subsamples,
with each subsample assigned to a unique set of triples. An equal number of
subjects were assigned to the “choice-only” and “standard” designs in Experiment
3, and the responses from the group that participated in the “standard” design
were imputed into choices as if they had conducted the “choice-only” design. The
bets used in the pairwise comparisons are presented in Table 1.5.
The subjects in Experiment 1 were split into 4 subsamples, A, B, C, and D,
each of which made pairwise choices across one triple, ($1, P1, C), where C varied
for each subsample as shown in the “Triple” column of Table 1.6 below. The
subjects in Experiment 2 were split into 2 subsamples, E and F , each of which
faced 4 triples, with each triple containing the $2 bet and either the P2 bet or
P3 bet and unique values of C for each triple. The subsamples for Experiment
2 differed only by the values of C in their triples. This is also shown in Table
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Table 1.5: Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (1989)
Bets Used in Three Experiments
$ bets P bets
$1 = (12.00, 0.4 ; 0, 0.6) P1 = (8.00, 0.6 ; 0, 0.4)
$1 = (12.00, 0.4 ; 0, 0.6) P1 = (8.00, 0.6 ; 0, 0.4)
$1 = (12.00, 0.4 ; 0, 0.6) P1 = (8.00, 0.6 ; 0, 0.4)
$1 = (12.00, 0.4 ; 0, 0.6) P1 = (8.00, 0.6 ; 0, 0.4)
$1 = (12.00, 0.4 ; 0, 0.6) P1 = (8.00, 0.6 ; 0, 0.4)
1.6, along with the number of subjects who responded with particular patterns of
choice for each triple.
The subjects in Experiment 3 were split into 6 subsamples, G1, H1, I1 for the
“standard” design and G2, H2, I2 for the “choice-only” design. Each subsample of
the same letter designation faced the same $ bet and P bet, and after imputing
the elicited selling prices from the “standard” design subsamples into a choice of
C, all subsamples of Experiment 3 faced the same value of C. The purpose of
imputing these choices was to provide a direct comparison of the “standard” design
and the “choice-only” design. The number of subjects who displayed each possible
choice pattern for Experiment 3 is shown in Table 1.7 below. Some subjects in
the “standard” design reported a selling price for a bet which was greater than the
largest possible outcome of the bet, or smaller than the smallest possible outcome
of the bet. The number of subjects who did not display this “perverse” behavior
in the “standard” design is reported in parenthesis next to the total number of
subjects displaying a particular choice pattern in Table 1.7, where r$ and rP are
the elicited selling prices for the $ bet and P bet, respectively, and c stands for
“chosen over.”
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Table 1.6: Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (1989)
Results of Experiments 1 & 2
Pattern of choice
$ $ $ $† P ∗ P P P
$ $ C C† $∗ $ C C
Triple Subsample n C P C P † C∗ P C P
Experiment 1
$t, Pt, 2.50(C) A 71 2 9 1 1 3 27 19 9
$t, Pt, 3.50(C) B 70 1 4 1 2 12 15 32 3
$t, Pt, 4.50(C) C 72 1 4 4 0 7 6 44 6
$t, Pt, 5.50(C) D 70 5 4 4 0 4 4 50 2
Total 283 9 21 10 3 26 40 145 20
Experiment 2
$2, P2, 2.25(C) E 60 14 17 3 1 7 8 8 2
$2, P2, 3.75(C) E 60 17 8 10 0 8 4 13 0
$2, P3, 2.25(C) E 60 7 22 0 1 2 15 9 4
$2, P3, 3.75(C) E 60 7 18 3 2 7 5 14 4
$2, P2, 3.00(C) F 60 19 11 3 2 11 1 9 4
$2, P2, 4.50(C) F 60 20 3 11 1 6 0 18 1
$2, P3, 3.00(C) F 60 9 21 2 1 2 10 7 8
$2, P3, 4.50(C) F 60 17 5 7 4 6 1 14 6
* indicates the “predicted” preference reversal
† indicates the “unpredicted” preference reversal
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Table 1.7: Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (1989)
Results of Experiment 3
$ c
P
$ c
P
$ c
P
$ c
P
$ c
P
$ c
P
Actions Subsample n $ c
P
$ c
P
$ c
P
$ c
P
$ c
P
$ c
P
Group 1 “Standard” Design: Choice and Valuations
$3, P4 G1 31 4(3) 0(0) 5(2) 11(11) 3(3) 8(6)
$4, P5 H1 31 14(11) 1(1) 5(1) 6(6) 2(1) 3(2)
$5, P6 I1 31 10(9) 2(1) 5(4) 11(10) 0(0) 3(3)
Total 93 28(23) 3(2) 15(7) 28(25) 5(4) 14(11)
Pattern of choice
$ $ $ $† P ∗ P P P
$ $ C C† $∗ $ C C
Triple Subsample n C P C P † C∗ P C P
Group 1 “Standard” Design: Imputed Choice and Valuations
$3, P4, 4.5 G1 31 1 1 5 1 2.75 6.75 10.25 2.25
$4, P5, 4.5 H1 31 4 4.5 10.5 1 3 2 5 1
$5, P6, 4.5 I1 31 4 3.5 6.5 3 6 2.5 5 0.5
Total 93 9 9 22 6 11.75 11.25 20.25 3.75
Group 2 “Choice-Only” Design: Imputed Choice and Valuations
$3, P4, 4.5 G2 31 2 0 4 0 4 2 12 7
$4, P5, 4.5 H2 31 10 2 3 3 6 1 6 0
$5, P6, 4.5 I2 31 3 5 8 1 4 1 8 1
Total 93 15 7 15 4 14 4 26 8
* indicates the “predicted” preference reversal
† indicates the “unpredicted” preference reversal
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In every experiment and across every subsample there were statistically signifi-
cantly more subjects displaying the “predicted” preference reversal than displaying
the “unpredicted” preference reversal, leading Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (1989)
to reject the null hypothesis of EUT in favor of the alternative of Regret Theory
for every experiment.
Regret Theory is unique in its explanation of the preference reversal phenomenon
in that, unlike the alternative proposed by Karni and Safra (1987), Regret The-
ory predicts both the preference reversal phenomenon’s existence as well as the
asymmetrical distribution between the two possible patterns of preference reversal.
1.3 Necessary Precepts for Valid Inferences
from Economic Experiments, and the
Violation of these Precepts
Smith (1982) lays out a conceptual framework for modeling microeconomic systems,
such as an economic experiment, in terms of an interactive relationship between
an environment, an institution, and agent behavior. In this framework agents send
messages to the institution which then maps those messages according to pre-set
rules into commodity outcomes. This framework provides the valuable insight
that “[. . .] agents do not choose direct commodity allocations. Agents choose
messages, and institutions determine allocations via the rules that carry messages
into allocation” [emphasis in the original] (Smith 1982, p. 926). Thus the data
which we observe from an experiment is derived from message producing behavior
which is said to be a function of the environment for that agent and the institution.
This mapping of messages into allocations does provide the experimenter with
valuable information, but only if four sufficient conditions are met for a controlled
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microeconomic experiment as discussed in Smith (1982) and Harrison (1989).
1.3.1 Salience and Potential Violations
Of the four sufficient conditions proposed by Smith (1982), the first, non-satiation,
is equivalent to the common requirement of most theories of utility that there
exists a reward mechanism such that the subject should not be satiated in it,
and should be interpreted in the same way. The second and third are of primary
importance in an experiment attempting to elicit what Smith refers to as “home-
grown” preferences; preferences that are not induced by the experimenter in a
laboratory, but instead are the subject’s own latent preferences from outside the
laboratory.
The second sufficient condition is Saliency. Smith (1982, p. 931) defines this as
the condition according to which “Individuals are guaranteed the right to claim
a reward which is increasing (decreasing) in the goods (bads) outcomes, xi, of an
experiment.” Harrison (1994, p. 223) notes that the above definition combined with
the non-satiation requirement leads to a mapping of a message m′ to a reward v′
instead of m′′ that maps into v′′, whenever v′ > v′′. This has also been interpreted
by Bruner (2011) to mean that the manner in which messages are mapped to
rewards by the institution is understood by the subject, even if it is stochastic,
otherwise there exists an institutional failure to induce values. In the syntax of
Smith (1982):
I i =
(
M i, hi(m), ci(m), gi(t0, t, T )
)
≡ I ip =
(
M ip, h
i
p(m), cip(m), gip(t0, t, T )
)
(1.16)
where I represents the property rights of agent i, and the subscript p on the right
side of the equality indicates the perceived property rights of agent i. M represents
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the language imposed by the institution, i.e. the set of all messages that can be
sent, h represents the process which maps messages to rewards, c represents the
processes which maps messages to costs, and g is the governing process which
indicates at which point events, including the elicitation of messages, will occur
from the beginning of the experiment, t0, to the end of the experiment, T .
Should any of the elements of I ip not be equivalent to their corresponding
element in I i, subjects may believe that they are guaranteed the right to claim a
reward which differs from the reward that will be granted by the institution given
their message. Or in the Harrison (1994) definition, it could lead to a message m′′
mapping to v′′ when v′ > v′′ due to the subject believing that m′′ maps to v′ or
that v′′ > v′.
An example of this apparent mis-mapping of messages and rewards could be
that a simple lack of understanding by the agents about their own property rights
leads to a lack of salience. The degree to which the equivalence of equation (1.16)
holds could depend on both the complexity of the property right endowment
and the ability of the agent to comprehend her own endowment. Various tax
incentives, for instance, endow a proportion of a population with potentially large
savings via a tax credit or deduction conditional on citizens behaving in a certain
way. However, these incentives may be too complex to comprehend and thus do
not motivate citizens to make the choices that the policy intended even if the
citizens would otherwise be willing. Cason and Plott (2014, p. 1237) report an
experiment which describes how the complexity of the BDM mechanism results
in potentially misreported preferences: “If the individual fails to understand the
connection between acts and outcomes, the choice of acts can be misleading about
the preferences over outcomes. In such cases, choice cannot be equated with
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preference over consequences.”
A more complex way in which the equivalence of equation (1.16) would fail
is a fundamental mistrust of the experimenter. That is, the subject may fully
understand the institution’s communication of the elements of the property right
endowment, but doesn’t believe that the institution will uphold these rights. This
in a way alludes to one of the experimental theories proposed by Grether and
Plott (1979, p. 629), that a potential cause of preference reversals in experiments
conducted by psychologists was that subjects were in experiments conducted by
psychologists: “Subjects nearly always speculate about the purposes of experiments
and psychologists have the reputation for deceiving subjects. It is also well known
that subjects’ choices are often influenced by what they perceive to be the purpose
of the experiment.”
Economic experiments designed to incentivize subjects to reveal their preferences
generally rely on the assumption that the subject views the experimenter to be
indifferent to the outcome of the experiment. Schneeweiss (1973) explores this
view as a alternative explanation of the Ellsberg (1961) paradox critique of the
axioms of Savage (1954). The subjects of the Ellsberg (1961) experiments, rather
than adopting different preferences for events which were “ambiguous” as opposed
to simply uncertain, could view the experiment as a zero-sum two-person game
between the experimenter and themselves. Schneeweiss (1973) shows that if the
subjects assume that the experimenter strategically wants to minimize the expected
payout to subjects, the seemingly paradoxical behavior of the subjects can be
explained as game theoretic optimal choice behavior.
Kadane (1992) also notes that if subjects in experiments are skeptical of the
intentions of the experimenter, then the seemingly paradoxical behavior described
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in Ellsberg (1961) and Allais (1953) can be explained as a rational response to
the possibility of being cheated. It can be shown that should the agent assign any
positive probability to the possibility of the experimenter selecting an outcome
that would lead to the lowest expected payout given the subject’s choice, both
“paradoxes” fail to violate the axioms of Savage (1954).
Though both the above examples require subjects to assume a profit maximizing
experimenter, an agent does not need to believe the experimenter has selfish
interests for there to be a disconnect between the property rights, as perceived
by the agent, and the property rights intended to be induced by the institution.
Harrison and Johnson (2006, p. 178) note that in experiments attempting to describe
behavior“variously labeled ‘cooperation,’ ‘altruism,’ ‘reciprocity’ or ‘confusion’,”
the experimental methods used are often confounded by the manner in which the
experimenter deals with the “residual” money left on the table after the experiment
is over. If subjects incorporate the residual claimant into their preference structure,
subjects displaying “altruistic” behavior may in fact be attempting to manipulate
the residual to the claimant.
In the bulk of these kinds of experiments the experimenter is the implied
residual claimant, though not always. Harrison and Johnson (2006) conducted
an experiment utilizing the popular “Dictator” game with four treatments which
allowed for variation in both the “peasant” (the recipient of the money from the
Dictator) and in the recipient of the residual funds. In treatment “O,” the “peasant”
was another subject paired with the Dictator, and in treatment “C,” the “peasant”
was an unspecified charity. In both treatments O and C the residual claimant was
implied to be the experimenter (nothing specific was said about the recipient of
the residual funds in the instructions to the subjects). In the “O(C)” treatment,
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the “peasant” was another subject paired with the Dictator with the residual going
to an unspecified charity, while in the “C(O)” treatment the “peasant” was an
unspecified charity with the residual going to another subject randomly selected
at the end of the experiment.
Harrison and Johnson (2006, p. 196) find greater giving to the “peasant” in
the C treatment compared to the O treatment, a greater giving to the “peasant”
in the C(O) treatment compared to the C treatment, and a reduction in giving
to the “peasant” in the O(C) treatment compared to the O treatment. Each of
these differences was statistically different from zero. These results imply that
the subjects in this experiment preferred money from the experiment to go to
a charity more than to the experimenter, and preferred the money to go to the
experimenter more than to the other subjects. The primary importance of this
study is to demonstrate that subjects may incorporate the residual claimant of
funds of an experiment into their utility functions.
Generally, if an agent views any “third party” (be this the experimenter, a
charity, or even Nature) as another agent in the system, while the experimenter
views this “third party” as being outside of the economic system, this could
conceivably cause any element in I ip to differ from its corresponding element in I i.
Most apparent however is the potential for hi(m) 6= hpi (m).
Though the above examples require the agent to view the set of agents in a
system differently than the experimenter views the set of agents, this isn’t necessary
for the agent to believe the institution will not uphold the agent’s property right
as endowed. For instance, the agent may believe she has superior knowledge of
the mechanism which maps messages to rewards thus causing hi(m) 6= hpi (m). In
many experiments, subjects are asked to make a choice between lotteries, with their
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chosen lottery being played out for a real reward. The mechanism used to select
the outcome of a lottery is almost always some physical device, such as a coin flip,
a dice roll, or a bingo cage, the physics of which may be well known by the subject
to result in certain outcomes with different likelihoods than the institution suggests;
the outcome of flipping a US quarter is not precisely a 50/50 gamble between heads
and tails for instance. In this instance, the choice between lotteries is the message,
the outcome of the lottery is the reward, and the mechanism which selects the
outcome of the lottery selected is the mechanism which maps the message to the
reward. Asymmetrical beliefs about the reward mechanism can lead to a failure to
induce salience as hi(m) 6= hpi (m).
Should either the subject or the experimenter not understand the other or should
the subject mistrust the institution, there can be a failure of salience. However,
the latter can be said to be the result of a certain preference structure,1 while the
former is usually an experimental artifact. The institution could fail to properly
communicate the endowed property rights, there could be a lack of technical ability
on behalf of the subject to comprehend her property rights as endowed, or the
actual institutional endowment could be misspecified by the experimenter when
observing messages, for instance, by ignoring an agent’s perception of additional
agents.
Both misunderstanding and mistrust could potentially affect the messaging
behavior of subjects in an experiment. In the syntax of Smith (1982), the degree of
(mis)understanding could be reflected by the technology element, T i, of equation
(1.17) below, while mistrust would be reflected in the utility element, ui, of equa-
1For instance, the greater the potential loss to the experimenter (or gain to the agent), the
more the agent may prefer to discount fortuitous events and overweight bad events. This could
be interpreted as mistrust being a determinant of the probability weighting function in RDU.
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tion (1.17) below. Both elements ultimately shape the behavioral process which
determines messages, defined in equation (1.18):
ei = (ui, T i, ωi) (1.17)
mi ' βi(ei|I) (1.18)
In equations (1.17) and (1.18), ei is called the environment of agent i which
is determined by the agents’ utility structure, ui, technology endowment, T i,
and wealth endowment, ωi. An agent’s behavior, βi, then maps the subject’s
environment conditional on the institutionally granted property right, I, to the
message space, mi. It is this message space which is observed by the institution
and ultimately mapped to a reward.
These two ideas are of course not the only ways in which salience could be
experimentally violated. A much used experimental method is that of asking
subjects for responses to hypothetical questions. There is a general disagreement,
even a “gentle aggression,”2 between experimental economists and experimental
psychologists about the use of hypothetical rewards and whether a subject’s intrinsic
motivation to complete a task proficiently is sufficient to produce a salient mapping
of messages to rewards in an experiment.
Grether and Plott (1979, p. 624) state their case against the use of hypothetical
rewards in exploring economic theory: “No attempt is made to expand the theory
to cover choices from options which yield consequences of no importance.[. . .]
Thus the results of experiments where subjects may be bored, playing games, or
otherwise not motivated, present no immediate challenges to theory.” This is later
2This is how Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) characterize the methodological critique by Smith
(1982) of both experimental economics and experimental psychology.
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discussed specifically in the context of using of imaginary money as a means to
provide salience.
Camerer and Hogarth (1999, p. 31) note that from 1970-97 not a single experi-
mental study was published in the American Economic Review in which all subjects
face only hypothetical rewards, indicating that economists are typically hostile to
the idea of intrinsic motivation being sufficient to produce saliency. Camerer and
Hogarth (1999) show in their analysis of a non-random sample of the experimental
literature that increasing financial incentives from zero to positive but low stakes
typically improves performance over some domain of experimental tasks, in partic-
ular tasks which are effort-responsive like judgment, problem-solving, or clerical
tasks, but they find that increasing stakes from some low level to a relatively higher
level does little to improve performance and sometimes hinders it. With respect
to tasks for which there is no normative level of performance to be measured,
such as games, auctions or choices between risky lotteries as in the Grether and
Plott (1979) experiments, Camerer and Hogarth (1999, p. 34) state tha“the most
typical result is that incentives do not affect mean performance, but incentives
often reduce variance in responses.” A reduction of variance in responses could
lead to a reduction in apparent violations of EUT such as the preference reversals
of Grether and Plott (1979).
Camerer and Hogarth (1999, p. 8) state however, that “The extreme positions,
that [material] incentives make no difference at all, or always eliminate persistent
irrationalities, are false,” and in no uncertain terms state “There is no replicated
study in which a theory of rational choice was rejected at low stakes in favor or of
a well-specified behavioral alternative, and accepted at high stakes [. . .] and nothing
in any sensible understanding of human psychology suggests that it would [be].”
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[emphasis in the original] (1999, pp. 33-34). This echoes earlier statements by
Smith and Walker (1993, p. 246) that “[. . .] rewards matter, and that neither of
the polar views - only reward matters, or reward does not matter - are sustainable
across the range of experimental economics” and that this view is “common sense.”
Should a subject have no intrinsic motivation to respond to a task but values
money, the introduction of monetary rewards for responses can potentially induce
saliency by changing the mapping of messages from non-valued hypothetical rewards
to valued monetary rewards. If a subject does have some degree of intrinsic
motivation to respond to a task “correctly” but also values money, the introduction
of monetary rewards for responses can potentially make the gross reward of sending
a certain message “dominate” the subjective costs of sending that message when
intrinsic motivation alone wouldn’t have sufficed.
1.3.2 Dominance and Potential Violations
Dominance is the third necessary precept for conducting a valid experiment pro-
posed by Smith (1982) and elaborated on by Harrison (1989, 1992). Smith (1982,
p. 934) defines dominance as selecting rewards such that “The reward structure
dominates any subjective costs (or values) associated with participation in the
activities of an experiment.” Harrison (1992, p. 1426) refines this definition and
states that dominance “requires that the reward of sending a message corresponding
to a null hypothesis be ‘perceptibly and motivationally greater’ than the reward of
sending an alternative hypothesis.”
If the messages corresponding to the null and alternative hypotheses are m0 and
ma, respectively, then dominance requires that the values associated with sending
each of these messages, v0 and va respectively, be such that v0 > va + δ, where δ
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is the subjective cost to the agent of sending message m0 instead of message ma
(Harrison 1992, p. 1427). This concept is illustrated in Figure (1.1a) below from
Harrison (1992, p. 1427):
Figure 1.1: Flat Maximum Critique - Harrison (1992)
(a) (b)
The potential experiments in Figure (1.1a) have been constructed such that the
value to the subject of sending the message corresponding to the null hypothesis
is equivalent for both experiments. However, only Experiment B has a value
associated with sending the alternative hypothesis that is less than v0 − δ. Thus
only Experiment B satisfies dominance for this particular set of null and alternative
hypotheses.
The difference between salience and dominance in the reward medium is obvious
in this example: the subject does in fact value the medium and is not satiated in
the medium that is being returned to her for sending messages m0 and ma in both
experiments, satisfying salience. But, only in Experiment B is there a sufficient
difference in her valuation of the reward medium from sending m0 instead of ma
for her to send the message m0 instead of ma.
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It is easy to extend this idea to a scenario in which one or more composite
alternative hypotheses are being tested against a single point-null hypothesis. In
this case there exists a set of messages “close” to m0, m, which provide rewards
that are not sufficiently different from v0 to warrant sending m0. Similarly there
will be a set of messages “far” enough from m0, mˆ, such that the value of sending
any of these messages is sufficiently different from v0 that the subject would be
motivated to send messages from the set of m0 instead of mˆ. This can be seen in
of Figure (1.1b) from Harrison (1992) above.
There is no reason to believe that δ shouldn’t vary from subject to subject
or from task to task. Looking at Figure (1.1a), Experiment B clearly satisfies
dominance for the subject in question and the task requiring the sending of either
m0 or ma, but a different subject might have a larger subjective cost of sending
m0 instead of ma making vBa > v0− δ and causing a failure of dominance. Looking
at Figure (1.1b), the set of messages in mˆ correspond to those messages which
provide rewards which are valued sufficiently differently from m0 to dominate the
subjective cost of sending message m0, but it cannot be said that any message in
mˆ satisfies dominance for any message in m¯.
Harrison (1989) argues that if message m0 is the optimal choice for a subject
conforming to EUT in a particular experiment, an observance of the choice of
ma is only relevant as a critique of EUT if dominance is satisfied for that task.
Harrison (1994) replicated the experiments ofGrether and Plott (1979) with only
minor differences and observed roughly the same proportion of subjects displaying
the apparent preference reversal phenomenon. However, assuming the subject
correctly reported their direct preference for either the P bet of the $ bet, but
mis-reported their true selling price with the BDM mechanism, the difference in
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expected income for a subject of displaying a preference reversal versus the expected
income if they have reported a consistent selling price averaged only $0.006. For
such a small value of v0 − va “one must nihilistically insist that subjects have a
sufficiently low threshold δ, perhaps even claiming δ = 0, in order to conclude that
such observations allow one to reject the null hypothesis”(Harrison 1992, p. 1428).
Harrison (1994, p. 237) concludes“that the subjects in these preference reversal
experiments had virtually no incentive to behave any more consistently than they
did.”
1.4 Holt and Laury (2002) Multiple Price List
and Apparent Inconsistencies
The preference reversal phenomenon of Grether and Plott (1979) is not the only
instance of apparent violations of EUT to be replicated by experimentalists. The
Ellsberg (1961) paradox is a popular early example of an apparent violation of
EUT, as well as repeated over-bidding with respect to the Nash predicted bids in
laboratory auctions by Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982), Cox, Smith and Walker
(1983a,b, 1988).
Cox, Smith and Walker (1985, p. 160) and Harrison (1989, p. 749) both note
that this overbidding behavior is consistent with risk-averse subjects, but that
the bid deviations are too heterogeneous to be consistent with subjects who are
uniformly risk-averse. Cox, Smith and Walker (1985) conduct an experiment which
attempts to test for heterogeneous risk preferences of subjects and conclude that
their experiments provide “evidence against the compound lottery axiom of EUT”
(Cox, Smith and Walker 1985, p. 165). Harrison (1989), though accepting that
deviations in bids from Nash predicted outcomes could be caused by risk-averse
37
subjects, argues that the experiments performed did not meet the dominance
criteria for a valid experiment. Thus, the (empirical) question of the degree of
heterogeneity in risk preferences among subjects and its influence on bidding
behavior remains unanswered.
Hey and Orme (1994, p. 1291) note that the “experimentally observed violations
of expected utility theory (EUT) have stimulated a deluge of generalized preference
functions, almost all containing EUT as a special case.” Hey and Orme (1994)
conduct a series of experiments on 80 subjects requiring the subjects to state their
preference for one lottery across each of 100 lottery pairs to test if subjects conform
to EUT (or the “Dual Theory” of Yaari (1987)) in favor of risk-neutrality, and
whether subjects conform to any of 8 various generalizations of EUT in favor of
EUT. They report substantial evidence against risk-neutrality, and it is clear from
their dataset that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in subjects deviating from
risk neutrality. Hey and Orme (1994, p. 1322) state that “we are tempted to
conclude by saying that our study indicates that behavior can be reasonably well
modeled [. . .] as ‘EU plus noise.’”
Holt and Laury (2002, p. 1644) note that bidding behavior in auctions can be
used to elicit risk attitudes and that the over-bidding with respect to the Nash
predicted outcomes had been attributed to risk aversion. They propose using a
multiple price list (MPL) as a tool for experimentalists to control for individual
heterogeneity in risk preferences and conduct an experiment to test whether the
extent of risk aversion in subjects is dependent on the stakes of the tasks with
which the subjects are presented.
The MPL has been widely used to elicit “homegrown” preferences for risk for
several decades. The earliest use of the MPL method is considered to be Miller,
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Meyer and Lanzetta (1969), but Binswanger (1980, 1981) is regarded as the first
experimental economist to identify risk attitudes using an MPL with real payoffs.
The MPL was further developed by Schubert, Brown, Gysler and Brachinger (1999)
and Holt and Laury (2002).
The instrument employed by HL requires subjects to make a series of binary
choices between two lotteries, A and B, across ten lottery pairs. The instrument
used in the “low-stakes” treatment of HL is as follows:
Table 1.8: Holt and Laury (2002)
The Ten Paired Lottery-Choice Decisions with Low Payoffs
Row # Option A Option B Expected PayoffDifference
1 1/10 of $2.00, 9/10 of $1.60 1/10 of $3.85, 9/10 of $0.10 $1.17
2 2/10 of $2.00, 8/10 of $1.60 2/10 of $3.85, 8/10 of $0.10 $0.83
3 3/10 of $2.00, 7/10 of $1.60 3/10 of $3.85, 7/10 of $0.10 $0.50
4 4/10 of $2.00, 6/10 of $1.60 4/10 of $3.85, 6/10 of $0.10 $0.16
5 5/10 of $2.00, 5/10 of $1.60 5/10 of $3.85, 5/10 of $0.10 -$0.18
6 6/10 of $2.00, 4/10 of $1.60 6/10 of $3.85, 4/10 of $0.10 -$0.51
7 7/10 of $2.00, 3/10 of $1.60 7/10 of $3.85, 3/10 of $0.10 -$0.85
8 8/10 of $2.00, 2/10 of $1.60 8/10 of $3.85, 2/10 of $0.10 -$1.18
9 9/10 of $2.00, 1/10 of $1.60 9/10 of $3.85, 1/10 of $0.10 -$1.52
10 10/10 of $2.00, 0/10 of $1.60 10/10 of $3.85, 0/10 of $0.10 -$1.85
The logic of the HL MPL is straightforward. In all ten lottery pairs, the
monetary outcomes of all A lotteries are the same, and similarly with the B
lotteries. Every lottery is comprised of two possible outcomes, with the higher
outcome in the B lotteries being greater than the higher outcome in the A lotteries,
and the lower outcome in the B lotteries being less than the lower outcome in
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the A lotteries. The probability of receiving these outcomes changes from pair
to pair. At the top of the list, the probability of receiving the high amount from
each lottery is only 0.1, while the probability of receiving the lower amount is 0.9.
Moving from the top to the bottom of the list, the probability of receiving the
higher amount in each lottery increases by 0.1 for each row until at the bottom
of the list, row 10, the probability of receiving the higher amount is equal to 1,
collapsing the decision to a choice between two certain outcomes.
If a subject has strictly monotonic utility for money, an EUT maximizer should
either prefer option A initially and then working down the rows eventually prefer
option B for the remaining rows, or the subject should prefer B for all rows.
However, it is often observed that subjects will “switch” back and forth between
selecting lottery A and selecting lottery B. This is commonly called “multiple
switching behavior” (MSB) (Bruner 2011). Data displaying MSB has often been
described as “inconsistent” with an EUT maximization. Holt and Laury (2002,
p. 1645) describes a subject switching once from A to B when the B lottery becomes
sufficiently attractive as what a risk averse subject “should” do in the HL MPL,
implying that MSB is contrary to theory.
Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2007, p. 347) note that a subject could be indif-
ferent between the lotteries of certain pairs, which would explain why a subject
displayed MSB. In fact, under EUT with a deterministic theory of choice specifica-
tion and some mild assumptions, a subject displaying MSB must be indifferent to
the lotteries in lottery pairs between the first switch and the last switch. This is
shown in Appendix A. Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2007) conduct an experiment
in which some subjects are offered an “indifferent” option and note that the propor-
tion of subjects who are not offered the indifference option expressing MSB almost
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equals the proportion of subjects offered the indifference option selecting the indif-
ference option. While this is very suggestive that MSB is caused by indifference, it
should be noted that the indifference option was played out by the experimenter
randomly selecting either option A or option B for payment. The selection of the
indifference option could therefore represent a preference for a compound lottery
of A and B, and not indifference between A and B.
Choosing option A in row 10 is also an apparent violation of EUT that is not
so easily believed to be caused by indifference. Since there is no uncertainty in the
outcomes of either lottery A or lottery B, a choice of A apparently violates the
axiom of monotonicity. It is possible that a subject who chooses A in row 10 has a
very good motivation to do so, perhaps because of some influence from outside of
the experiment, and could potentially still be making choices in accordance with
EUT. As noted by Smith (1982, p. 930): “It is hard to find an experimentalist who
regards anything as self evident, including the proposition that people prefer more
money to less.” This is mentioned merely as a caveat applied to proclaiming a
general absence of rationality on the part of the subjects making such choices. It is
more believable that such subjects are making a mistake in choosing A in row ten.
The extent of this type of behavior in economic experiments is not entirely clear.
Experimental procedures often vary from experimenter to experimenter and form
experiment to experiment. For instance, Holt and Laury (2002) note that some
subjects “crossed out and changed” their responses to choices near their switch
point. If the experimental design hadn’t allowed subjects to change their responses,
or if the design made it cumbersome to do so, then there might have been more
observed “inconsistent” responses than reported.
While many experimenters report the number or proportion of subjects switch-
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ing multiple times, some experimenters exclude subjects who display this behavior
from their analysis or only report the number of “safe” choices (the lottery A
choices). Holt and Laury (2002, p. 1648) tested an analysis without the“inconsis-
tent” subjects but note that “The average number of safe choices increases slightly
in some treatments when we restrict our attention to those who never switch back,
but typically by less than 0.2 choices” and ultimately left “inconsistent” subjects
in their final analysis. When experimenters only report safe choices, they often
don’t discriminate between subjects who switched once or multiple times or if one
of those “safe” choices was a choice of A in row 10. However, if 10 safe choices are
reported, then clearly one of them was a choice of lottery A in row 10.
Filippin and Crosetto (2016, p. 9) collected datasets of 54 published replications
of HL to examine gender differences in estimates for risk attitudes. Filippin and
Crosetto (2016, pp. 10-11, 17-18) also briefly discuss the number of “inconsistent”
subjects in the aggregated dataset they collected. Their Tables 4 and 7 are combined
and reproduced in Table 1.9.
Table 1.9 shows to some extent the potential reporting bias of “inconsistent”
behavior in experiments. Of the 6707 subjects, there was insufficient data to
tell if any type of “inconsistent” behavior occurred with 772 subjects, those with
“Summary” detail, and a further 699 subjects in which it was only possible to
tell if there was an apparent violation of monotonicity, those with “Partial” detail
and only reporting the number of safe choices. About 21.5% of the data reports
insufficient information to determine the extent of inconsistent behavior.
In the first part of Table 1.9, if we consider only the “Full” detail data and the
“Partial” detail data which indicates whether or not subjects were “consistent,”
there were 1075 out of 5236 subjects who displayed some sort of inconsistency,
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Table 1.9: Filippin and Crosetto (2016)
Prevalence and Type of “Inconsistent” Behavior
Detail Consistent Subjects Inconsistent Subjects
Males Females Total Males Females Total
Microdata Full 2119 2205 4324 411 502 913
# of safe choices + consistency Partial 504 408 912 64 98 162
# of safe choices only 375 324 699 3 1 4
Summary Statistics Summary 413 359 772
Total 3411 3296 6707 478 601 1079
Inconsistent Choices % Inconsistent Subjects
Number Out Of Males Females Total
Multiple or inverse switching 703 6825 8.8 11.8 10.3
Dominated choices 102 6882 1.8 1.2 1.5
Switch and dominated 270 6825 3.6 4.3 4.0
Total 1075 14.1 17.3 15.8
about 20.5% of subjects. Holt and Laury (2002, p. 1647) reported 28 of 212 (13.2%)
of their subjects exhibited MSB.
While this is not as substantial a proportion of subjects acting in apparent
violation of EUT as in the Grether and Plott (1979) preference reversal phenomenon,
it is not a trivial proportion. Additionally most of the potential explanations for the
preference reversal phenomenon proposed by Grether and Plott (1979) should be
considered resolved given the many replications of HL. Almost all of the proposed
experimental method explanations can be generally rejected: the observance of
this behavior is not a low frequency event, nor are sample sizes small; most of
the subjects in these experiments (including all of the original HL subjects) were
either university students or faculty who can hardly be considered unsophisticated
subjects; almost all the experimenters were economists. The question of confusion
or misunderstanding, however, remains open, along with many of the theoretical
critiques.
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Two of the theoretical critiques of the Grether and Plott (1979) experiments
deserve particular note. In the HL experiments, subjects were presented with
several MPLs and were told that one of their responses would be chosen at random
and played out for real earnings. Most experimenters take advantage of this “pay
one” mechanism in order to increase the stakes for each individual question without
breaking their budget. This “pay one” mechanism, however, requires that an
independence axiom hold over for a pattern of choices, with a single switch point
as a condition for utility maximization across all preferences. This is no different
from the critique noted by Holt (1986) and Karni and Safra (1987) that should a
subject have preferences which are in line with RDU, then there is no apparent
violation of economic theory by MSB.
Similarly, the use of a “pay one” mechanism may dilute the payoffs of outcomes
to the point where the difference in the value of option A versus option B fails to
satisfy the dominance criteria of Smith (1982). The HL MPL is structured in such
a way that a subject will confront a lottery pair in which she will be nearly (or
entirely) indifferent between the two options. The “pay one” mechanism decreases
the expected difference in the value of the options by in effect multiplying the
probability of each outcome in the lotteries by 0.10.
The two lottery pairs that the subject is closest to indifference over will always
be the two on either side of the switch point. If MSB is party due to a failure to
satisfy dominance, it should occur with greater frequency near this point. Holt and
Laury (2002, p. 1648) comment that “Even for those who switched back and forth,
there is typically a clear division point between clusters of A and B choices, with
few ’errors’ on each side” and that responses that were crossed out and changed
generally were around the switch point (2002, p. 1646). Holt and Laury (2002,
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pp. 1647-1648) further note that the rate of MSB was lowest for their high stakes
treatments and highest for their hypothetical stakes treatment. The way the
instrument is built and the frequency of MSB across different treatments suggest
that a failure of dominance may be a large factor in explaining the frequency of
MSB.
While it may be more believable that dominance is at play for MSB than the non-
monotonic choice of lottery A in row 10, dominance failure shouldn’t be ruled out
a priori for non-monotonic choices. Take for example, a choice between $0.01 and
$0.02. Even if the outcomes of both options are guaranteed, the value difference is
likely to be very small, and thus more likely to fail the dominance criteria. Similarly,
because of the “pay one” mechanism, the expected cost of choosing A in row 10 of
the HL MPL is only $0.185. This may be high in comparison to the cost associated
with the generally observed MSB, but it is not unfathomably high.
A failure to induce salience could also help explain some “inconsistent” choices.
If subjects don’t comprehend the two-part payment mechanism (selecting one
lottery from the list for payment, then playing the lottery out to determine the
reward), or more generally how the probabilities associated with outcomes are
mapped to (presumably valued) monetary rewards, then there is a failure to induce
salience. A failure to induce salience seems less likely than a failure of dominance
when explaining MSB given that most MSB is clustered around what could be
called a “true” switching point and that the remaining choices seem “consistent”
with a salient reward mechanism. It does, however, seem more likely that there is
a failure of salience for subject who selected lottery A in row 10.
45
1.5 Stochastic Choice as an Explanation of
“Inconsistent” Choices
It is easy to imagine the theoretical possibility that a subject’s preference ordering
among a set of alternatives is mapped perfectly without error to the messages which
will realize the optimal outcome for that subject. In this case, the various models
make specific predictions as to which elements belong in the chosen set given any
set of preferences consistent with that model in question. Any occurrence of some
alternative within the chosen set which isn’t predicted is therefore an apparent
violation of the utility theory in question given this mapping assumption. As
has been discussed with respect to the Grether and Plott (1979) and Holt and
Laury (2002) replications, the mass of empirical data collected over the past few
decades has shown that such apparent violations are common, and that there is a
need to “attempt to modify the theory to account for [these] exception[s] without
simultaneously making the theory vacuous” Grether and Plott (1979, p. 634). Such
a modification that potentially explains observed choices of subjects which appear
to be inconsistent with some predetermined utility theory is that observed choices
by subjects are a product of a choice process that is at least in part stochastic, and
not wholly deterministic.
The first description of choice as a stochastic process appears to be by Edwards
(1954), with notable early contributions by Luce (1958), Debreu (1958), Davidson
and Marschak (1959), Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1963), Luce and Suppes
(1965). Stochastic choice models add elements of randomness to utility models,
which allow for a degree of error during the evaluation of various alternatives, a
degree of randomness of the preference relation used in the evaluation of alternatives,
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and/or randomness in the selection of an alternative to belong to the chosen set.
These stochastic models are used as complements to, rather than substitutes for,
deterministic theories of utility. As such, they generally (though not always)
seek to link deterministic preference relations, A  B, to probabilities of choice,
Pr(A) ≥ Pr(B).
There are various ways to accomplish this linking of ideas, the most common
of which are discussed by Wilcox (2008). Generally, these models fall into one of
two groups: Random Preference (RP) models, or deterministic preference with a
random error models. The most common deterministic preference with random
error models consist of Strong Utility (SU) models, Strict Utility models (a subset
of SU models), and Strong Utility’s superior derivatives Moderate Utility (MU)
models. I lump SU and MU models into the same group because although they
differ on several key points, they both implement stochasticity by assuming some
error in the evaluation of alternatives. They differ in their treatment of this error,
with SU models assuming it is homoscedastic and MU models requiring it to be
heteroscedastic in a particular fashion over the domain of potential outcomes. RP
models differ from the rest of these by imposing randomness in the preference
relation used to evaluate the alternatives.
A notable third group, with only one member I am aware of, could be considered
deterministic preferences with a stochastic choice strategy. The sole member model
in this group was proposed by Machina (1985) in which randomness is explained as
subjects having convex indifference curves in the Machina Triangle space, Machina
(1987), and seeking mixtures of alternative lotteries in order to maximize a deter-
ministic preference. The stochastic mixture is said to be deterministically more
preferred to any of the “pure” lottery options which make up the mixture for such
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subjects. This theory implies that there is no error in the evaluation of alternatives,
no error in the choice of the stochastic mixture, and no randomness of preferences,
while still predicting noisy observed choices. This theory however has fallen out of
favor, and Hey and Carbone (1995) provide strong experimental evidence against
it. Because of the large degree of determinant preference behavior in this model, it
is not considered in the rest of this text when discussing stochastic choice models.
Another concept called “trembles,” a term derived from the notion of a “trem-
bling hand” equilibrium developed by Selten (1975), suggests that some choices
are made completely at random with no consideration for the underlying values of
the alternatives. Trembles can be implemented by assuming that there is no error
in the evaluation of alternatives, no randomness of preferences, and that all of the
apparently inconsistent choices are mistakes. Trembles can also be imposed on top
of other stochastic models to transform the “true” choice probabilities derived from
the stochastic models into observed probabilities of choice. Because in either case
the probability of a tremble does not depend on any preference relation, trembles
will be left out of the discussion of stochastic models unless otherwise specifically
noted.
In order to discuss stochastic models in more depth, some notation will be
borrowed from Wilcox (2008). Let Sm and Rm be two lotteries in lottery pair m in
which discrete probability distributions sm0, . . . , sm(I−1) and rm0, . . . , rm(I−1) apply
respectively to a set of I outcomes in Z = {z0, . . . , z(I−1)}. Let the context of lottery
pair m, cm, be the set of outcomes in Z with non-zero probabilities applied to them
by any lottery in pair m. Assume that for any lottery pair m, z0 > . . . > z(I−1).
Finally, let P nm = Pr(ynm = 1) represent the probability that subject n chooses
lottery S in pair m, and let 1−P nm = Pr(ynm = 0) equal the probability that subject
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n chooses lottery R in pair m. It is this concept of probability of choice which is
linked to the deterministic concept of the preference relation .
With this notation in place we can define the manner in which the preference
relation is most commonly linked to a probability of choice. Assuming for now
that a subject has an EUT structure:
V (Sm|βn) ≡
I−1∑
z=0
smzu
n
z , V (Rm|βn) ≡
I−1∑
z=0
rmzu
n
z (1.19)
where unz is the utility of prize z given some elements of the vector of structural
parameters βn, and V (Xm|β) is a value function determined by properties of lottery
Xm and the vector of structural parameters. The structural parameters βn can be
the utilities of the outcomes themselves, or the determining parameters of some
parametric function of utility. Equation (1.19) can be easily transformed to be
represented by rank dependent utility with no loss of generalization. The βn vector
would simply have to additionally include parameters defining the probability
weights. Thus, for any transitive structure:
Sm n Rm ⇔ V (Sm|βn) ≥ V (Rm|βn)⇔ Pr(ynm = 1) ≥ Pr(ynm = 0) (1.20)
RP models posit that for every choice task faced by the subject, a preference
relation is drawn randomly from some distribution of preference relations and
then the subject makes a choice in accordance with the randomly drawn preference
relation. Econometrically it is possible to model choice such that once the preference
relation is drawn, further randomness is added by having the evaluation of the
alternatives involve some error process, as in SU and MU models. However, this
is almost never done. Usually subjects conforming to RP models are said to draw
the preference relation randomly from a distribution, and then make a choice
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deterministically with respect to the preference relation. Thus the probability of
choosing any lottery conditional on this randomly drawn preference is either 0 or
1:
Pr(ynm = 1|βn∗) = {0, 1} (1.21)
where βn∗ is the vector of parameters randomly drawn by subject n. Given
this relationship, the unconditional choice probability is just the probability of
observing βn∗ given some joint distribution of the elements of β, Gβ(x|αn), where
αn is a vector of parameters which defines the shape of the distribution. Let
Bm = {B|V (Sm|β) ≥ V (Rm|β)}. Then the unconditional probability that a
subject chooses lottery Sm is:
P nm =
∫
β∈B
dGβ(x|αn) (1.22)
that is, the probability of the choice is simply the probability of observing a β
vector which deterministically conforms to that choice.
The collection of SU and MU models represent preferences as stable across
choice tasks but with an error of some kind when the utilities of the lotteries are
evaluated. These models are very similar to commonly used latent variable models,
with SU models assuming that the latent variable is homoscedastic and MU models
assuming that the latent variable is heteroscedastic. Much in the same way as
a standard logit model, SU and MU models state that this latent variable, yn∗m ,
relates to the observed choice such that ynm = 1⇔ yn∗m ≥ 0, thus P nm = Pr(yn∗m ≥ 0).
The latent variable takes the form:
yn∗m = V (Sm|βn)− V (Rm|βn)−

λn
(1.23)
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where  is a random variable with a mean of 0, some standard variance and a
symmetric c.d.f F (·) where F (0) = 0.5. Together with 1
λn
, this term represents the
degree of noise in the evaluation of alternatives. Equation (1.23) is transformed
into a choice probability by applying some c.d.f F (·):
P nm = F (λn[V (Sm|βn)− V (Rm|βn)]) (1.24)
As λn approaches infinity, equation (1.24) will approach either 0 or 1, while as
λn approaches 0, equation (1.24) will approach 0.5. Should the function F (·) take
the form of the logistic c.d.f. then the choice probabilities can be calculated by:
P nm =
exp [λn × V (Sm|βn)]
exp [λn × V (Sm|βn)] + exp [λn × V (Rm|βn)] (1.25)
Because utility structures such as EUT and RDU are unique up to positive affine
transformations, λn can be any arbitrarily chosen constant and choice probabilities
would still be preference order preserving. The choice of λm is however a defining
distinction between SU and MU models. Wilcox (2008) proposes and Wilcox (2011)
expands upon a MU model called “contextual utility” (CU) model. A “context”
in this model refers to the set of outcomes in a lottery or collection of lotteries
that have non-zero probabilities. This expands equation (1.25) by setting λn to
the following:
λn = 1
λn∗
[
unm0(z)− unm(I−1)(z)
] (1.26)
where
[
unm0(z)− unm(I−1)(z)
]
is the difference in utility of the greatest utility out-
come and the least utility outcome in the context of pair m, and λn∗ can continue
to be adjusted with the same effects as λn in equation (1.24). It is this property
which makes the latent random variable defined in equation (1.23) heteroscedastic
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with respect to the context of the lottery pair. It has several appealing implications.
First and foremost, CU allows the “more risk averse than” relation derived by
Pratt (1964) for deterministic risky choice to be extended to the“stochastically
more risk averse than” (SMRA) relation across multiple contexts. Wilcox (2011,
p. 89) defines it thus: “Agent a is stochastically more risk averse than agent b [. . .]
iff P a > P b for every [mean preserving spread] pair {S, T}.” A mean preserving
spread (MPS) pair is simply a pair of lotteries with equal expected values. SU
models only allow the SMRA relation arcoss pairs that share a context, while CU
allows for this relation across contexts. Second, CU only conforms to moderate
stochastic transitivity, hence its inclusion as a MU model. This allows CU to
be descriptively more appealing as potential choice patterns which violate strong
stochastic transitivity are acceptable with moderate stochastic transitivity.
Stochastic choice models can add a great deal of traction to utility theories
which would otherwise falter when applied to apparently inconsistent choice data.
As the difference in value between any two alternatives approaches 0, the choice
probabilities of the two alternatives approach each other. The HL MPL for example
is structured in such a way to confront the subject with a list of lottery pairs in
which the lotteries get closer and closer in value before diverging in value. With a
deterministic choice process, this structure leads to a choice pattern with a single
switch point. With a stochastic choice process, a choice pattern with a single
switch point is only the most likely choice pattern for a subject with preferences in
accordance with EUT.
For any given set of preferences and a modest degree of noise, a choice pattern
displaying MSB clustered around the switch point that would be produced by
a deterministic choice process is often only marginally less likely than a choice
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pattern with one switch point. As noted previously, Holt and Laury (2002, p. 1648)
observed MSB with this kind of clustering. In this way, stochastic choice models can
explain behavior which may otherwise be taken as to imply a failure of dominance.
Also, as noted previously, when the stakes were raised in the HL experiments, the
extent of MSB was reduced. With SU models, this could be potentially explained
as the increase in stakes causing an increase in the difference in values of the two
alternative lotteries, which would lead to choice probabilities moving closer to 0
or 1. This however, is not the case with CU models which would normalize the
difference to be the same for any scaling of outcomes.
SU and MU models do incorporate an often overlooked idea about what the
choices by subjects ultimately amount to. In particular, it is often suggested, but
seldom explored, that occasionally choices by a subject must in fact be inconsistent
with the subject’s own underlying latent preferences. As stated by Holt (1986):
“Each subject must be making some error or mistake or whatever when answering
the questions.”
A choice error can be defined as the selection by a subject of an option among
a set of alternatives which does not provide the greatest utility among the set
of alternatives. More generally, to include scenarios where subjects are asked to
make multiple selections among alternatives, it is the selection by a subject of an
option among a set of alternatives which doesn’t belong to the set predicted by a
deterministic choice process and some predetermined theory of utility. As such,
errors can only arise conditional on some predetermined theory.
A choice error in this context should not be interpreted as a violation of
imposed utility theory. Any choice error requires that the manner in which the
various alternatives are evaluated and ranked be consistent with the subject’s latent
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preference structure, but in the mapping of the subject’s preference to the choice
space, some noise is introduced that leads to a sub-optimal choice.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
Economic orthodoxy over the past half century has been presented with several
challenges to the way it characterizes how an agent makes a choice between alterna-
tives in her choice set. One of these challenges in the form of experiments initially
conducted by psychologists, but later replicated by economists, spearheaded the
discussion by observing a high frequency “preference reversals” which seemingly
contradicted Expected Utility Theory. As stated by Grether and Plott (1979):
“Taken at face value the data are simply inconsistent with preference theory and
have broad implications about research priorities in economics.”
The challenge to explain the mounting apparent violations of contemporary
economic theory, however, did not go unheeded. Theorists noted that it wasn’t
necessary to forego the transitivity axiom as suggested by Grether and Plott (1979,
p. 623), which along with the completeness axiom forms the basis for what is
sometimes labelled as “rationality” in economics. Instead, it was shown by Holt
(1986) and later by Karni and Safra (1987) that should the independence axiom be
rejected, there exist preferences which conform to the observed apparent violation
of choice. The “Anticipated Utility” theory of Quiggin (1982), now referred to
as “Rank Dependent Utility,” provides an axiomization of such a theory of utility
without the independence axiom. Another departure from Expected Utility Theory
was “Regret Theory,” initially proposed independently by Bell (1982) and Loomes
and Sugden (1982), then axiomized by Fishburn (1987), which abandons the
transitivity axiom altogether. Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (1989) test this theory
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on a replication of the Grether and Plott (1979) experiments and conclude that it
fits the entire dataset better than Expected Utility Theory.
Economics as an experimental science has also progressed greatly over the
past half century, notably with Smith (1982) defining the necessary precepts of
conducting a valid controlled economic experiment Using the framework of these
precepts, Harrison (1994) addresses the Grether and Plott (1979) experiments
directly by stating that the dominance criteria put forth by Smith (1982) wasn’t
met in the original experiment and that several of the subsequent replications
which purport to address the dominance issue do not do so. Some experimental
modifications employed in replications in fact may decrease the saliency of the
rewards offered. In this line of thought, the theory is less to blame than the
experiments employed. Harrison (1994, pp. 236-239) replicated the Grether and
Plott (1979) experiments with some modifications to increase the cost of reporting
a selling price inconsistent with a subject’s own latent preferences and observed a
precipitous drop in the proportion of subjects displaying an apparent preference
reversal.
A powerful supplement to current economic theory is the idea of choice as a
stochastic processes as opposed to a deterministic one. Some stochastic models
regard apparent violations of economic theory as the result of some randomness of
latent preferences while others regard them as “mistakes” or “choice errors” from
stochastic noise in the evaluation of alternatives. Such models are powerful as they
make only very mild requirements on the structure of underlying preferences if any
at all, and create a framework for these preferences to be mapped to choices. As such
most stochastic models are equally applicable to Expected Utility Theory, Rank
Dependent Utility, or Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and
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Kahneman 1992), and can encompass and enhance the explanatory power of these
utility theories.
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Appendix - MSB as Deterministic Indifference
Lemma (1): If independence holds, and we have L0  L1 and L2  L3, then we
must also have aL0 + (1− α)L2  αL1 + (1− α)L3∀α ∈ (0, 1)
Proof. Given L0  L1 and L2  L3
αL0 + (1− α)L2  αL1 + (1− α)L2 by independence
αL1 + (1− α)L2  αL1 + (1− α)L3 by independence
αL0 + (1− α)L2  αL1 + (1− α)L2  αL1 + (1− α)L3 by transitivity of 
therefore
aL0 + (1− α)L2  αL1 + (1− α)L3
Any three rows of lottery pairs in the Grether and Plott (1979, p. 623) MPL
conform to the following
A1 = α(A0) + (1− α)A2, B1 = α(B0) + (1− α)B2 for some α ∈ (0, 1)
An example of a multiple switch from a MPL is the following:
A0  B0, B1  A1, A2  B2
A multiple switch in the MPL implies indifference between lotteries of the interior
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lottery pair:
Since A0  B0, A2  B2
then A1  B1, by Lemma (1) and reduction of compound lotteries (ROCL)
therefore A1 ∼ B1, by completeness of 
If any two lottery pairs in an MPL style instrument display preference relations in
the same direction, then every lottery pair which is a linear combination of those
two lottery pairs must have the same preference direction if we hold on to EUT
and ROCL, otherwise the subject must be indifferent.
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Chapter 2
The Normative Promise of
Stochastic Models
The recent interest in the applicability of stochastic choice models for explaining
choice behavior that seemingly violates Expected Utility Theory (EUT) has led
to a variety of calls for, and attempts to seek out, a “true” stochastic model or
combination of models which best describe observed choice behavior in experiments.
Mosteller and Nogee (1951) may be the first to conduct an experiment that mapped
choice frequencies to utility functions. Edwards (1954), who accused economics of
having become “exceedingly elaborate, mathematical, and voluminous,” continued
to call for a research effort to link choice probabilities to utility functions. He
criticized economists as “mak[ing] assumptions, and from these assumptions [. . .]
deduce[ing] theorems which presumably can be tested, though it seems unlikely
that the testing will ever occur.”(1954, p. 380) and proposed that individuals may
make choices stochastically as opposed to deterministically, which married some of
the extent findings of psychology at the time with economics to help explain the
data.
A more recent call to study stochastic models was issued by Hey and Orme
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(1994, p. 1321) after they conducted rigorous subject-by-subject tests of some of
the popular proposed alternatives to EUT, alongside EUT. They conclude that
“possibly the overriding feature of our analysis is the importance of error [. . .]
Perhaps we should now spend some time on thinking about the noise, rather than
about even more alternatives to EU?” A wealth of stochastic models has resulted
from economists and psychologists taking up the project proposed by Hey and Orme
(1994). This chapter describes the results of this effort and introduces discussion
of the normative promise of some of these models.
2.1 The Specification of Stochastic Models
I begin by distinguishing three classes of stochastic models. Hey and Orme (1994,
p. 1301) proposed a model which incorporates a random error term into the
evaluation of lotteries by subjects. The roots of this type of model date back to
Fechner (1966) and Luce (1959), which has subsequently been called a “Strong
Utility” (SU) or “Fechnerian” model. There are, however, a large number of models
that have been derived from the SU model, and so I will refer generally to this
class of models as “Random Error” (RE) models. Harless and Camerer (1994)
had undertaken their own analysis of various alternatives to EUT and suggested a
stochastic model which allows for subjects to potentially disregard their underlying
preferences and choose between the available options with equal probability. The
models in this class are called the “Constant Error” or “Tremble” (TR) models.
Loomes and Sugden (1995) reconsidered and generalized a model initially proposed
by Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1963) called the “Random Preference” (RP)
model which, in its most popular form, allows for subjects to have some distribution
of preference relations from which they randomly choose every time they evaluate a
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choice situation. Generally, any model that calls for an agent to have a distribution
of preference relations belongs to the RP class.1
A less popular class of stochastic choice models proposed by Machina (1985)
and Chew, Epstein and Segal (1991), suggests that subjects have deterministic
preferences for “stochastic options” and thus deliberately engage in adding ran-
domness to their choices. That is, subjects have convex indifference curves in the
Marshack-Machina Triangle space,2 and therefore a probabilistic (linear) mixture
of two lotteries lies on a higher indifference curve than any two lines which lie on
the same curve.
Hey and Carbone (1995) tested the “stochastic options” theory of Machina
(1985) using the “Quadratic Mixture” model of Chew, Epstein and Segal (1991)
and find strong evidence against it. The model itself has some restrictive aspects
for estimation: “First, the likelihood function, although continuous everywhere, is
not smoothly so; there are kinks in the function with resulting discontinuities in the
derivatives. Second, for certain parameter sets, certain observations are impossible”
[emphasis in the original] (1995, p. 164). Out of a sample of 45 subjects, Hey and
Carbone (1995) find only 4 subjects to whom they can fit the model at all, and of
1There are other members of the RP model class that are less commonly utilized, one of
which will be discussed later. For now, when referring to the RP model, I refer to the formulation
specified by Loomes and Sugden (1995), where one preference relation is drawn per decision
situation.
2The Marshack-Machina Triangle was developed by Machina (1987) as a way to represent
the relation of lotteries with up to 3 outcomes and preferences for those lotteries. Each vertex
of the triangle represents an outcome, and any point in the triangle represents a lottery. Any
point on a vertex of the triangle represents a lottery with a 100% composition of one outcome.
Any interior point represents a lottery composed of a mixture of outcomes, with the relative
proportion of any outcome in the lottery defined by its geometric distance from its corresponding
vertex. If the independence axiom holds, a straight line between any two points in the triangle
space indicates all the lotteries amongst which the agent is indifferent. Parallel lines thus indicate
either an increase or decrease in preference. A strictly convex curve connecting 2 lottery points
represents a violation of the independence axiom.
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these 4, for only 2 does the “Quadratic Mixture” model fit better than a RE type
model, and of these 2, for only 1 subject are the estimated coefficients plausible
(1995, p. 167). Continued investigation of this class of models has largely ceased
since these and additional results by Camerer and Ho (1994).3 Keeping with this
pattern, when referring to stochastic models for the remainder of this text I do not
include this class of models in our definition.
These general classes of stochastic choice constitute the bulk of the research on
stochastic models, with the RE models possibly being the most widely employed
models when estimating utility parameters from choice data. I will begin by
defining some notation to characterize how these models operate.
For each option a in a set of alternatives t, stochastic models generate a
probability that an agent will select that option from the set. These probabilities
are referred to as “choice probabilities” and are generally related to an underlying
determinisitic relation of preference. First, I define the Rank Dependent Utility
(RDU) structure as formulated by Quiggin (1982), which nests EUT as a special
case, as the deterministic structure of preference. Second I define the manner in
which RP, TR, and RE models relate this deterministic structure to the stochastic
specification of probabilities of choice.
RDU is characterized by the following function:
RDU =
C∑
c=1
[wc(p)× u(xc)] (2.1)
where c indexes the outcomes, xc, from {1, . . . , C} with c = 1 being the smallest
3Sopher and Narramore (2000) provide the only experimental evidence I am aware of sub-
sequent to the results of Camerer and Ho (1994) that are favorable to the “stochastic options”
theory. However, this study does not employ the same kind of statistical tests as Hey and Carbone
(1995).
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outcome in the lottery and c = C being the largest outcome in the lottery, u(·)
returns the utility of its argument, wc(·) returns the decision weight applied to
outcome c given the distribution of probabilities ranked by outcome, p.
The utility function u(·) can take many functional forms due to it being unique
up to an affine transformation, and can be normalized in various was, as illustrated
by Hey and Orme (1994). It will sometimes be useful to use a specific functional
form to make certain concepts clearer, and in such cases the constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) function will be employed:
u(x) = x
(1−r)
(1− r) (2.2)
where r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (Pratt 1964). Other popular
functions such as the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) function, or the
Expo-Power function due to Saha (1993) can alternatively be employed without
loss of generality.
The decision weight function, wc(·), takes the form:
wc(p) =

ω
(
C∑
a=c
pa
)
− ω
 C∑
b=c+1
pb
 for c < C
ω(pc) for c = C
(2.3)
where the probability weighting function, ω(·), can take a variety of parametric or
non-parametric forms. Many functions have been proposed for ω(·). One is the
“Inverse-S” shaped function popularized by Tversky and Kahneman (1992):
ω(pc) =
pγc(
pγb + (1− pb)γ
) 1
γ
(2.4)
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Another is the power function used by Quiggin (1982):
ω(pc) = pγc (2.5)
The flexible function proposed by Prelec (1998) is also popular:
ω(pc) = exp(−β(− ln(pc))α) (2.6)
where α > 0 and β > 0. In all cases there exist values for the shaping parameters
which allow wc(p) = pc, the special case of EUT. When both a decision weight
function applied to probabilities and a utility function applied to outcomes are
defined, we have what is called a utility structure.
To make a general point about notation, consider lottery a with Ca = 2 possible
outcomes, and lottery b with Cb = 3 possible outcomes. Suppose that xac 6= xbc ∀c.
A lottery a∗ can be constructed with Ca∗ = Ca + Cb = 5 such that it is equivalent
to lottery a by adding the outcomes in lottery b to lottery a and setting the
probabilities associated with each of these added outcomes equal to 0. Similarly for
lottery b. This equivalence property holds for all EUT and RDU functional forms
as zero probability outcomes are given no weight in either structure. The common
set of combined outcomes is what Wilcox (2008) refers to as the choice scenario’s
“context.” Throughout this chapter, the a∗ form of lotteries will be assumed
whenever notation concerning the composition of individual lotteries is used. This
allows for identical notation to be utilized when comparing the probabilities of
ranked outcomes across lotteries.
We now define a single choice scenario or task, t, as a discrete set of A mutually
exclusive options from which a subject is asked to select one for payment. The
most common form of such a task is a binary choice problem where subjects are
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presented with 2 alternatives and asked to select one for payment, t = {X1, X2} .
Each element of t, Xa, is a vector of the option’s observable characteristics, such
as various outcomes and the associated probability of those outcomes in a lottery.
When presented with such a task, should the subject have a deterministic choice
process and preference structure, the subject is assumed to choose option a over
the alternative b if and only if the utility of option a was at least as great the utility
of option b:
yt = a ⇔ Xat < Xbt ⇔ G(βn, Xa) ≥ G(βn, Xb) (2.7)
where G(·) is some utility structure such as RDU in equation (2.1), βn is the
unobservable vector of parameters of the utility structure for subject n, such as
probability weights and utilities of outcomes, X is as defined above, and yt = a
is a function that records which option a is chosen. The function yt indicates the
chosen alternative in task t, not the option most preferred by the agent. In the
case of a stochastic choice process, yt does not necessarily indicate which option in
a set of alternatives is most preferred by the agent.
In the deterministic case presented in equation (2.7), the preference relation
< provides all the necessary conditions for the creation of a utility function G(·),
meaning it is complete, transitive, and continuous. Consequently, < provides a
complete ranking of all the available alternatives in task t. It will be convenient to
denote this ranking explicitly throughout this chapter by setting the a subscript of
option Xat equal to its ranking in task t:
X1t <n X2t <n . . . <n Xat <n . . . <n XAt (2.8)
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This allows us to rank the utility of the A options in task t likewise:
G(βn, X1t) ≥ G(βn, X2t) ≥ . . . ≥ G(βn, Xat) ≥ . . . ≥ G(βn, XAt) (2.9)
It is worth reiterating that yt indicates the option chosen in task t, while the value
of the a subscript indicates the rank of the option in terms of the agent’s preference
in task t. With yt defined and the options in task t ranked in terms of the subscript
a, we can also define the set of options in task t not selected by subject n as follows:
Z = t \ y = {z ∈ t | z /∈ y}. (2.10)
As in equation (2.9), we can set the a subscript of the A− 1 unchosen options in
Z equal to their respective rankings in Z:
G(βn, XZ1t) ≥ G(βn, XZ2t) ≥ . . . ≥ G(βn, XZat) ≥ . . . ≥ G(βn, XZ(A−1)t) (2.11)
With these base definitions in place, generalized formulations of the classes of
stochastic models can be specified. As stated above, the RP model characterizes
each observed choice made by an agent as conforming to a deterministic preference
relation which is drawn at random from a set of such relations whenever the agent
is confronted with a choice scenario. While the set preference relations can have a
discrete distribution, the RP model is most commonly discussed in terms of utility
functions with the relevant parameter vector, βn, being continuously distributed
according to some density function, Fn(β|α). In this definition, α is a vector
containing the necessary parameters to define the shape of the distribution. Thus
the probability of choice in a RP model is simply the probability that a vector β∗n
is drawn from the distribution governed by Fn(β|α) that would deterministically
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satisfy that choice:
Pr(yt = a) = Pr(a = 1) = Pr
(
β∗n |G(β∗n, Xat) ≥ G(β∗n, XZ1t)
)
(2.12)
If we let Bt =
{
β∗n |G(β∗n, Xat) ≥ G(β∗n, XZ1t)
}
, given the density function Fn(β|α):
Pr(yt = a) =
∫
β∈Bt
dFn(β|α). (2.13)
Note the implication concerning first order stochastic dominance (FOSD)4 with
the above specification. Should Xa FOSD Xb, there is no monotonic preference
relation β∗ that will allow G(β∗, Xbt) ≥ G(β∗, Xat). Thus, if we observe yt = b in
such a scenario, the RP model collapses econometrically.
RE models are consistent with a model of the latent choice process that assumes
that the utility of each option is evaluated with some error term, which is assumed
to be homoscedastic with the SU model and generally assumed to be heteroscedastic
with the derivative models of SU, but with a mean of 0 in either case. A choice
is characterized as incorporating this error. Assuming a binary choice scenario,
the error terms and utility functions must satisfy the following given the choice of
option a:
G(βn, Xat) + at ≥ G(βn, Xbt) + bt
[G(βn, Xat) + at] − [G(βn, Xbt) + bt] ≥ 0
(2.14)
Setting at − bt = tλn, where λn is proportional to the standard deviation of t,5
4Lottery a is said to FOSD lottery b iff:
∀xc,
C∑
c
pac ≥
C∑
c
pbc and ∃xc,
C∑
c
pac >
C∑
c
pbc
where c ranks the outcomes of lotteries a and b as described in equation (2.1). All deterministic
theories of utility require the dominant option to be chosen over the dominated option.
5It is useful to recognize that what is described as “noise” in the data is determined by the
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we can rewrite equation (2.14) as:
G(βn, Xat)−G(βn, Xbt) + tλn ≥ 0
t ≥ 1
λn
[G(βn, Xat) − G(βn, Xbt)]
(2.15)
Thus for RE models, the probability option a is chosen is given by:
Pr(yt = a) = Pr
(
t ≥ 1
λn
[G(βn, Xbt)−G(βn, Xat)]
)
= 1− F
(
G(βn, Xbt)−G(βn, Xat)
D(βn, Xt)λ∗n
) (2.16)
where λ∗ is a precision parameter that remains after λn is adjusted by D(βn, X)
for heteroscedastic models. As λ∗ approaches 0, choice probabilities approach 0 or
1, while as λ∗ approaches ∞, choice probabilities approach 0.5. The asterisk will
be dropped from the remaining formulae to save space. F (·) is some cumulative
distribution function (cdf) such that F (0) = 0.5 and F (x) = 1− F (−x). Usually
F (·) is taken to be either the normal or logistic function, but any distribution
function satisfying the previous conditions is acceptable. When discussing the
SU model throughout this chapter, what is referred to is the model specified in
equation (2.16) with D(βn, Xt) = 1. This results in the SU model being said to be
homoscedastic.
If utilizing the logistic function, equation (2.16) resembles a latent index model
popularly used in a variety of econometric applications, but with a non-linear
latent index. While equation (2.16) represents the common 2-option case, using
variance (or standard deviation) of the error term, not its mean. If the sign and magnitude of
the mean of the error were anything but 0, choices would reveal a biased preference, but if the
variance is sufficiently small, the choices are unlikely to reveal apparent deviations from a utility
theory.
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the logistic cdf, the RE model can be rewritten to accommodate A alternatives:
Pr(yt = a) =
exp
(
G(βn, Xat)
D(βn, Xt)λn
)
J∑
c=1
[
exp
(
G(βn, Xct)
D(βn, Xt)λn
)] (2.17)
With the TR model the “observed” probability of choice, Pr(yn = a), needs to
be distinguished from the choice probability which would be modeled should the
tremble not exist, Pr0(yn = a). The agent is said to “tremble” with probability φn
and select among the available options with equal probability, and with probability
(1− φn) select an option according to the underlying process:
Pr(yt = a) = (1− φ)Pr(yt = a) + φ
A
. (2.18)
When Harless and Camerer (1994) proposed the TR model, the underlying choice
process was made deterministic so that the option with the greatest utility has
a choice probability of 1: Pr0(yt = 1) = 1. Loomes, Moffatt and Sugden (2002)
however, proposed that Pr0(yt = a) is generated from the RP model as specified
in equation (2.13).
2.2 The Empirical Support for Stochastic
Models
The previous section provided the econometric specification of the classes of stochas-
tic models typically utilized in the literature to estimate parameters from choice
data. The choice of model to utilize however, has not been ad hoc; because each
stochastic model assigns very specific assumptions to the nature of the “noise” or
randomness in choice data, these assumptions “amount to identifying restrictions
69
which may affect the relative performance of the theories under scrutiny” (Ballinger
and Wilcox 1997, p. 1091). In much the same way as the various alternatives to
EUT were proposed and then received rigorous testing, stochastic models have also
been rigorously tested on the basis of their identifying restrictions.
Ballinger and Wilcox (1997) engaged in detailed tests of the SU and TR models,
along with various assumptions about the heterogeneity of subjects, and find
generally mixed results. The various models must be combined with somewhat
unsavory assumptions about the nature of the heterogeneity of the population to
make them statistically plausible. The TR model performs the worst, and requires
the most assumptions. Ultimately Ballinger and Wilcox (1997, p. 1104) conclude
by continuing to call for development and testing of the stochastic component of
choice.
Carbone (1997) investigates the RP model, in addition to the TR and SU
models, by estimating each model for each subject in an experiment, and finds that
the SU model performs the best of the three, with RP a close second. Carbone
(1997, p. 307) notes that if the set of alternative lotteries contains a lottery that
stochastically dominates the others, the RP model requires the subject to always
select the stochastically dominant lottery from the set, and that “this feature is of
importance as it seems to capture well the experimental evidence.” This feature of
RP models, however, presents a problem when estimating preferences from choice
data because, although violations of FOSD typically constitute a relatively small
fraction of choices observed in experiments, this small fraction is reliably replicated
in experiments.
Loomes and Sugden (1998) (LS) performed a similar investigation of the RP,
TR, and SU models and strongly reject the TR model and to a lesser extent the
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SU model. The SU model over-predicts violations of FOSD; however, they note, as
Carbone (1997) did, that even one violation of stochastic dominance in a dataset is
sufficient to cause the stand-alone RP model to collapse econometrically, and thus
LS reject the model due to the few observations where stochastic dominance was
violated. LS note, however, that the RP model can potentially accommodate these
violations if it is combined with another stochastic choice model, such as the TR
model. This point will be discussed in more detail subsequently. LS also report
systematic deviations from EUT near the edges of the Marschak-Machina triangle,6
and suggest that these cannot be fully accommodated by any of the stochastic
models. In these instances, they suggest it is EUT that fails, not the stochastic
models they consider.
Loomes, Moffatt and Sugden (2002) also test the RP, TR, and SU models.
They recognize that “[t]here is no obvious reason to assume that only one of
these forms of randomness is present” (2002, p. 106).7 When faced with a choice
situation, an agent may be best characterized as randomly drawing a preference
from some set of preferences (RP model), evaluating the choice situation given
that randomly drawn preference with some error (SU model), and then, with some
positive probability, selecting an option irrespective of the agent’s evaluation of
the choice probability (TR model). Practically, this means estimating additional
6Recall that the vertices of the Marschak-Machina triangle represent potential outcomes
in a lottery, given as a point in the triangle space. The probability of any given outcome is
proportional to the geometric distance between the point representing the lottery and the vertex
representing the outcome. Thus, if a lottery point lies on an edge of the triangle, the outcome
associated with the opposite vertex has 0 probability. If a lottery point is minimally interior
of an edge, the outcome associated with vertex opposite of the edge has a small, but positive,
probability.
7This is a point with which I only partly agree. While I agree that there isn’t an obvious
reason why some models cannot be jointly present, there is a restriction on combining stochastic
models: normative coherence. As discussed later, the RP model fails to satisfy this restriction.
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parameters and making clear the identifying restrictions of any combination of
these models, but mathematically these models are not mutually exclusive.8
Loomes, Moffatt and Sugden (2002) report that the best fitting stochastic
model was RP plus TR paired with RDU. In addition, the estimated probability
of TR diminished with the number of questions answered by the subjects, as did
apparent deviations from EUT. When pairs with one lottery that stochastically
dominates the other are removed from estimation, it is no longer clear that the RP
model is superior to the SU model. This result suggests that “trembles” can be
un-learned. Hey (2001) and Moffatt and Peters (2002) report similar results from
experiments where it appears that noise is reduced with repetition. Hey (2001)
also reports diminishing deviations from EUT with repetition.
Other than the prominent TR, SU, and RP models, there are a variety of
alternatives that receive less attention, most of which are derivatives of the SU model
with heteroscedastic error terms as opposed to the homoscedastic error of SU.9
While TR and RP models can be manipulated in different ways to possibly explain
more of the observed choice behavior,10 such attempts often leave underlying, core
problems with these models unattended to. For instance, if TR models predict that
8To illustrate the combination of RP, RE, and TR models derived in equations (2.13), (2.17),
and (2.18):
Pr(yt = a) =
φ
A
+ (1− φ)
∫
β∈Bt
Pr
(
t ≥ 1
λ
[G(βn, Xbt)−G(βn, Xat)]
∣∣β) dFn(β|α)
This model would require the estimation of α, λ and φ.
9The SU model posits an error term with a variance that is independent of the domain of
the utility function it is added to. Thus it is said to be homoscedastic. If the error term is
correlated with some part of the domain of the utility function to which it is added, it is said to
be heteroscedastic. There are many ways in which this correlation may occur, leading to a large
variety of heteroscedastic models.
10For example, trembles could apply differently to FOSD pairs and non-FOSD pairs, and RP
models could assume flexible distributions of the agent’s preferences such as the Logit-Normal or
Gamma distributions.
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with some probability choices will be made irrespective of underlying preferences,
why then should this probability vary depending on certain special cases of choice
scenarios faced by the subject? Even with flexible distributions of RP models, there
is no underlying utility theory which allows violations of FOSD, hence standard,
stand-alone RP models can never accommodate such observed violations.11 In
contrast, the ability to manipulate the error term of the SU model in a tractable
manner is part of what makes the SU model and its derivatives such popular models
of stochastic choice.
To understand the motivations for developing the differing models that are
derivatives of SU models, I briefly describe the concept of stochastic transitivity.
Borrowing from Wilcox (2008, p. 210), consider three pairs of lotteries: {C,D},
{D,E}, and {C,E}, designated pairs 1, 2, 3, respectively. P1 is the probability of
choosing C in pair 1, and P2 and P3, are the probabilities of choosing D and C
from pairs 2 and 3, respectively. We can define three forms of stochastic transitivity
as follows:
Strong Stochastic Transitivity (SST): min(P1, P2) ≥ 0.5⇒ P3 ≥ max(P1, P2)
Moderate Stochastic Transitivity (MST): min(P1, P2) ≥ 0.5⇒ P3 ≥ min(P1, P2)
Weak Stochastic Transitivity (WST): min(P1, P2) ≥ 0.5⇒ P3 ≥ 0.5
Stochastic transitivity (ST) enforces a probabilistic form of transitivity for the
same reasons that the non-stochastic transitivity axiom is employed for determin-
11However, non-standard RP models can sometimes accommodate violations of FOSD. An
example of this is a model which specifies agents as randomly drawing a new preference relation
for each option in a set of alternatives instead of randomly drawing one preference relation per
set of alternatives. I explore the implications of this type of model, which I call the Random
Preference Per Option (RPPO) model, later. For now, I will note that the RPPO model is very
rarely utilized in the literature on stochastic models.
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istic theories of choice: it is a mathematically convenient, and normatively useful
way to model the choice process of a viable economic agent. Its consequence is
that agents must make choices in a way that are at least stochastically consistent
with economic success in an incentivized environment. Each version of ST makes
descriptive and normative predictions which are operationalized by the stochastic
model that incorporates them. For each proposed model described below, a particu-
lar version of ST is utilized because of its perceived superiority, either descriptively
or normatively. The SU model, for instance, requires SST, whereas most of the
proposed derivatives of SU attempt to relax this requirement in favor of either
MST or WST.
Hey (1995) proposed three RE models with heteroscedastic error terms and
conducted an experiment with 80 subjects to compare the heteroscedastic models
to the homoscedastic SU model, denoted (H.1). In all three models, the Normal
distribution was utilized for F (·). The first heteroscedastic model, (H.2), modeled
the variance of the error as an exponential function of the time taken by the subject
to give an answer to the question m and a corresponding coefficient, α:
D(βn, X) = exp(α×m) (H.2)
λn = 1
Thus if α > 0, the longer (shorter) it takes a subject to answer the question, the
more (less) “noisy” the subject’s responses should be. There is, however, no reason
to expect α > 0 a priori.12
The second heteroscedastic model, (H.3), modeled the error as an exponential
12Additionally, one might suspect that the time spent on a decision problem might itself be
determined by the properties of the choice scenario, creating an endogeneity problem for this
formulation.
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function of the absolute value of the difference in utility of the alternatives multiplied
by a coefficient, α:
D(βn, X) = exp (α× |G(βn, Xbt)−G(βn, Xat)|) (H.3)
λn = 1
Thus, if α < 0, the larger the difference in utility of the alternatives, the smaller
the noise.
The third heteroscedastic model, (H.4), modeled the error as an exponential
function of the “difficulty” of the question, d, multiplied by a coefficient, α. In
this specification, d is the average number of outcomes per option in the set of
alternatives.
D(βn, X) = exp(α× d) (H.4)
λn = 1
Thus, if α > 0, the greater (smaller) the average number of outcomes per option, the
greater (smaller) the noise. All of the heteroscedastic models nest the homoscedastic
SU model as a special case (when α = 0). While (H.3) and (H.4) did not perform
particularly well, (H.1) was rejected in favor of (H.2) for 27 of 80 subjects at the
1% level, and 36 subjects at the 5% level (1995, p. 639).
Another derivative called the “Wandering Vector” (WV) model was proposed
initially by Carroll (1980) and expanded on by Carroll and De Soete (1991). It
makes the standard deviation of the error proportional to the Euclidean distance
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between the probability vectors of the two alternative lotteries, a and b.
D(βn, X) =
[
C∑
c=1
(pac − pbc)2
]1/2
The original rationale for this model was to incorporate MST into a stochastic
model: “for many realistic multidimensional stimulus domains, SST seems too
strong. On the other hand, WST seems too weak” [emphasis in the original] (1991,
p. 343). This model was proposed in the psychology literature to accommodate noisy
perceptions of multidimensional stimuli, but this can be utilized as an economic
model by reinterpreting the noisy perception of stimuli as noisy measurement of
utility.
Wilcox (2011) expands on the “Contextual Utility” (CU) model initially pro-
posed in Wilcox (2008). It makes the standard deviation of the error proportional
to the difference in utility of the greatest non-zero probability outcome and the
utility of the least non-zero probability outcome:
D(βn, Xt) = max [u(xct)]−min[u(xct)]
st. wc(xct) 6= 0
This model also satisfies MST and additionally allows for the “more risk averse
than” relation of Pratt (1964) to be extended to the stronger “stochastically more
risk averse than” relation. The “stochastically more risk averse than” relation of
the CU model allows for interpersonal comparisons of risk-aversion in a way that
is potentially more meaningful than with the SU model (2008, p. 221).
Busemeyer and Townsend (1993) propose “Decision Field Theory” (DFT),
which when considering a pair of alternatives where one alternative is a certainty
and the other is a lottery of only 2 outcomes, can be formulated in terms of the
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D(·) function. If we define the set of outcomes that belong to the lottery as
H = {x ∈ Xa | px < 1} = {h1, h2} where h2 > h1 we have:
D(βn, X) = [u(h2)− u(h1)]
√
wh1(p)[1− wh2(p)]
The reasoning behind DFT is ultimately psychological. Busemeyer and Townsend
(1993) posit that in cases where objective probabilities of outcomes are unknown,
an agent may sample from past experiences with the same decision problem to
estimate the objective probabilities. This kind of decision problem is deemed choice
under “uncertainty” rather than choice under “risk.” “Decision field theory was
developed for this more natural type of uncertain decision problem” (1993, p. 436).
Blavatskyy (2014) proposes a model (BF) deemed “Stronger Utility,” which
shares properties with the “incremental EU advantage model” initially proposed by
Fishburn (1987). There exist stochastic choice specifications which can be classified
as both a “Stronger Utility” model and an “incremental EU advantage” model. The
BF model makes the standard deviation of the error proportional to the difference
in the utility of two abstract lotteries. The first abstract lottery is constructed
to stochastically dominate all lotteries in the proposed decision scenario, but can
itself be stochastically dominated by any other lottery which also scholastically
dominates the proposed lotteries. The second abstract lottery is constructed to be
stochastically dominated by both lotteries proposed in the decision scenario, while
stochastically dominant any other lottery which is also stochastically dominated
by both of the proposed lotteries. For FOSD pairs, this specification attaches a
probability of 1 to the dominating option and 0 to the dominated option.
The three models proposed by Hey (1995) don’t make any special predictions
about the likelihood of choosing options in particular scenarios, such as with FOSD
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pairs, other than to hypothesize that they improve on the explanatory fit of the SU
model. They also require the estimation of additional parameters. The (H.2) and
(H.4) models of Hey (1995) are very similar to the method utilized by Harrison
and Rutström (2009, p. 142) in which observable characteristics of subjects are
modeled as linear covariates of the core parameters to be estimated. However,
Hey (1995) models the standard deviation to be exponential functions of these
observable characteristics instead of linear functions, making the heteroscedasticity
multiplicative rather than additive. The linear specification utilized by Harrison
and Rutström (2009) is used to control for observable heterogeneity of subjects,
not aspects of the choice scenario. The (H.3) model of Hey (1995), however, seems
to reflect the same line of thinking as the subsequent derivatives of the SU model.
The other RE models mentioned above, however, often add new implications
which generally help ease some of the shortcomings of the SU model. Both the
CU model and the “sure thing vs two-outcome” DFT model discussed previously
have the benefit of extending the “more risk averse than” relation of Pratt (1964)
to the “stochastically more risk averse than” relation. DFT additionally requires
that as the lottery becomes closer to first order stochastically dominating the CE ,
the probability of selecting the dominant option approaches 1. The BF model also
requires that the probability of selecting the dominant option is always 1. Both
the WV and the CU models enforce MST as opposed to the more restrictive strong
SST, required by SU models. The CU, WV, DFT, and BF models don’t require
the estimation of any additional parameters on top of those required by the SU
model, so any improvement of explanatory fit by them is free in terms of degrees
of freedom used in classical estimation.
Wilcox (2008) provides a detailed discussion of the necessary implications of
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the TR, RP, and SU models, along with some of the SU model’s derivatives. He
also discusses various well known events which can sometimes be attributed to
stochasticity in choice: the Common Ratio Effect, low-frequency, but persistent,
violations of FOSD, and changes in choice probabilities when lotteries are simply
scaled.13 Treatment is also given to whether models hold to various degrees of
stochastic transitivity, whether they are descriptive of the “more risk averse than”
relation, and how well the various models perform at predicting in-sample and
out-of-sample choices.14
Wilcox (2008) estimates WV, CU, RP, SU, and an early variation of SU proposed
by Luce (1958) called “Strict Utility” on the dataset from Hey (2001). He employs
the method developed by Vuong (1989) to test if the log-likelihoods of the fitted
models are significantly different from each other. Wilcox (2008, p. 273) finds that
given an RDU structure, the CU model fits significantly better (p = 0.013, p <
0.0001) than the WV and “Strict Utility” models in-sample, and significantly
better (p < 0.0001, p = 0.0005, p < 0.0001, p < 0.0001) than the SU, RP, WV, and
“Strict Utility” models out-of-sample. Given an RDU structure, the RP model
fits significantly better (p = 0.0388, p < 0.0001) than the WV and “Strict Utility”
models in-sample, and significantly better (p = 0.049, p < 0.0191, p < 0.0001) than
the SU, WV, and “Strict Utility” models out-of-sample. Neither the CU or RP
models fit significantly better or worse than the SU model in-sample with a RDU
structure. In all cases where the CU and RP models both fit better than a third
13Borrowing again from Wilcox (2008, p. 249): Consider four pairs of lotteries, {C,E},
{D,E},{C,E′}, {D,E′}, and make the probability of selecting the first lottery in pair {C,E}, Pce,
and similarly for the remaining pairs. Simple Scalability requires that Pce > Pde ⇐⇒ Pce′ > Pde′ .
This requirement is only met by transitive utility structures, such as EUT and RDU, combined
with stochastic models that satisfy SST.
14This particular topic was given extensive attention in Wilcox (2007).
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model, the CU model fits better by a greater margin than the RP model.
With an EUT structure, the CU model significantly improves on every model
except the SU model in-sample, and on every model out-of-sample, while the RP
model fits significantly worse (p < 0.058) than the SU model and only improves
on the “Strict Utility” significantly (p < 0.0001) in-sample, but fits significantly
better (p = 0.051, p = 0.016, p = 0.078) than the SU, WV, and “Strict Utility”
models out-of-sample. In addition to fitting better than the RP model in a direct
comparison, the CU model fits better than every other model that the RP model
also improves on, and by a greater margin than the RP model.
From these results it is clear that “Strict Utility” is a poor model in terms
of goodness of fit given the alternatives: it doesn’t significantly fit better than
any alternative model, regardless of the utility theory, either in-sample or out-of-
sample. The WV model only does marginally better: the only model it significantly
improves upon is the “Strict Utility” model.
The more interesting story in light of the literature up to this point is the
comparison of the SU, CU, and RP models. Considering in-sample fit, the SU
model fits significantly better than the RP model with EUT, and with RDU there
is no significant difference in goodness of fit. Out-of-sample the RP model fits
significantly better than the SU model under both EUT and RDU. This echoes
some of the mixed evidence up to this point concerning which of these two models
is superior. New to the competition are the various SU derivatives. Two of
these, the WV and “Strict Utility” models, perform relatively poorly in goodness
of fit compared to the alternatives, but CU is shown to have generally superior
performance compared to all the proposed models. The CU model has a greater
log-likelihood than than all of the other models in all of the various test conditions,
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in-sample or out-of-sample, with EUT or RDU. This difference is statistically
significant for many of the comparisons, as noted above.
This discussion is not meant to be an exhaustive list of every proposed derivative
of the SU model and their implications. Such a list would be very long and many
of these derivative models deserve detailed discussion in their own right. This
discussion simply serves to demonstrate that, as put by Wilcox (2008, p. 277), “we
are witnessing a fertile period for stochastic model innovation now.” Nearly all of
this innovation has come from the RE class of models by changing the error term in
the SU model from being homoscedastic to heteroscedastic, in very particular ways
that have testable implications. The only apparent non-SU derived innovation was
to combine the TR model with the RP model to help explain the low-frequency,
but persistent, violations of FOSD observed in economic experiments.15 Given
the variety of theoretical implications of the various stochastic models and the
repeatedly demonstrated sensitivity of goodness of fit measures to alternative
stochastic models, it is no wonder that Wilcox (2008, p. 275) concludes: “It is hard
to escape the conclusion that decision research could benefit strongly from more
work on stochastic models.”
While such a conclusion is undoubtedly true, there is a question relevant to
economics concerning these models which has been sidelined in the continuing
effort to find the “true” or “best” stochastic model: “What are the likely welfare
implications of an economic agent’s choices in an incentivized environment given an
assumed stochastic model of choice?” This is the primary question of this chapter.
Answering this question helps to draw the distinction between economics and
15This combination of models however is not an innovation to the RP model in itself as such
a combination is just as possible with the SU model and any of its derivatives. As stated earlier,
such a combination fails to address a core problem with the RP model: normative coherence.
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decision theory or psychology. I argue that answering this question puts reasonable,
restricting conditions on the econometric question “What is the best stochastic
model to employ?”
2.3 Utility and its Relation to Welfare
With the RDU structure defined, and the stochastic models specified, we can define
the basis of what will become our proposed metrics for individual welfare, the
certainty equivalent. For any salient lottery Xa, and any vector βn, there exists
some certain outcome, CEa, such that subject n is indifferent between the lottery
and the certainty equivalent:
Xa ∼n CEa ⇔ G(βn, Xa) = G(βn,CEa) (2.19)
Combining the RDU structure from equation (2.1) with the utility function
defined in equation (2.2), we can define the CE as follows:
C∑
c=1
wc(p)
x(1−r)ca
(1− r) =
CE (1−r)a
(1− r)
CEa =
(
(1− r)×
C∑
c=1
wc(p)
x1−rca
(1− r)
)1/(1−r) (2.20)
Thus if we assume some vector of βn, of which r and the parameters governing
wc(p) are elements, we can easily calculate the CE of lottery Xa.16 If the utility
function employed is monotonically increasing in the domain, as the CRRA function
16In general, the CE of any lottery can easily be calculated with numerical methods even if
an analytical solution doesn’t exist. This is because the CE must lie in the interval between the
lowest outcome and the highest outcome. Numerically, one can just iterate through this interval
until equation (2.20) is satisfied, or employ an optimization routine to look for the CE directly.
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is, then this leads to the logical corollary of equation (2.9):
CEn1 ≥ CEn2 ≥ . . . ≥ CEna ≥ . . . ≥ CEnA (2.21)
With equations (2.20) and (2.21), we can also see that the CE can itself be
considered a utility function, it is complete, transitive, and continuous, which is
all that is required for a utility function to be well defined. Utilizing the CEs of
options in a task is useful because of its potential to be considered a utility function,
but also because it allows utility to be normalized to the units of the outcomes.
This “CE” approach is similar to the “money-metric utility” function Samuelson
(1974) employed to calculate welfare surplus. The “money-metric” utility function
is used as a normalized utility function by, for instance, Diewert (1983) and King
(1983).
We can employ the notation used for the set of unchosen alternatives, Z, derived
in equation (2.10), to rank the CEs of each unchosen alternative just as in equation
(2.11):
CEZn1 ≥ CEZn2 ≥ . . . ≥ CEZna ≥ . . . ≥ CEZn(A−1) (2.22)
Utilizing these CEs, four metrics are proposed to help measure welfare. If an
agent with deterministic preferences and a deterministic choice process is presented
with two lotteries to chose from, X1 and X2, she would choose X1 and receive a
welfare change of CE1 − CE2. This is the rational behind the first metric. With
this metric, a change in welfare is measured as the difference between the CE of
the option chosen and the CE of the highest ranked alternative option:
∆Wnt = CEnyt − CEZn1t = CERnt (2.23)
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This welfare metric is similar to the notion of compensating equivalence in
standard consumer theory. If equation (2.23) is positive, it calculates the minimum
amount of money the agent would need in compensation in order to change her
choice. If this metric is negative, it calculates the maximum the agent should be
willing to pay in order to change her choice.
Another metric, which also utilizes the CEs, characterizes welfare received by
choosing an option as a proportion of the CE of the option chosen and the CE
that was ranked highest in the task:
%Wnt =
CEny
CEn1
(2.24)
A variation of (2.23) which can be used to make statements about welfare across
tasks could be:
∆WnT =
T∑
t=1
(
CEnyt − CEZn1t
)
(2.25)
A similar variation of (2.24) could be:
%WnT =
T∑
t=1
CEny
T∑
t=1
CEn1
(2.26)
All of these metrics have strengths and weaknesses. Metric (2.23) is more
relevant to the case of deterministic choice as it can change from task to task, while
metrics (2.24) and (2.26) will become more relevant when discussing stochastic
choice models and modest claims about inter-subject welfare. Any agent would be
best off by making a choice which maximizes either of these metrics.
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2.3.1 Special Case of Random Preferences: The Random
Preference Per Option Model
Before beginning the discussion of welfare, a final model belonging to the RP class
will be noted which requires a more involved explanation. It could be the case that
an agent’s choices are best characterized by a version of the RP model where a
different β∗na is drawn to evaluate every option in the set of alternatives. I refer to
this type of RP model as the “Random Preference Per Option” (RPPO) model.
When evaluating option a, a standard preference relation is drawn from a
distribution of preference relations that ranks each of the A alternatives, including
option a, according to this preference relation:
X1t <na X2t <na . . . <na Xat <na . . . <na XAt (2.27)
A utility function exists which represents these preference relations is shaped by
βan:
G(βan, X1t) ≥ G(βan, X2t) ≥ . . . ≥ G(βan, Xat) ≥ . . . ≥ G(βan, XAt) (2.28)
As was shown in equation (2.20), a CE can be calculated for each of these βan
conditional utility functions such that:
CEan1 ≥ CEan2 ≥ . . . ≥ CEana ≥ . . . ≥ CEanA (2.29)
In equations (2.27), (2.28), and (2.29), the ordinal ranking of the set of al-
ternatives is the same. As stated previously, the CE of an option has the same
utility function properties as G(·), and is additionally normalized by the units of
the options themselves. If only one βn vector is drawn to derive cardinal values for
the set of alternatives, we have the RP model discussed previously.
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But, with RPPO models, when evaluating another option b, such that b 6= a,
another, potentially different, preference relation is drawn and each of the A
alternatives, including both a and b, are ranked according to this preference relation:
X1t <nb X2t <nb . . . <nb Xat <nb . . . <nb XAt (2.30)
where <nb represents the preference relation drawn by subject n when considering
option b across all A outcomes. A utility function exists which represents these
preference relations shaped by βbn:
G(βbn, X1t) ≥ G(βbn, X2t) ≥ . . . ≥ G(βbn, Xat) ≥ . . . ≥ G(βbn, XAt) (2.31)
And again, a CE can be calculated for each of these βbn conditional utility functions
such that:
CE bn1 ≥ CE bn2 ≥ . . . ≥ CE bna ≥ . . . ≥ CE bnA (2.32)
The difference between the realizations of equations (2.29) and (2.32) is twofold.
First, the different β∗n vectors may lead to different ordinal rankings of the same
set of alternatives. Second, if βan 6= βbn, then there may be two different cardinal
evaluations for the same option.
The RPPO model takes the cardinal value of each option, evaluated using its
own β∗n vector, and constructs an ordinal ranking of the set of alternatives based
on these individual evaluations. To deal with the potential issue of comparing
different utility functions cardinally, the utility functions G(·) should be normalized
somehow.17 In line with the previous discussion, we will utilize the CE for each
17Without the normalization, the RPPO model requires an unusual interpretation of preference
relations to accommodate particular aspects of relatively common G(·) functions. An example
will be presented later that will make this clearer.
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option based on its individually drawn β∗n vector.
Adding the superscripts {1, 2, . . . , x, . . . , X} to the CE to indicate the option
that it is associated with, and the subscripts {1, 2, . . . , a, . . . , A} to the CE to
represent its rank in the set of alternatives conditional on its individual βxn vector,
we could have the following ordinal ranking:
CE1n1 ≥ CE2n2 ≥ . . . ≥ CExna ≥ . . . ≥ CEXnA (2.33)
Notice that the superscripts match the subscripts in this example, but this need
not always be the case. The superscripts represent the unranked options, while the
subscripts represent the RPPO ranked options. The following could also represent
an ordinal ranking from the RPPO model:
CE3n1 ≥ CE1n2 ≥ . . . ≥ CExna ≥ . . . ≥ CEXnA (2.34)
The RPPO model, as discussed here, is characterized as having random prefer-
ence parameters, but is otherwise deterministic in characterizing choice. That is,
this RPPO model characterizes an agent as choosing the option with the highest
individually evaluated CE . Just as with the RP model, additional stochasticity
can be imposed by including measurement error as with RE models and/or a
tremble event as with TR models. These additional elements create unnecessary
mathematical complexity for the current discussion, but they will be touched on
briefly later. Just as in equation (2.10), the non-chosen options can be expressed
as the set of A− 1 alternatives in task t that doesn’t include the chosen option:
Z = t \ y = {z ∈ t | z /∈ y} (2.35)
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The RPPO model therefore constructs a choice function as follows:
yt = x⇔ CExna ≥ CEznb ∀z ∈ Z (2.36)
That is, yt is a function that indicates that option x is chosen in task t if and
only if the CE associated with option x is greater than or equal to the CE of any
other option z. The probability of yt = x is determined by the joint probability of
observing the set
{
βxn, {βZn }
}
, such that:
CE(βxn, X1t) ≥ CE(βzn, Xat)∀z ∈ Z (2.37)
Call such a set Btn. The probability of yt = x is therefore:
Pr(yt = x) =
∫
βxn∈Btn
∫
βZn ∈Btn
fBtn
(
βxn, {βZn }|α
)
dβxn dβ
Z
n (2.38)
where fBtn(βxn, {βZn }|α) is the joint density of the elements of Btn, the shape of
which is governed by the vector α.
2.4 The Stochastic Money Pump: A Tool for
Describing Welfare Accumulation
With the various classes of stochastic models defined, I begin the discussion of
the welfare implications of these models by first introducing a decision problem
which resembles the “Money Pump” argument against intransitive structures in
deterministic choice theory, though with several important distinctions that will
be made clear later. I will refer to this relatively simple thought experiment as a
“Stochastic Money Pump” (SMP). Assume that there is an experimental economist
who, through cleverly selected choice problems, is able to correctly identify the
utility structure and stochastic process governing the choices of subjects with perfect
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knowledge. That is, the utility structure and relevant parameters βn, as well as
the correct stochastic model and relevant parameters that completely characterize
some subject n are all known by the experimenter.
The experimenter then offers to sell a lottery ticket to the subject for some
amount of money, and should the subject agree to buy the ticket, the experimenter
offers to buy the ticket back from the subject for a lower amount of money. The
subject can refuse the initial purchase, buy the ticket and refuse to sell the ticket
back, or buy the ticket and sell it back to the experimenter. How often can
the experimenter expect to be successful in extracting the difference between the
buying and selling price of the ticket from the subject without giving the subject
anything, and what are the welfare implications of this pair of transactions? The
various classes of stochastic models can all have different welfare implications while
predicting similar observed choice behavior.
To make this example concrete, we can work this problem out numerically
assuming 3 different subjects, Amy, Beth, and Cate. Amy operates with a random
preference model of choice, Beth operates with a contextual utility model of choice,
and Cate makes choices deterministically but with a tremble. Amy, Beth, and Cate
all have the same utility structure of the RDU special case where wc(p) = pc for all pc
and incorporate the CRRA utility function from equation (2.2). Amy’s distribution
function Fn(β|α) is N(µ, σ2) = N(0, 0.01), thus normal with α featuring a mean
equal to 0 and a standard deviation of 0.1. Beth operates with a β vector that
is composed of r = 0, and a λn = 0.015. Cate operates with a β vector that is
composed of r = 0 and a probability of trembling of φ = 0.816. All values picked in
this example are for ease of calculation, but the implications hold when generalized
to different parameter values.
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The lottery ticket has a 0.5 probability of an outcome of 10 and a 0.5 probability
of an outcome of 100, and thus an expected value of 55. The experimenter offers to
sell each of the subjects the lottery for 55.50, and to buy the lottery back at 54.50.
These values are 0.50 above and below the CE of the lottery for Beth and Cate,
and 0.50 above and below the mean CE of the lottery for Amy. The probability of
the experimenter successfully extracting money costlessly is approximately equal
for all three subjects:
Pr(Extraction) = Pr(Buy)× Pr(Sell) ≈ 0.167 (2.39)
The manner in which the this probability is reached is different for each subject:
For Amy,
BBuy = {βA| G(βA, XLottery) ≥ G(βA, XBuyprice)}
= {rA
∣∣∣ r ≤ −0.0232}
BSell = {βA| G(βA, XSellprice) ≥ G(βA, XLottery)}
= {rA
∣∣∣ r ≥ 0.0232}
Pr(yBuy = Buy) =
∫
β∈BBuy
dFA(β|α) = φ(BBuy, 0, 0.01)
≈ 0.408
Pr(ySell = Sell) =
∫
β∈BBuy
dFA(β|α) = φ(BSell , 0, 0.01)
≈ 0.408
Pr(ExtractionA) = Pr(yBuy = Buy)× Pr(ySell = Sell)
≈ .167
(2.40)
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where φ is the cumulative normal distribution. For Beth,
D(βB, X)× λB = 0.015[u(100)− u(10)]× 1
= 1.35
Pr(yBuy = Buy) =
exp
(
G(βB, XLottery)
D(βB, X)λB
)
exp
(
G(βB, XLottery)
D(βB, X)λB
)
+ exp
(
G(βB, XBuy price)
D(βB, X)λB
)
≈ 0.408
Pr(ySell = Sell) =
exp
(
G(βB, XSell price)
D(βB, X)λB
)
exp
(
G(βB, XLottery)
D(βB, X)λB
)
+ exp
(
G(βB, XSell price)
D(βB, X)λB
)
≈ 0.408
Pr(ExtractionB) = Pr(yBuy = Buy)× Pr(ySell = Sell)
≈ .167
(2.41)
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For Cate,
Pr0(yBuy) =

1 , G(βC , XLottery) > G(βC , XBuy price)
0.5 , G(βC , XLottery) = G(βC , XBuy price)
0 , G(βC , XLottery) < G(βC , XBuy price)
Pr0(ySell) =

1 , G(βC , XSell price) > G(βC , XLottery)
0.5 , G(βC , XSell price) = G(βC , XLottery)
0 , G(βC , XSell price) < G(βC , XLottery)
Pr(yBuy = Buy) = (1− φ)Pr0(yBuy) + φ
A
= (1− 0.816)(0) + (0.816)/2
= 0.408
Pr(ySell = Sell) = (1− φ)Pr0(ySell) + φ
A
= (1− 0.816)(0) + (0.816)/2
= 0.408
Pr(ExtractionC) = Pr(yBuy = Buy)× Pr(ySell = Sell)
≈ .167
(2.42)
While the observed choice behavior is identical for all three subjects, the welfare
implications are not. According to the metrics defined by equations (2.23) and
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(2.24), this decision problem has the same welfare implications for Beth and Cate:
∆W(B,C),Buy = CE (B,C),Lottery − CE (B,C),Buy Price = 55− 55.5 = −0.50
∆W(B,C),Sell = CE (B,C),Sell Price − CE (B,C),Lottery = 54.5− 55 = −0.50
%W(B,C),Buy =
CE (B,C),Lottery
CE (B,C),Buy Price
= 5555.5 ≈ 0.99
%W(B,C),Sell =
CE (B,C),Sell Price
CE (B,C),Lottery
= 54.555 ≈ 0.99
(2.43)
In this case, the welfare implications of such decision problem are clear for both
the TR and RE models: with a roughly 0.167 probability, Beth and Cate will make
2 consecutive “mistakes” or “choice errors,” which results in 1 unit of money and
1 unit of CE being extracted from each of them. The other potential results are
easy to calculate. With a 1− Pr(yBuy = Buy) = 0.592 probability, Beth and Cate
make no mistakes and experience a welfare gain:
∆W(B,C),Buy = CE (B,C),Buy Price − CE (B,C),Lottery = 55.5− 55 = 0.50
%W(B,C),Buy =
CE (B,C),Buy Price
CE (B,C),Buy Price
= 55.555.5 = 1
(2.44)
With a Pr(yBuy = Buy)(1 − Pr(ySell = Sell)) ≈ 0.242 probability, Beth and
Cate make the mistake of buying the lottery ticket, but not the mistake of selling
it back for less:
%W(B,C),T =
T∑
t=1
CE (B,C),y,t
T∑
t=1
CE (B,C),1,t
= 55 + 5555.5 + 55 ≈ 0.995
∆W(B,C),T =
T∑
t=1
(
CE (B,C),y,t − CEZ(B,C)1,T
)
= 55− 55.5 + 55.5− 55 = 0
(2.45)
The RP model characterizing Amy’s choices, however, does not provide an
intuitive understanding of the welfare implications of this decision problem. The
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RP model discussed here, the stand-alone RP model, requires that every choice
by Amy be characterized by a deterministic preference relation according to some
vector βA randomly drawn from a distribution. Thus:
∆W(A),Buy = CE (A),Lottery − CE (A),Buy Price ≥ 0
∆W(A),Sell = CE (A),Sell Price − CE (A),Lottery ≥ 0
%W(A),Buy =
CE (A),Lottery
CE (B,C),Lottery
= 1
%W(A),Sell =
CE (A),Sell Price
CE (B,C),Sell Price
= 1
(2.46)
According to the metric definition in (2.23) and the decision process for Amy
defined in (2.40), the ∆W welfare evaluations in (2.46) must be weak inequalities.
However, the only situation where ∆W(B,C),Buy = 0 is when r = −0.0232, which
has a probability of 0 given that FA(β|α) is continuous. Similarly for the choice
between selling or not selling. With a probability approaching 1, the RP model
predicts that should an extraction occur the choices causing the extraction leave
the subject with positive welfare.
Before moving on to the normative implications of these welfare characteriza-
tions, we revisit the SMP thought experiment with two new entrants, Dana and
Emma. Suppose that Dana’s choices are characterized as being in accordance with
the RPPO model discussed previously, and Emma operates a tremble model as
defined by Loomes, Moffatt and Sugden (2002), where Pr0 is defined by the RP
model. We can pose the same questions concerning Dana and Emma’s choices
that we asked of Amy, Beth, and Cate’s choices: “How often can the experimenter
expect to be successful in extracting the difference between the buying and selling
price of the ticket from the subject without giving the subject anything and what
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are the welfare implications of this pair of transactions?” As we will see below, the
answers to these questions for Dana are exactly the same as for Amy, and though
the math involved with Emma is slightly more complicated, the counterintuitive
interpretation of welfare caused by the RP model remains.
Suppose that for Dana, the marginal distributions of each option’s β∗A vector
used to construct fBtn(βxn, βzn|α) are identical and uncorrelated.18 Also, Dana’s
marginal distribution functions are all N(µ, σ2) = N(0, 0.01), thus normal with α
consisting of a mean equal to 0 and a standard deviation of 0.1. The joint density
function, fBtn(βxn, βzn|α), is therefore:
N2(µ,Σ)
µ =

µx
µz
 =

0
0

Σ =

σ2x ρσxσz
ρσxσz σ
2
z
 =

0.01 0
0 0.01

(2.47)
where µ is the vector of means, Σ is the covariance matrix for the joint density
function fBtn(βxn, βzn|α). The choice behavior for Dana is as follows:
18These assumptions are made for mathematical simplicity in the following example. There is
no obvious reason why it should be necessary that these distributions be identical or uncorrelated,
though the conceptual result would be the same even if they were not.
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For Dana,
CEBuy Price = Buy Price ∀ βD
CESell Price = Sell Price ∀ βD
BBuyD = {βxD, βzD|CExLottery ≥ CEZBuy Price}
= {rxD, rZD|rxD ≤ −0.0232, rZD ∈ <}
BSellD = {βxD, βzD|CExSell Price ≥ CEZLottery}
= {rxD, rZD|rxD ≥ 0.0232, rZD ∈ <}
Pr(yBuy = Buy) =
∫
βxD∈BtD
∫
βZD∈BtD
fBtD
(
βxD, {βZD}|α
)
dβxD dβ
Z
D
= φ(rZD ≤ −0.0232, 0, 0.01)× φ(rxD ∈ <, 0, 0.01)
= 0.408× 1
Pr(ySell = Sell) =
∫
βxD∈BtD
∫
βZD∈BtD
fBtD
(
βxD, {βZD}|α
)
dβxD dβ
Z
D
= φ(rxD ∈ <, 0, 0.01)× φ(rZD ≥ 0.0232, 0, 0.01)
= 1× 0.408
Pr(ExtractionD) = Pr(yBuy = Buy)× Pr(ySell = Sell)
≈ .167
(2.48)
This thought experiment presents a special case where the RPPO model essen-
tially reduces to the standard RP model. This is due to the fact that the CE of
any certain amount of money is equal to that amount of money. Because this is
true, the distributions of the βD vectors associated with the buying and selling
prices are irrelevant.19
19Take any degenerate lottery X comprised of a single outcome x with a probability of px = 1.
The utility of this lottery is UX = wx(px)ux(x), where wx is any probability weighting function
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The reason why the utility functions are normalized can also be made clear
with this example. The CRRA function described in (2.2) and utilized in the
above example has some interesting properties around r = 1: u(x|r) = ln(x) at
r = 1, u(x|r) → ∞ as r → 1 from the left, and u(x|r) → −∞ as r → 1 from
the right.20 If the RPPO model didn’t normalize the CRRA function to its CE ,
the set of {βxn, {βZn }} would be contradictory in its elements due to the properties
of the CRRA function around 1. To demonstrate, assume that the utility of the
lottery is evaluated with rxn = −0.0232: what values of rZn satisfy equation (2.20)
such that Dana would decide to purchase the lottery? We might expect that since
rxn = −0.0232 is the value of rn that sets the utility of the lottery and the utility of
the buy price equal to each other, should the buy price be evaluated with greater
risk aversion than the lottery, equation (2.37) will hold. That is, we might expect
that should rZn > −0.0232 Dana would prefer the lottery over the buy price.
Intuitively this makes sense: an increase in risk aversion corresponds to an
increase in the concavity of the utility function under EUT (or holding a probability
weighting function constant under RDU) which implies lower utility for a given
outcome as risk-aversion increases. While this is true when the CRRA function
and ux is any utility function. Since wx(px = 1) = 1 for every probability weighting function,
UX = ux(x) = ux(CEx). Since ux is a well-defined utility function, CEx = x is a solution
for equation (2.19) for every ux and every x when px = 1. This solution is unique when ux is
monotonic, as with the CRRA function employed in the example.
20The use of ln(x) for r = 1 is not as ad hoc as it may seem. Wakker (2008, p. 1333) shows
that if equation (2.2) is normalized, it can be seen “that the normalized logarithmic function is
the limit of the normalized power functions for r tending to 0 [1], both from above (r > 0) [r > 1]
and from below (r < 0) [r < 1]:”
lim
r→0
xr − cr
dr − cr =
ln(x)− ln(c)
ln(d)− ln(c) ∀ x > 0, d > c > 0
While Wakker (2008) uses the single exponent version of the power function, the same limit
applies to the formulation of the CRRA function used in equation (2.2), with the bracketed values
of r in the above quote representing the revised limits.
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is normalized to its CE , this isn’t true without the normalization. Without the
normalization, βZn consists of −0.023 ≤ rZn ≤ 0.9814 and rZn > 1.
The gap of (0.9814, 1) is due to the properties of the CRRA function around
1. The un-normalized RPPO model allows for a relatively risky option to be
chosen over a relatively less risky option should the less risky option be evaluated
using a preference relation indicating intense risk aversion, but not when the less
risky option is evaluated using a preference relation indicating only moderate risk
aversion. Intuitively we might expect the reverse to be true, but it is mathematically
possible. The possibility of this kind of gap is not removed even if the marginal
distributions which make up fBtn(βxn, {βZn }|α) are correlated and can be exacerbated
if they are not identical.
Now, suppose Emma operates a TR model with the Pr0 choice probabilities
generated by the RP model described for Amy and the tremble parameter described
for Cate. Emma’s choice behavior is defined as follows:
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For Emma,
BBuy = {βE| G(βE, XLottery) ≥ G(βE, XBuyprice)}
= {rE
∣∣∣ r ≤ −0.0232}
BSell = {βE| G(βE, XSellprice) ≥ G(βE, XLottery)}
= {rE
∣∣∣ r ≥ 0.0232}
Pr0(yBuy) =
∫
β∈BBuy
dFE(β|α) = φ(BBuy, 0, 0.01)
≈ 0.408
Pr0(ySell) =
∫
β∈BBuy
dFE(β|α) = φ(BSell , 0, 0.01)
≈ 0.408
Pr(yBuy = Buy) = (1− φ)Pr0(yBuy) + φ
A
= (1− 0.816)(0.408) + (0.816)/2
= 0.483072
Pr(ySell = Sell) = (1− φ)Pr0(ySell) + φ
A
= (1− 0.816)(0.408) + (0.816)/2
= 0.483072
Pr(ExtractionE) = Pr(yBuy = Buy)× Pr(ySell = Sell)
≈ 0.233
(2.49)
We have a more complicated result with Emma when we attempt to describe
her welfare. The preferences in this model are provided by the aspects that belong
to the RP model. This means that not only is Pr0(yBuy) the probability that
Emma would chose to buy the lottery should she not experience a “tremble,”
99
but it is also the probability that the choice to buy the lottery is the result of
greater utility being accumulated from the lottery ticket than is associated with
the buying price. Similarly for Pr0(ySell) and the choice to sell the ticket. Thus,
given Pr(ExtractionE), Pr0(yBuy), and Pr0(ySell), we have:
Pr
(
%W(E),Extraction = 1
)
= Pr(ExtractionE)× Pr0(yBuy)× Pr0(ySell)
= 0.233× 0.408× 0.408
≈ 0.0388
(2.50)
That is, we characterize Emma as having the 1 unit of money extracted by the
SMP, and this extraction as having resulted in optimal welfare for Emma 3.88%
of the time. Similarly, this probability can be interpreted as a lower bound on
Pr(∆W(E),Extraction ≥ 0).
The probability that the welfare surplus metric is positive in the event of an
extraction is equivalent to the probability of an extraction occuring times the
probability that the welfare change from buying the ticket plus the welfare change
from selling the ticket is positive:
Pr(ExtractionE)× Pr(βBuy, βSell
∣∣∣ CEBuyLottery − CEBuyBuyPrice + CESellSellPrice − CESellLottery)
Pr(ExtractionE)× Pr(βBuy, βSell
∣∣∣ CEBuyLottery − CESellLottery ≥ 1)
If we set βB,S = {βBuy, βSell
∣∣∣ CEBuyLottery − CESellLottery ≥ 1},21 we have:
0.233×
∫
βBuy∈βB,S
∫
βSell∈βB,S
F (βBuy|α)F (βSell |α)dβBuydβSell ≥ 0.0388 (2.51)
This complication arises because Emma’s choice function has both TR and RP
21Recall that the CE of an certain amount is always that certain amount. So the CE of
the "Buy Price" is 55.5, and the CE of the sell price is 54.5 for any utility function. Therefore
CEBuyPrice − CESellPrice = 1 for all utility functions.
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elements. Sometimes Emma will value the prospect of buying the lottery ticket
extremely highly, not tremble, and choose to buy, and then value the prospect of
selling the ticket back only somewhat negatively, tremble, and then sell it back.
The welfare gained in the buying choice can therefore sometimes outweigh the
welfare lost in the selling choice, resulting in a net positive change of welfare. Note
that every time Emma values the buying of the ticket and the selling of the ticket
positively, the net change in welfare will also be positive. Thus, 0.0388 constitutes
a lower bound on Pr(∆W(E),Extraction ≥ 0).
2.5 The Normative Coherence of Stochastic
Models
Having clarified the welfare implications of several representative stochastic models,
I can discuss the normative implications of these models. When a variety of
stochastic models were detailed by Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1963), they
were intended as a way to “circumvent the difficulty” associated with the problem
that “the preference choices of the chooser are often inconsistent with each other.”
In laying out the implications of these models, Becker, DeGroot and Marschak
(1963) detail descriptive implications about the frequency with which certain types
of choices would be observed, but do not make any normative claims. The intent
behind developing these models was to provide greater descriptive veracity to EUT,
apparently while maintaining EUT as the normative force behind these models.
The historical course that lead to EUT becoming the dominant orthodox theory
appears to have started with a descriptive justification, then a normative justifica-
tion. Moscati (2016) details the correspondences between Paul Samuelson, Leonard
Savage, Jacob Marschak, and Milton Friedman concerning the axiomatization of
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EUT by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and its burgeoning acceptance
as the orthodox theory of choice involving risky outcomes. The correspondence
highlights Samuelson’s strong initial reluctance to accept EUT based on his dissatis-
faction with what later became known as the independence axiom, which he called
a “gratuitously-arbitrary-special-implausible hypothesis” (Moscati 2016, p. 225).
Savage, and to a lesser extent Marschak and Friedman, advocated for EUT as being
descriptively accurate, theoretically simple, and, eventually, normatively robust.
Samuelson had strong reservations about the descriptive veracity of EUT, advo-
cated by both Savage and Friedman, stating that the phenomena associated with
gambling are “infinitely richer” than EUT permitted (Moscati 2016, p. 227). Fried-
man also admitted that in order to be able to explain certain gambling phenomena,
EUT would “need complication” (Moscati 2016, p. 229). Eventually, however,
Samuelson was persuaded of EUT’s normative force by Savage’s discussion of what
would become known as the “Sure-Thing Principle,” without necessarily relenting
on the descriptive claims.
What is meant by “normative force” in these discussions is the specification
of what a “rational” agent “ought” to do. Marschak, in correspondence with
Samuelson, makes this distinction: “It may be usual for village carpenters [. . .] to
deviate from the advice of Euclidian geometers [. . .] All the same, they would be
better advised to behave rationally by following Euclid” (Moscati 2016, p. 229). In
relenting to Savage’s normative arguments, Samuelson concedes that the normative
value of the Independence Axiom, and by extension EUT, makes it useful as an
assumption “defining ‘rational’ behavior” (Moscati 2016, p. 231) despite maintain-
ing that EUT doesn’t provide “a very illuminating explanation” of gambling or
investment behavior even “as a first approximation” (Moscati 2016, p. 232).
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The appeal of normative arguments, and their apparent superiority to descrip-
tive veracity arguments in the case of accepting EUT, is based on their adding to a
theory’s potential to generate statements about the welfare of agents in incentivized
environments. Pigou (1929, preface to the third edition) prefaces his third edition
with a comment to future students of economics:
The complicated analyses which economists endeavour to carry through
are not mere gymnastic. They are instruments for the bettering of
human life. The misery and squalor that surround us, the injurious
luxury of some wealthy families, the terrible uncertainty overshadowing
many families of the poor - these are evils too plain to be ignored. By
the knowledge that our science seeks it is possible that they may be
restrained. Out of the darkness light! To search for it is the task, to find
it perhaps the prize, which the “dismal science of Political Economy”
offers to those who face its discipline.
Varian (1996, p. 238) writes: “economics is a policy science and, as such, the
contribution of economic theory to economics should be measured on how well
economic theory contributes to the understanding and conduct of economic policy.”
Leamer (2012, p. 30) echoes this sentiment: “The primary goal [of economics]
should not be to amuse each other with mathematical complexities [. . .] [it] should
be to design policy interventions - policies that are intended to help achieve social
objectives, notably the highest level of well-being for the largest number of people.”22
It is with these sentiments, both historical and contemporary, that I interrogate
the extent to which stochastic models presented in this chapter provide useful
methodologies for the design and interpretation of policy interventions. Critical to
this objective is the ability to make statements on how changes in stocks of assets
22This utilitarian conceptualization of the primary goal of economics can be relaxed somewhat
without losing force. Policy interventions can be, and often are, crafted to improve the welfare of
specific sub-populations. For instance, the kind of individuals referenced by Pigou may have a
disproportionate number of policies crafted to improve their lot relative to their numbers in the
total population without this being at odds with the goals of economics.
103
affect the welfare of individuals. The various criteria used to assess the normative
validity of stochastic models will largely be interpreted from the works of Grüne-
Yanoff, Marchionni and Moscati (2014), Berg (2014) and Hands (2014). Normative
criteria are relations of particular means and ends that describe what an agent
“ought” do or not do in certain circumstances. Economic theories purporting to be
normatively justified must provide the mechanisms that satisfy these relationships.
In this framework, I will primarily discuss the capacity of stochastic models provide
to generate outcomes that have commonly been employed as normative criteria.
2.5.1 Economic Existence and Objective Betterness
Criteria
For an economic theory to gain normative force, it should satisfy the constraint that
an agent ought not to make choices systematically in such a way as to drive herself
out of economic existence. For example, this could mean that an economic theory
should not normatively justify an agent’s choice to deliberately put themselves into
bankruptcy.23
The popular, often informal, way EUT is justified in light of this criteria is
through its invulnerability to money pumps. The traditional money pump is defined
as a series of trades that will succeed in extracting the entirety of an agent’s stock
of assets, say some amount of good A, if the agent has intransitive preferences, such
as B < A, C < B, A < C with at least one relation being strict. This occurs when
the extractor offers to trade his B for the agent’s A, then his C for her B, and
finally his A−  for her C, where  is a sufficiently small, but positive amount of
23Bankruptcy here is in meant in the abstract sense of the loss of all assets without recourse to
recover them. In the United States for instance, given what are called “Chapter 9” and “Chapter
11” bankruptcy provisions, it could be quite rational to engage in institutionally controlled
bankruptcy under certain circumstances.
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good A such that A− < C, and those trades are accepted. This process is repeated
until the agent has no remaining quantity of good A, and is thus economically
eliminated.
Hands (2014, pp. 402-403) refers to this argument as “empirical elimination:”
This is the argument that agents who act in ways that violate [rational
choice theory] will (in fact) cease to exist or at least cease to play an
active role among the relevant class of decision-makers. The two most
common forms of this argument are the money pump (for agents who
have intransitive preferences and thus make choice mistakes) and the
Dutch book[. . .]
Grüne-Yanoff, Marchionni and Moscati (2014, p. 336) refer to “universal loss-
avoidance considerations:”
If an agent violates the transitivity condition on preferences, then that
individual can be “money pumped:” all wealth can be taken from her,
simply by trading goods with her in a way that exploits her preference
intransitivity[. . .] Consequently, to the extent that any one wants to
avoid such sure losses, one must satisfy the corresponding internal
consistency criteria.
Cubitt and Sugden (2001) however, methodically decompose the argument that
failure to satisfy consistency axioms, in particular transitivity, results necessarily in
vulnerability to money pumps. They develop a detailed methodology for describ-
ing decision problems without the need to specify an underlying theory of value
that traditionally denotes rewards at nodes in decision trees, and provide several
examples of how an agent could have preferences that violate consistency axioms
and yet remain invulnerable to money pumps.24 Cubitt and Sugden (2001, p. 154)
conclude: “Thus, in relation to what we take to be their original objectives, money
24See Cubitt and Sugden (2001) for a novel methodology on atheoretic representations of
decision problems, as well as the examples indicated.
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pump arguments are a failure.”
The critiques of Cubitt and Sugden (2001) show that adherence to EUT is not
a necessary condition for invulnerability to a money pump, only a sufficient one.
Indeed, it is possible for an agent to conform to standard consistency axioms of
completeness and transitivity and still be economically eliminated.25 However, the
claim that an agent should not make choices in such a way as to have her stock
of assets stripped away from her is still largely seen as a necessary condition for
a normative theory. More generally, we claim that for a theory to be useful in
guiding policy it should accord with the intuition that being stripped of her stock
of assets renders an agent worse off.26 I call this the economic sustainability (ES)
criterion.
Cubitt and Sugden (2001, p. 141) define a relation communicating this necessity
of not valuing less assets to more, which they state “coincides with weak statewise
dominance” and that “Many theories of choice under uncertainty generate choice
functions which respect statewise dominance and hence, within this setup, objective
betterness. Obviously, this is true of expected utility theory. But it is also true of,
for example, Quiggin (1982) rank-dependent expected utility theory [RDU].”
Marschak (1950, p. 112) seems to endorse this notion of ES as a normative
criterion, describing agents who choose dominated offers as worse off: “In dealing
25The poem “Smart” by Shell Silverstein (1974) exhibits such an agent. A son receives a dollar
from his father and gleefully trades it for two quarters, and those two quarters for three dimes,
and those three dimes for four nickles, and those four nickels for five pennies. It is clear that the
son’s preferences for these objects are both complete and transitive, satisfying the axioms for
consistency. Perhaps the son has not been economically eliminated, since the five pennies do still
have some value, but should there exist infinitely divisible denominations of hard currency, the
son would approach elimination. The implied reaction of the father to his son’s trades, lost on
the son, suggests that such a set of preferences is normatively unacceptable.
26The requirement of “just” compensation in eminent domain provisions in the United States
implies that policy crafters agreed that stripping a citizen of her assets, even for the public good,
leaves her worse off.
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with his environment (‘nature’ which includes ‘society’) a man who often makes
mistakes in his inferences and his sums is, in the long run, apt to fare less well
than if he had been a better logician and arithmetician.”
With this interpretation of ES as a necessary criterion for a normative theory
of choice, we return to the SMP thought experiment presented earlier. In the SMP,
at no point does an agent face a single choice that incorporates FOSD. Thus, taken
in isolation, a choice to buy or sell the lottery ticket cannot be said to necessarily
reveal anything about changes in the agent’s welfare. Should an agent buy the
ticket and then proceed to sell the ticket back for less money, the agent’s choices
consider as a set lead directly to her stock of assets being reduced by 1 unit. For
a considered theory to be a normatively acceptable theory of choice it must, at
a minimum, describe the agent as having become worse off than if she had never
engaged in the trades.
This concept of describing objective betterment across aggregated choices is
no different to previous uses of the standard money pump argument.27 Utilizing
the above example of a standard money pump, it isn’t until the extractor seeks to
trade back a reduced quantity of the agent’s original endowment, A − , for her
current stock of assets, C, that the agent is said to be made worse off. Furthermore,
all trades prior to the final trade cannot be said to necessarily make the agent
worse off, but are simply transfers of different stocks of goods. With all the trades
aggregated together however, the final trade is what completes the extraction that
leaves the agent with a smaller stock of assets.
All the stochastic models examined in the SMP thought experiment allow for the
27Note that Cubitt and Sugden (2001) do not dispute that the strict loss of a stock of assets, as
happens when a subject is “money pumped” over a series of choices, is normatively unacceptable.
They argue that EUT is sufficient, but not necessary, to prevent such a loss of assets.
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choices resulting in an extraction to occur. All of the examples except for Emma
even predict the extraction will occur with the same probability. Additionally,
every model allows for a mechanism to describe the agent’s welfare at every choice.
However, it is only the TR and CU models associated with the Beth and Cate
examples that satisfy the normative requirement described in this section.
Equations (2.41) and (2.42) show that the CU and TR models allow for the
observed extraction to occur, while equation (2.43) states that these agents are
worse off than they would have been had they not engaged in the trades. The
TR and CU models would make similar allowances for the selection of dominated
lotteries in FOSD lottery pairs, and also correctly align the subjective welfare
assessment with the ES criterion. Even considering alternative RE models that
assign a probability of 0 to dominated lotteries in FOSD lottery pairs, and thus
econometrically collapse with every proposed utility function having equal, 0,
likelihood, all proposed utility functions would still respect ES. Thus, it is a general
result that stand-alone RE and TR models successfully adhere to the normative
criteria described in this section.
The RP, RPPO, and the TR-RP models of Amy, Dana, and Emma however,
all share the property that the extraction of 1 unit of wealth from the agents can
be described subjectively as an increase in welfare. For the RP and RPPO models,
this description of an extraction as welfare improvement is guaranteed, while for
the TR-RP model this description is applicable under some conditions. Thus, I
argue that this property of the RP class of stochastic models violates the normative
criteria described in this section.
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2.5.2 Willingness to “Correct” Choices Criterion
The willingness to correct choices (WCC) criteria is often interpreted in multiple
ways. A general version of WCC requires that should an agent deviate from
the requirements of a theory of choice, and should she then be confronted with
the deviation, she will willingly “correct” her choices to conform with the theory.
Sometimes this argument states that the theory in question is normatively justified
if such a willingness to correct choices be observed empirically.
This criteria seems to require multiple moving pieces. First, an agent must
make choices that apparently violate the economic theory in question, such as
the kind of choices described in the money pump and SMP examples. Secondly,
someone, often characterized as an “expert” in decision problems, must confront
the agent with the theory and a prescription of how the agent should make choices
in light of this theory. Finally, the agent, presumably having been convinced about
the validity of the theory, chooses again and selects a set of choices that conform
to the theory. An alternate version of the criterion only requires that the agent in
question be an “expert” or some kind of exemplary decision maker herself.
Such a confrontation of experts is famously said to have occurred at a conference
on decision theory held in Paris in May 1952 between Leonard Savage and Maurice
Allais (Allais 1953, p. 1; Moscati 2016, p. 221). Savage, having presented arguments
for EUT during the conference, was asked by Allais to choose a lottery ticket he
would prefer to own from two pairs of lottery tickets. Savage made choices over
these two lottery pairs that violated the Independence Axiom of EUT, and was
confronted by Allais with proof of the violation. Allais argued that if even Savage
did not make choices in accordance with EUT, it could not be accepted as a
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normative theory. Savage replied that he had made a mistake in his choices, and
having been confronted with the error was willing to correct them. He argued that
his willingness to change his choices upon having been confronted with his error
was evidence in favor of the normative validity of EUT. In the terms of his private
correspondence with Samuleson, he would have nothing to “reproach” himself for in
having changed his choices to be in accordance with EUT (Moscati 2016, p. 230).
Most often, agents engaging in economically salient choices are not confronted
by other agents directly with suggestions about how their choices could better
conform to some normative theory. Instead, agents are generally only confronted
with the way their choices deviate from an economic theory indirectly, through
consequences of the operation of market forces. We can reformulate the WCC
criterion with market forces as the confronter of agents and pose the following
question: “When confronted with salient market outcomes resulting from choices
that are discordant with some theory, do agents willingly change their choices to
be in accordance with the theory in similar subsequent market interactions?”
Chu and Chu (1990) deliver evidence in favor of EUT responding to exactly
this question. They conduct an experiment replicating the design of Grether and
Plott (1979), which found frequent deviations from EUT, specifically, apparent
violations of transitivity.28 Chu and Chu (1990) differ from the previous replications
of Grether and Plott (1979) by actively engaging in arbitrage with subjects who
committed apparent violations of transitivity, thus experimentally simulating the
kind of market forces that would operate outside of the laboratory. Chu and
Chu (1990, p. 910) find that incidences of apparent violations of transitivity were
28There is an extensive literature, reviewed in Chapter 1, concerning the Grether and Plott
(1979) experiments.
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eliminated from all subjects’ choices after an average of 1.71 arbitrage transactions,
and that “subjects displayed substantially fewer reversals [apparently intransitive
choices] after they were exposed to a marketlike environment in previous rounds of
games.” The largest number of arbitrage transactions needed to induce conformity
to the transitivity axiom was 3, and this number of transactions occurred for only
one subject across all of their treatments. On the other hand, Braga, Humphrey
and Starmer (2009), in a similar experiment, find that while most anomalies are
eliminated with market exposure, others arise as rounds progress and that there
may exist a “just enough” amount of market exposure to induce conformity to
EUT.
Our revised WCC criterion requires that exposure to market forces must induce
a “correction” to choices that do not consistently lead to worse welfare outcomes,
such as the arbitrage transactions implemented by Chu and Chu (1990). TR and
RE models handle this requirement in 2 ways. First, both classes of models are
structured such that the most likely choice in every scenario is one that will leave
the agent at least as well off as she currently is. Thus there is a built-in correcting
mechanism in these models. Secondly, one could model the relevant stochastic
parameters, φ in the case of the TR model and D(β,X) or λ in the case of RE
models, as being determined in part by the number of choice problems (or arbitrage
transactions) experienced with the assumption of a negative coefficient. With this
specification, increased market interaction would lead to lower probabilities of
mistakes, and in the limit would result in choices conforming with EUT, just as
was observed by Chu and Chu (1990).
However, it isn’t clear which choices should be “corrected” given an RP model
and a set of choices which in aggregate do not conform to EUT. Each choice is
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the optimal choice given the preference relation drawn for that task. Changing a
choice in the RP model to make an aggregate choice pattern better conform to
EUT therefore implies that an option with lower utility should be selected over an
option with higher utility for certain tasks. This then, paradoxically, reduces the
expected welfare of the corrected choice pattern. Thus, the RP class of models do
not provide normatively useful statements with respect to the WCC criterion.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have shown that stochastic models of economic agents have been
given an increasing amount of attention, and have discussed three classes of models
at length: the “Tremble” (TR) model, the “Random Error” (RE) model, and the
“Random Preference” (RP) models. The primary purpose for which these models
were developed was to account descriptively for the apparent deviations from EUT
frequently observed in experimental data. To further this descriptive purpose,
these models were formulated in such a way as to make specific predictions about
observed choice probabilities in particular choice scenarios. The TR model requires
that all deviations from EUT are equally likely; the SU model requires Strong
Stochastic Transitivity; and the RP model requires that violations of FOSD have
a zero probability of occurring.
Additionally, these models are formulated mathematically to be parsimonious
and modular, meaning that their stochastic elements effectively never interfere with
the elements concerned with utility. The TR model and most of the RE models
only require the estimation of one parameter in addition to whatever model of
utility is employed, whereas common interpretations of the RP model only require
the additional estimation of two parameters. The modularity of these models also
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allows researchers such as Loomes, Moffatt and Sugden (2002) to combine them to
address potential descriptive shortfalls arising from their individual application.
However, the main purpose of this chapter is not to illustrate the descriptive
capabilities of these models, but to draw attention to their normative implications
and potential justifications. I propose a simple thought experiment involving a
contrived decision problem, the “Stochastic Money Pump” (SMP), and several
hypothetical agents who individually operate as if using differing classes of stochas-
tic models when making choices. The SMP is structured in such a way as to
demonstrate the possibility of an agent entering into a decision problem and then
leaving with a strictly lower stock of assets, as in the traditional “money pump.”
With the SMP in hand, we show that, at least for this decision problem, each of
the major classes of stochastic models can be parameterized in such a way that
they produce exactly the same descriptive choice probabilities. This descriptive
equality, however, does not in any way imply that the welfare implications of these
models are always equivalent or even coherent.
I show that for the examples of the models given, the TR and RE models
make equivalent implications concerning the welfare of agents, in particular, that
agents who have some of their assets extracted from them are modeled as strictly
worse off than if this had not happened. The same cannot be said about the RP
model or any of its derivatives, such as the proposed “Random Preference Per
Option” (RPPO) model or the RP-TR combination model. The mathematical
descriptions of welfare from these models beg the larger question of how or whether
the stochastic models can be normatively justified.
I attend to the discussion of normative coherence by first noting the historical
and contemporary emphasis on the potential of an economic theory to make
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statements about welfare that are useful for assessing policy. I attempt to limit the
discussion by focusing on two prominent criteria used in the literature on normative
justifications: “Economic Sustainability” (ES) and the “Willingness to Correct
Choices” (WCC).
I argue that the ES criterion requires adherence to a notion that strictly greater
stocks of assets are objectively better than smaller stocks of assets, and normative
models must require agents to subjectively conform to this valuation. I conclude
that only the RE and TR models make coherent statements with respect to ES;
the SMP thought experiment demonstrates how the RP model allows for the
implication that agents who have had assets extracted from them are subjectively
better off than if they had not suffered extraction.
I argue that to effectively posit the WCC criterion as a condition for normative
coherence, the role of the “confronter” must be delegated to the market. In this
interpretation, the WCC builds on the notion of “objective betterness” described
by ES by requiring that having been confronted with the market outcomes of a
choice, should the agent face the same decision again, the most likely choice she
will make will leave her at least as well off as her previous choice. I conclude
that, again, the RE and TR models make coherent statements with respect to this
criterion, but the RP models do not.
I find that the motivations underpinning the development of the RP model as
a descriptive model of choice probabilities are relatively sound. There has been
some evidence showing the RP model does statistically fit choice data better than
many alternative models, particularly when combined with the TR model, though
there has been a significant amount of evidence showing that heteroscedastic RE
models outperform RP. The RPPO model presents the possibility of still better
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statistical fit, particularly since it allows for the violation of FOSD in certain choice
scenarios.29 Whether the RPPO model does in fact perform statistically better
than other stochastic models is an empirical question that hasn’t been given much
attention.
I argue that the RPPO model shouldn’t be given much attention. The RP
and RPPO models both exist in a territory of economic modeling that concerns
itself with statistical fit and predictive quality, which are indeed things economists
should be concerned about, but cannot be used to make persuasive arguments
about how an agent maintains economic welfare through choices. It is the latter
of these two concerns which constitute the economic, as opposed to the technical,
content of the inquiry. The exercise presented in this chapter helps to inform the
econometric question proposed by analysts of “what is the ‘best’ stochastic model?”
by suggesting that the “best” model is the one which has the greatest “fit” among
the models that make normatively coherent statements about the welfare of the
modeled agents.
I conclude from this experiment that the RP model’s failure to provide coherent
statements on how the choice mechanism relates to a useful interpretation of welfare
renders it unsuitable for modeling the kind of choices over risky alternatives that
it was initially developed to describe. There may very well be other economic
environments in which the RP model provides useful normative statements, but
when explaining “noise” in binary lottery choices there are models that can make
sense of the noise and additionally provide useful normative statements. When
29The normalized RPPO model doesn’t allow an option with a single certain outcome to
be chosen over an option with a larger single certain outcome, but the un-normalized RPPO
model might, depending on the particular utility functions being utilized and distributions of
parameters.
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attempting to describe choices over risky alternatives, these models should be
preferred to the RP model and its derivatives, regardless of any evidence that
suggests it is a better fitting model. I recognize that rejecting a model that
potentially fits choice data from economic experiments better than its alternative
seems counter-empiricist, but if estimates from these models are only useful for
describing choice probabilities, and not the welfare implications of the choices made,
the model is not useful in economic applications.
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Chapter 3
The Welfare Implications of
Stochastic Models
Given the discussion about how the various stochastic models generally support
incorporation of the normative notion of welfare, I reintroduce the question asked
earlier in Chapter 2, section 2.2: “What are the likely welfare implications of an
economic agent’s choices in an incentivized risky environment given an assumed
stochastic model of risky choice?” The conclusion for the Random Preference (RP)
model and its derivative, the Random Preference Per Option (RPPO) model, is
“no perfectly coherent statements can be made.” As stated in the conclusion of
Chapter 2, the Random Error (RE) and Tremble (TR) models do not suffer from
this inadequacy, and will be referred to as “coherent models.”
Many stochastic models make specific restrictions on the probabilities associated
with certain special choice scenarios. For instance, options in a choice scenario
which are first order stochastically dominated (FOSD) by another option are
prohibited under the RP model and severely restricted under many heteroscedastic
RE models. For any choice scenario, an option which is FOSD by another option
can also be said to provide the subject with less expected utility, and thus less
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expected welfare. Thus, at the individual choice level there is a perfect relationship
between likelihood and welfare realization. In this chapter, I make clear that this
relationship between likelihood and welfare realization does not hold for aggregated
choice patterns. I also show that choice patterns which display behavior that
cannot be rationalized by a utility function can often result in greater welfare than
choice patterns which can be rationalized.1
How often this divergence between welfare realization and likelihood occurs,
and the extent to which this divergence in welfare terms is meaningful for an
individual agent, depends on the nature of the choice scenarios presented to the
agent and the agent’s preferences. Additionally, the likelihood of an agent holding
preferences in a population of interest will determine how likely we are to observe
choice patterns that are able to be rationalized, but are in fact suboptimal. To help
understand the relationship between the likelihood of observing a choice pattern
and its potential welfare consequences, I conduct a numerical exercise with methods
related to Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) and utilizing the Multiple Price
List (MPL) proposed by Holt and Laury (2002) (HL) for a given hypothetical
population of agents. To understand how the distribution of preferences in a
population influence the expected welfare realization of a population, I repeat this
analysis for many different populations. First however, I revisit some notation from
Chapter 2, briefly describe some econometric methods for identification, and then
propose some further notation to make concepts cleaner.
1A similar point is made by Wilcox (1993, p. 1402) concerning the relationship between the
expected value of choice patterns and their conformity to axioms.
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3.1 Notation and Estimation
For any salient lottery Xa, and any vector of parameters βi, there exists some
certain outcome, CEa, such that subject i is indifferent between the lottery and
the certainty equivalent:
Xa ∼i CEa ⇔ G(βi, Xa) = G(βi,CEa) (3.1)
where G(·) is some utility function with all the usual properties. For our purposes
throughout this chapter, we will assume some variation of the Rank Dependent
Utility (RDU) structure defined as follows:
RDU =
C∑
c=1
[wc(p)× u(xc)] (3.2)
where u(·) is the CRRA utility function throughout this chapter,
u(x) = x
(1−r)
(1− r) , (3.3)
and wi(p) is the decision weight applied to option a defined as
wc(p) =

ω
(
C∑
k=c
pk
)
− ω
 C∑
k=c+1
pk
 for c < C
ω(pc) for c = C
(3.4)
where ω(·) is a probability weighting function and w(·) are decision weights. In
cases where ω(pc) = pc, the RDU structure is equivalent to Expected Utility Theory
(EUT) as the decision weights for each option will equal their objective probabilities,
p. Many parametrized probability weighting functions allow for this special case
to occur.
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Combining the RDU structure with a CRRA utility function, we can define the
CE as follows:
G(βi, Xa) =
C∑
c=1
wc(p)
x(1−r)ca
(1− r) =
CE (1−r)a
(1− r)
CEa =
(
(1− r)×
C∑
c=1
wc(p)
x1−rca
(1− r)
)1/(1−r) (3.5)
where c indexes the C outcomes of option a in task t.
I continue the notation from Chapter 2 where the value of a also represents
each option’s ordinal rank among the alternative options in task t. Thus X1 < X2
and Xa < Xb, where b ≥ a. Similarly, we define the set of unchosen options from
the full set of alternatives as Z = t \ y = {z ∈ t | z /∈ y}, with the subscript on the
elements of Z indicating their ordinal rank in the set of Z. Thus XZ1 < XZ2 and
XZa < XZb , where b ≥ a.
The probability of any choice a by some subject i, given some vector of param-
eters β, being observed for a task t, is denoted by Pr(yt = a), where yt = a is an
indicator function that records option a as being chosen in task t. To make explicit
the dependency of this probability on the option in question, the subject, the task,
and the β vector, this relationship will be re-framed as follows:
Piat(βi) = Pr(yt = a) (3.6)
The likelihood of observing a series of choices is the product of the probability
of observing the option chosen for each task across all tasks, T :
PiT (βi) =
T∏
t
Piat(βi) (3.7)
This is the standard likelihood function applied to binary choice data, which
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assumes choices are statistically independent between tasks. We could take the log
of equation (3.7) and conduct standard maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) by
searching for the vector βˆi which maximizes the log-likelihood function:
LP iT (βi) =
T∑
t
ln (Pit(βi)) (3.8)
Thus, the maximum likelihood estimator βˆi for subject i is:
βˆi = arg max
x
T∑
t
ln (Pit(βi)) (3.9)
We can utilize this estimator to recover the CE for every option in every
task, and then utilize these CEs to recover our best estimate of the proportion of
welfare the subject obtained. While conducting welfare analysis given individually
estimated parameter vectors is rare in the economics literature,2 the recovery of
parameter vectors through MLE is relatively common. Hey and Orme (1994),
Wilcox (2015) and Hey (2001) provide several examples of parameter estimation.
These particular examples, however, are distinctly different from other uses of
MLE in experimental economics, primarily because equation (3.9) is estimated for
every subject individually, as opposed to pooling all subject data together and
estimating a parameter vector for one, representative agent (RA), as proposed in
the pioneering Camerer and Ho (1994).
There are legitimate methodological (and practical) reasons for modeling choices
across subjects as the choices of a single RA. For instance, the analyst could be
primarily concerned with the economic characteristics of the whole sample, rather
than with the individuals composing the sample. As shown in Harrison and
2Examples of this kind of analysis are Harrison and Ng (2016, 2018) and Harrison, Martínez-
Correa, Ng and Swarthout (2017).
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Rutström (2008, p. 63), it is easy to allow the βˆ to be determined by a linear
combination of observable characteristics of the subjects and/or experimental
treatments. For instance, if the race, gender and age of each of the subjects were
known, we could estimate:
βˆ = βˆ0 + βˆ1 × race + βˆ2 × gender + βˆ3 × age (3.10)
where βˆ1 through βˆ3 represent the mean marginal effects3 of race through age
respectively on the vector βˆ.
Another useful technology demonstrated by Harrison and Rutström (2009) for
RA modeling is the use of finite mixture modeling. This is when a finite mixture of
stochastic specifications are estimated jointly on the same data along with mixture
parameters. For instance,
PT =
T∏
t
[
M∑
m
pim × LmT (βm)
]
st.
M∑
m
pim = 1
(3.11)
where pim is the proportion of model m in the mixture, β is the vector of parameters
to be estimated in model m and LmT is the likelihood of the choice data across the
T tasks explained by model m given the vector βm.4 Similarly, the log-likelihood
for finite mixture models is defined as:
LPT =
T∑
t
[
ln
(
M∑
m
pim × LmT (βm)
)]
st.
M∑
m
pim = 1
(3.12)
3“Marginal” with reference to the default set of characteristics captured by the constant βˆ0.
4In this formulation, each observation can be generated by any of the models in the mixture,
as opposed to each subject having all observations being generated by one of the models in the
mixture.
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Thus M βm vectors and M − 1 pim scalars need to be estimated. These parameters
can additionally each be determined by observed characteristics, as in equation
(3.10). This method can be useful if the analyst wishes to estimate the proportion
of a sample which more closely adheres to RDU versus EUT for instance, or if
the analyst wants to determine if there is some heterogeneity in the sample that
is revealed by choice, but unobservable otherwise. Harrison and Rutström (2009,
p. 141) use this method to jointly estimate a specification composed of Prospect
Theory (PT) and EUT. They employ a Strong Utility (SU) stochastic model to
generate the probabilities. Although there does not appear to be any literature
doing so, it is possible to estimate a mixture of two differing stochastic models.
For instance, an analyst could use a mixture model to determine what proportion
of subjects in a dataset are better characterized by the SU or TR models.5
There are also some methodological problems, or at least limitations, when
conducting estimation on pooled data. The estimates represent the means of the
relevant parameters in the sample, but the distributions of these parameters and
whether these distributions are correlated can potentially provide more important
information to analysts.6 While the methods described in equations (3.10) and
5This process could be used to help with the econometric limitations of the pure RP model,
since those subjects who violate FOSD can be picked up by an alternative model which permitted
such violations. This process, of course, doesn’t resolve the RP model’s normative failures
discussed in chapter 2.
6For an example of why it could be problematic to make inferences about a population from
an estimate which represents the mean of a distribution of preferences consider a population
that has preferences distributed as Logit-Normal ∼ N (0, 5). Logit-Normal is a distribution in
which the logistic function, Λ, is applied to the realization of a Normal distribution N(µ, σ2).
See Figure 2 of Andersen, Harrison, Hole, Lau and Rutström (2012, p. 83). This distribution is
highly bi-modal, and the area around the mean of the distribution has very low density. Thus,
if a single stochastic specification is estimated on a sample from this population, the estimated
parameters representing their distributional means give highly misleading information about the
choice behavior we would expect from individual agents sampled from this population. In this
case a mixture model of two models could potentially identify the modes, thus providing more,
but still limited, information about the population. A similar approach is utilized by Conte, Hey
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(3.11) provide some insight into the heterogeneity of a pooled sample, this is
mostly limited to estimating average deviations from the mean due to observable
heterogeneity. While it is theoretically possible to have a mixture model with greater
than two underlying stochastic specifications, in reality this is computationally
demanding and thus the mixture model presented in (3.11) is often only utilized
with two mixtures.
Estimating parameter vectors for every subject in a sample helps to improve on
this limitation, as can “random coefficients,” discussed below. If every subject has
an individually estimated parameter vector, then an analyst can use the distribution
of these estimates to approximate the distribution of parameter vectors of the
population from which this sample was drawn. However, the individually estimated
parameters are still estimates, and thus they all have associated standard errors
and positive probabilities of misidentification. The likelihood of misidentification
typically decreases with the number of choice tasks presented to subjects, just as
standard errors are negatively correlated with sample size. Hey and Orme (1994)
estimate parameters for individual subjects utilizing 100 choice tasks per subject in
order minimize the potential for misidentification. Hey (2001) utilized 500 choice
problems per subject.
However, conducting experiments where subjects are required to give responses
to a large number of tasks has practical problems, which then spill over and generate
theoretical problems. Subjects can become bored or tired, which may make the
tasks less salient or cause them to fail to satisfy the dominance criteria described
by Smith (1982) and Harrison (1992). Often experimenters utilize a random lottery
incentive mechanism (RLIM) in experiments, selecting one choice by the subject at
and Moffatt (2011).
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random for payment. While in theory this is incentive compatible with EUT, it is
not necessarily incentive compatible with any utility theory that doesn’t require the
independence axiom (IA), such as RDU (Cox, Sadiraj and Schmidt 2015; Harrison
and Swarthout 2014). Furthermore, each additional choice task presented to the
subject dilutes the expected outcomes of the other choice tasks. This means that
the task could fail the dominance criteria unless the outcomes are sufficiently scaled
up, even if the outcomes and the payment mechanism are salient. Thus, when the
experimenter implements the RLIM for practical reasons, such as not needing to
resolve and then compensate a subject for all of potentially hundreds of choices,
he potentially introduces a serious theoretical concern.
These qualifications to estimation of individual parameter vectors should not
be considered fatal for this method, but they should be noted when conducting
this kind of estimation. Hey (2001) split the 500 choice tasks over 5 days to help
mitigate the potential for subjects to become bored. Other experimenters split
the T lottery tasks into smaller sets of tasks which are split by other, potentially
unrelated, tasks. These kinds of designs help mitigate the procedural problems
with such estimation, though sometimes they may introduce other concerns. While
subjects may be less bored by doing choice tasks over 5 days rather than all on 1
day, subjects may experience events in between sessions that change their beliefs
about the lottery pairs presented during the sessions.
An alternative method to recover greater information on entire samples of
agents is to estimate the distributions of the parameter vectors describing individual
preferences directly from pooled data.7 Instead of estimating preference parameters,
7Andersen, Harrison, Hole, Lau and Rutström (2012) discuss the application of these well-
known econometric methods to the estimation of standard models of risk (and time) preferences.
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the parameters which shape the distributions of preferences in the population
are estimated. This is often called a “random coefficients model”. We can call
equation (3.6), which is at the heart of equations (3.7) through (3.12), a conditional
probability, because the probability is conditional on a particular β vector. We can
however weight this function by the likelihood of observing the β vector from a
given distribution.8 We call this weighted probability the unconditional probability:
Pit(θ) =
∫
Pit(βi)f(β|θ)dβ (3.13)
where f(β|θ) is the density function of the β vector given some vector of hyper-
parameters θ shaping the distribution of the β.
This unconditional probability can be substituted for the conditional probability
used in equations (3.7) and (3.8) to give us the unconditional likelihood equation:
LiT (θ) =
T∏
t
Pit(θ) (3.14)
and its counterpart, the unconditional log-likelihood equation:
LLiT (θ) =
T∑
t
ln (Pit(θ)) (3.15)
Equations (3.13) through (3.15) are computationally impossible to estimate
directly due to the general “inability of computers to perform integration” for
non-trivial distributions in a closed-form (Train 2002, p. 2). However, equation
8It is worth noting the relation of these statements to a Bayesian approach. Having knowledge
of the distribution of preferences in a population is akin to holding a prior in a Bayesian approach.
This prior could then be incorporated to condition individual level estimates and produce an
individual level choice probability. This Bayesian technique is different from the two approaches
discussed here. The individual level approach discussed here does not incorporate a distributional
prior in its estimation process, while the unconditional approach generates choice probabilities
directly from pooled data, not individual data.
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(3.13) can be approximated by simulation as follows:
SP it(θ) =
H∑
h
Pit(βh)
H
(3.16)
Equation (3.16) needs some explanation. The integration involved in equation
(3.13) is approximated by taking H random draws of βh from the distribution
governed by θ, evaluating equation (3.6) with each of these H randomly drawn βh,
and taking a simple average across these H evaluations. Only a simple average
is needed because if the βh vectors are drawn at random from the distribution
governed by θ, then the likelihood of their occurrence is already weighted by the
distribution’s density.
The use of H as the term characterizing draws from a distribution is not
arbitrary. It indicates that the random draws will often be approximated by a
Halton sequence of numbers. The Halton routine is a numerical method to produce
a sequence of numbers which efficiently approximate random draws from a uniform
distribution bounded between 0 and 1, and which has been shown to provide better
coverage of the distribution than other pseudo-random9 number generators.10
The Halton sequence of uniformly distributed numbers can be transformed into
a sequence of randomly drawn numbers from any invertible, univariate distribution.
9All “random” numbers generated by computers are in fact “pseudo-random” numbers
produced algorithmically. Train (2002, p. 234) describes these numerical routines as follows:
“The intent in [the] design [of pseudo-random routines] is to produce numbers that exhibit the
properties of random draws. The extent to which this intent is realized depends, of course, on
how one defines the properties of ‘random’ draws. These properties are difficult to define precisely
since randomness is a theoretical concept that has no operational counterpart in the real world.”
Because of the non-existence of truly “random” number generators, the term “random” will be
used in place of “pseudo-random” throughout this text.
10See the remainder of Train (2002, Chapter 9) for an in-depth discussion and derivation of
why Halton sequences are widely viewed as being superior to many other pseudo-random number
generators for the purposes of simulating estimators, at least when the dimensionality of the
estimation problem is small.
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That is, if µ is taken to be a random variable indicating a draw from a uniform
distribution, and F () is an invertible, univariate, cumulative distribution, then
given µ, draws of  from this distribution can be obtained by solving  = F−1(µ).
Train (2002, p. 236) discusses this method for obtaining random draws from
invertible, univariate distributions, as well as using Choleski transformations to
obtain draws from multivariate normal distributions.
With this simulated unconditional probability, we can obtain the simulated
unconditional likelihood by substituting equation (3.16) for equation (3.13) in
equation (3.14):
SLiT (θ) =
T∏
t
 H∑
h
Pit(βh)
H
 (3.17)
Equation (3.17) is limited in terms of identifying θ because, as indicated by the
i subscript, this metric is defined for a single agent. Since the normatively coherent
stochastic models discussed in Chapter 2 have non-random elements composing βi,
there is no distribution of βi to be estimated from a single agent’s choices. The real
power of this method is realized, however, when sample data are pooled together
and the distribution of βi vectors is estimated from this pooled data. This is an
easy extension of equation (3.17), which is logged for numerical reasons:
SLLNT (θ) =
N∑
i=1
(
T∑
t
[
ln
(
H∑
h
Pit(βh)
H
)])
(3.18)
We call equation (3.18) the unconditional simulated log-likelihood function, or just
the simulated log-likelihood function (SLL). Maximum simulated likelihood (MSL)
methods can be applied to this equation to return the MSL estimator θˆ which
maximizes this function. The characteristics of simulated estimators are reviewed
in depth by Train (2002, Chapter 10), and the critical insight is that the estimator
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θˆ derived from equation (3.18) approaches the estimator from equation (3.15) with
a sufficiently large, H, number of draws from the distribution governed by θ.
Estimating the distribution of preferences for a sample with MSL may improve
the analyst’s position over RA models with pooled data. The limitation of estimat-
ing only the conditional mean preference parameter for pooled data with standard
MLE is no longer binding. Flexible distributions such as the Logit-Normal11 can
be employed to estimate higher moments of the distribution such as the variance,
skewness and kurtosis. Additionally, the individual elements of θ can be modeled
as linear functions of observable covariates, as was done in equation (3.10) for
pooled MLE. This added flexibility allows the analyst to have greater information
about preferences at the sample level, and can also be used to make characteri-
zations of welfare at the individual level. On the other hand, MSL routines are
computationally intensive, and become even more so when MSL mixture models
are estimated.
3.2 The Holt and Laury (2002) MPL and the
Unconditional Assessment of Expected
Welfare
Each of the econometric methods detailed above provide some information about
economics agents, either at the individual or collective level, and each have their
own strengths and limitations. Issues concerning statistical power and identification
for individual level estimation will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 4. In
11Andersen, Harrison, Hole, Lau and Rutström (2012, p. 82) utilize the Logit-Normal dis-
tribution because of its high degree of flexibility and because “MSL algorithms developed for
univariate or multivariate Normal distributions can be applied directly.” The figures they present
(2012, p. 83) display some of the flexible forms this distribution can take.
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the discussion below, I detail the usefulness of knowledge of the distributions of
preferences in a population, given by θ, but not the methods and limitations of
estimating θˆ via MSL or some other estimation procedure. The results presented
below are therefore numerical approximations of statistics for candidate values of θ,
not estimates of statistics given an estimated θˆ. The formulae presented below for θ
could be extended to incorporate standard errors associated with he elements of θˆ,
but additional assumptions about the sampled population would need to be made.
In this section I demonstrate that knowledge of the distribution of preferences in a
population, given by θ, can provide useful information about the expected welfare
of individual agents from this population for any given pattern of choices.
To make this discussion more concrete, we can utilize one of the HL-MPL
instruments alluded to earlier and displayed in Table 3.1. In the HL experiment
subjects were presented with this table, without the “Expected Payoff Difference”
and “CRRA for Indifference” columns, and asked to select one option from each
row. The “Option A” column indicates the outcomes and associated probabilities
for option A in each of 10 tasks, and similarly for the “Option B” column. The
“CRRA for Indifference” column indicates the CRRA value that would make an
EUT agent indifferent between option A and option B. Thus, an agent with a
CRRA value of 0.5 would theoretically select option A for rows 1-6, and then
“switch” to selecting option B for the remaining rows.
The popularity of this approach is in part due to its straightforward logic: if a
subject conforms to a deterministic EUT specification, then she should start off
selecting option A, then at some point switch once, and only once, to selecting
option B for the remaining rows or she should select B for every row. The point at
which the subject switches reveals an interval in which preference for risk must lie,
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Table 3.1: The Ten Paired Lottery-Choice Decisions with Low Payoffs
Holt and Laury (2002, p. 1645)
Row # Option A Option B Expected ValueDifference
CRRA for
Indifference
1 1/10 of $2.00 , 9/10 of $1.60 1/10 of $3.85 , 9/10 of $0.10 $1.17 -1.7134
2 2/10 of $2.00 , 8/10 of $1.60 2/10 of $3.85 , 8/10 of $0.10 $0.83 -0.9468
3 3/10 of $2.00 , 7/10 of $1.60 3/10 of $3.85 , 7/10 of $0.10 $0.50 -0.4866
4 4/10 of $2.00 , 6/10 of $1.60 4/10 of $3.85 , 6/10 of $0.10 $0.16 -0.1426
5 5/10 of $2.00 , 5/10 of $1.60 5/10 of $3.85 , 5/10 of $0.10 -$0.18 0.1464
6 6/10 of $2.00 , 4/10 of $1.60 6/10 of $3.85 , 4/10 of $0.10 -$0.51 0.4115
7 7/10 of $2.00 , 3/10 of $1.60 7/10 of $3.85 , 3/10 of $0.10 -$0.85 0.6762
8 8/10 of $2.00 , 2/10 of $1.60 8/10 of $3.85 , 2/10 of $0.10 -$1.18 0.9706
9 9/10 of $2.00 , 1/10 of $1.60 9/10 of $3.85 , 1/10 of $0.10 -$1.52 1.3684
10 10/10 of $2.00 , 0/10 of $1.60 10/10 of $3.85 , 0/10 of $0.10 -$1.85 N/A
at least under EUT.
However, this pattern need not necessarily occur given stochastic specifications.
Subjects may, and sometimes do, switch multiple times between option A and
option B as they work their way down the rows. Some subjects even select option
A in row 10, despite it being dominated by option B. The first of these observed
choice behaviors is often referred to as multiple switching behavior (MSB), while
the second is a form of FOSD since there is no risk involved in row 10. Holt and
Laury (2002, p. 1647) observe that 28 of their 212 subjects exhibited MSB. Rather
than discussing all of the potential reasons why a subject would exhibit MSB, we
will assume a normatively coherent stochastic model and discuss the implications
of MSB within it.
The HL-MPL instrument is a useful instrument to discuss the welfare implica-
tions of stochastic models because the observed MSB is an apparent violation of
EUT that is easy to notice visually without estimation. As discussed in Chapter
2, when utilizing normatively coherent stochastic models, observed violations of
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EUT necessarily imply that some welfare has been forgone by the agent because of
the violation according to EUT. In Savage’s terms, one would have something to
“reproach” oneself for by violating the theory (Moscati 2016, p. 230). Since there is
no deterministic EUT utility function which allows either the switching back and
forth from option A to option B or the selection of a guaranteed, lower outcome
over a guaranteed, higher outcome, it must be the case that the observance of MSB
implies that some welfare has been forgone, at least under an EUT framework.
An important and often overlooked reality of stochastic models is that even if
a subject doesn’t display MSB, the subject may still have made choice errors and
therefore have foregone some amount of welfare. This may not seem obvious at
first, since any non-MSB choice pattern can be rationalized by some preference
relation. Cases such as these arise when a subject makes a choice error with respect
to the utility function they employ, but this choice error results in a choice pattern
that is still rationalizable, or “consistent.” When we incorporate knowledge of a
sample’s distribution of preferences governed by θ, we can see that many observed,
apparently “consistent” choice patterns contain more choice errors and are often
more costly in terms of foregone welfare than apparently “inconsistent” choice
patterns. This will be made clear in the discussion below, but first we must define
some notation.
Utilizing notation from the beginning of Section 3.1, an option in a set of
alternatives t is represented as Xat, where a indicates the option’s ordinal rank
among the set of alternatives given the agent’s utility parameter vector, βi, and
yt = a indicates that option a was chosen by the agent in task t. We can define
a “choice error” as any choice where the option chosen was not ordinally ranked
the highest among the set of alternatives with respect to the agent’s preferences,
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given by βi. Therefore a choice error in task t is when yt 6= 1 (recall the description
of subscripts given for equation (3.5)), and an indicator function for choice errors
given some vector of assumed utility parameters βi is given by:
Kt(βi) =

1 yt 6= 1
0 yt = 1
(3.19)
The frequency of choice errors by agent i in the choice pattern yt × T is:
MT (βi) =
T∑
t
K(βi) (3.20)
Given the distribution parameter vector θ, we can define the expected frequency
of choice errors in the choice pattern yt × T as:
E(M |θ) =
∫
M(βi)f(β|θ)dβ (3.21)
where, just as in equation (3.13), f(β|θ) is the density function of the β vector
given the vector of hyper-parameters θ shaping the distribution of the β. Equation
(3.21) is just the mean of the discrete distribution of choice errors in the choice
pattern yt× T, given the distribution parameter vector θ. Because the distribution
of choice errors is discrete, M(βi) ∈ [0, T ] ⊂ N0, we can define the probability mass
function of choice errors as follows:12
PE(e|θ) =
∫
N [M(β), e]f(β|θ)dβ (3.22)
12N0 indicates the set of natural numbers, inclusive of 0. N1 or N+ would indicate the set of
natural numbers not inclusive of 0.
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where
N [M(β), e] =

1 M(β) = e
0 M(β) 6= e
(3.23)
and e indicates the number of choice errors for the given choice pattern and θ
vector. Equation (3.22) provides useful information about whether an observed
pattern deviates from a deterministic choice model, but is limited since it assigns
equal weight to errors which are very costly in terms of welfare and errors that are
not so costly.
We can incorporate two of the metrics developed in Chapter 2 for welfare
assessment into this sample framework. The first metric, calculated for a choice
pattern yt × T , is equivalent to a standard consumer surplus calculation:
∆WiT =
T∑
t=1
(
CE iyt − CEZi1t
)
(3.24)
where CE iyt is the CE of the option chosen, indicated by the subscript y, by agent
i in task t, and CEZi1t is the CE of the option that is ordinally ranked the highest
among the set of unchosen alternatives, Z, with respect to the agent’s preferences,
given by βi, in task t. Throughout this chapter, we will refer to the metric in
equation (3.24) as the “welfare surplus” metric. The second metric we propose to
characterize the welfare implications of choices is similar to the concept of auction
and market “efficiency” proposed by Plott and Smith (1978):
%WiT =
T∑
t=1
CE iyt
T∑
t=1
CE i1t
(3.25)
In the metric defined in equation (3.25), the CE ’s of the options chosen by the
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agent across all tasks T are summed, and then divided by the CE ’s of the options
that were ordinally ranked the highest with respect to the agent’s preferences across
all the tasks. Therefore, should an agent never make a choice error, this metric
would take on the value of 1, and should the agent make at least one choice error,
it would take on a value between 0 and 1.13 Throughout this chapter, we will refer
to the metric in equation (3.25) as the “welfare efficiency” metric.
The welfare surplus and welfare efficiency metrics from equations (3.24) and
(3.25) can be used in place of equation (3.20) in equation (3.21) to gather useful
information for a given choice pattern and θ vector:
E(∆WT |θ) =
∫
∆WT (β)f(β|θ)dβ (3.26)
E(%WT |θ) =
∫
%WT (β)f(β|θ)dβ (3.27)
Given equation (3.23), we can denote the expected welfare surplus and the
expected welfare efficiency obtained by agents who have committed e ∈ [0, T ] errors
by making choices yt × T as follows:
E(∆WT |θ, e) =
∫ (
∆WT (β)×N [M(β), e]
)
f(β|θ)dβ (3.28)
E(%WT |θ, e) =
∫ (
%WT (β)×N [M(β), e]
)
f(β|θ)dβ (3.29)
The same limitation mentioned about MSL concerning a computer’s inability
to perform closed-form integration in general applies to equations (3.21), (3.22),
and (3.26) through (3.27). However, these equations can be approximated in the
13There are a few mathematical peculiarities with this metric. This metric can lose its (0, 1)
bounds if any of the T tasks has a mixed frame, that is, a task that has both positive and negative
outcomes. This metric would become negative if the CE of a chosen option is negative and the
CE of the highest ranked option is positive. Also, this metric becomes undefined if the CE of
the highest ranked alternative is 0. These general issues will not be of concern in this chapter
because all examples of lotteries have outcomes in the strictly positive domain.
135
manner described for MSL in equation (3.16): the terms in these equations between
the integrand and the density function will be evaluated with β vectors randomly
drawn H times from the distribution governed by θ, and then averaged. As H gets
sufficiently large, the simulated statistics approach the true statistics.
3.2.1 Sample Level Analysis with an EUT Population
The simulation methods described here and for the remainder of this chapter
characterize an individual agent as having a single βi vector representing her
preferences, and making choices in an economic environment that satisfies the Smith
(1982) precepts for valid economic experiments. An individual agent i generates an
observed choice pattern yt × T by resolving the stochastic process defined by her
preferences. In Chapter 2 we described normatively coherent stochastic models as
those models that characterize agents as having non-random preferences, thus an
agent’s preferences do not change from choice to choice.14 Individual βi parameter
vectors are themselves drawn from a population of β vectors. This distribution of β
vectors in the population is characterized by the parameter vector θ. Throughout
the following discussion, we will refer to a choice pattern’s likelihood of being
observed, by which we mean the choice pattern’s simulated likelihood as calculated
in equation (3.17). This is the probability of observing a choice pattern given that
it has been generated by an agent randomly drawn from the population defined by
θ. Likewise, when we discuss the expected welfare implications of a choice pattern
14Not only are we assuming that agents do not have random preferences, we’re also assuming
that an agent’s preferences are the same across choices generally. We could, as Hey (2001) does,
model some or all of the parameters in an agent’s utility function as being partly determined
by the number of choices that the agent has encountered. Because preferences modeled in this
way change from choice to choice in a non-random manner, the welfare analysis discussed in
this chapter could be extended in a normatively coherent manner to incorporate this “learning,”
potentially with interesting implications. This would involve specifying additional marginal
distributions which characterize the parameters defining the “learning” process.
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for a given population, we are discussing the expected welfare implications for an
agent from that population who generated that choice pattern.
To construct an explicit numerical example, we first define the models character-
izing an individual agent’s choice probabilities, and then the marginal distributions
of the elements of β which together define the population characterized by θ. For
the sake of simplicity, we first consider a population entirely composed of agents
conforming to an EUT utility model with a Contextual Utility (CU) stochastic
model due to Wilcox (2008). Thus, choice probabilities for an individual agent are
defined as follows:
Piat(βi) = Pr
(
t ≥ 1
D(βi, Xt)λi
[G(βi, Xkt)−G(βi, Xjt)]
)
= 1− F
(
G(βi, Xkt)−G(βi, Xjt)
D(βi, Xt)λi
)
= Pr(yt = a)
(3.30)
where t defines the random error associated with the measurement of utility, the
functional form of the utility function, G(·), is the CRRA function of the form
u(x) = x1−r(1−r) , F (·) is the logistic cumulative distribution function (cdf), and the
adjusting function D(·) is as follows:
D(βi, Xt) = max [u(xit)]−min[u(xit)]
st. wi(xit) 6= 0
(3.31)
Thus the βi vector for each agent is said to consist of only two parameters, r and
λ. The joint distribution of these two parameters characterizes the population of
agents and is characterized by the parameter vector θ. We assume the marginal
distributions of the r and λ parameters to be independent and uncorrelated in
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the population.15 The r parameter can conceivably take any value, but to make
the bulk of the density lie in the familiar range of the literature employing the
HL-MPL instrument, we assume it to be distributed normal, with mean of 0.65
and a standard deviation of 0.3, thus r ∼ N (0.65, 0.32). The λ parameter must be
strictly positive, so it will be assumed to be distributed as gamma with a mean of
0.35 and a standard deviation of 0.3. This is equivalent to a gamma distribution
with a shape parameter of k ≈ 1.36 and a scale parameter of t ≈ 0.26, thus
λ ∼ Γ(1.36, 0.26). Together these 4 parameters make the joint distribution-shaping
parameter θ = {0.65, 0.32, 1.36, 0.26}.
The metrics described in equations (3.17) and (3.20) through (3.29) rely on
a given choice pattern, yt × T . In the HL-MPL instrument there are a total of
210 = 1024 choice patterns that can be observed. To begin the discussion of
the welfare implications of stochastic choice models, we calculate the values for
equations (3.17), and (3.20) through (3.29) for all TT = 1024 choice patterns and
all e ∈ [0, T ] for the given θ, with H = 2.5× 106.
To make clear how the result of these equations are arrived at, we can work
through the calculations step by step. First, we select a choice pattern from one of
the 1024 choice patterns possible with the HL-MPL instrument, for example, the
choice of option A for the first five rows and option B for rows 6 through 10. Next
a βi vector is drawn from the joint distribution defined by θ. As an example, we
assume βi = {r = 0.65, λ = .35} was drawn; recall that we are also assuming EUT
with a CU stochastic model. Utilizing this βi and choice pattern, we can evaluate
15This is done for convenience; adding correlation among the marginal distributions would
require the specification of a covariance matrix. In samples of real populations, we might expect
there to be correlation among these marginal distributions, and this analysis can be easily
extended to accommodate it. This additional step is not difficult, but introduces more parameters
to keep track of and doesn’t significantly add to the narrative.
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the various metrics proposed. First, we evaluate equation (3.7), the likelihood that
agent i would produce this choice pattern, utilizing equation (3.30) to calculate
choice probabilities for the individual tasks:
Pi,a,1 = Pr(y1 = A | βi) = 0.82
Pi,a,2 = Pr(y2 = A | βi) = 0.78
Pi,a,3 = Pr(y3 = A | βi) = 0.74
Pi,a,4 = Pr(y4 = A | βi) = 0.68
Pi,a,5 = Pr(y5 = A | βi) = 0.62
Pi,a,6 = Pr(y6 = B | βi) = 0.44
Pi,a,7 = Pr(y7 = B | βi) = 0.51
Pi,a,8 = Pr(y8 = B | βi) = 0.57
Pi,a,9 = Pr(y9 = B | βi) = 0.63
Pi,a,10 = Pr(y10 = B | βi) = 0.95
PiT =
T=10∏
t=1
Piat(βi) = 0.0154
(3.32)
Note that Pi,a,6 = 0.44 < 0.50. With the CU stochastic model, given in equation
(3.30), the option with the greatest utility, expected or otherwise, will always have
the greatest probability of being chosen. Since there are only two alternatives in
row #6, and the choice probability of option B is less than that of option A, it
must be the case that option B in this row had a lower expected utility than option
A. If B has a lower expected utility than A, the choice of B in row #6 is a choice
error. Using the notation defined in Section 3.1, y6 = 2, and for all t ∈ {T \ 6},
yt = 1. This information allows us to evaluate equation (3.20), the frequency of
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choice errors in a given choice pattern, utilizing equation (3.19):
Pi,a,1 = Pr(y1 = A | βi) = 0.82 ⇒ K1(βi) = 0
Pi,a,2 = Pr(y2 = A | βi) = 0.78 ⇒ K2(βi) = 0
Pi,a,3 = Pr(y3 = A | βi) = 0.74 ⇒ K3(βi) = 0
Pi,a,4 = Pr(y4 = A | βi) = 0.68 ⇒ K4(βi) = 0
Pi,a,5 = Pr(y5 = A | βi) = 0.62 ⇒ K5(βi) = 0
Pi,a,6 = Pr(y6 = B | βi) = 0.44 ⇒ K6(βi) = 1
Pi,a,7 = Pr(y7 = B | βi) = 0.51 ⇒ K7(βi) = 0
Pi,a,8 = Pr(y8 = B | βi) = 0.57 ⇒ K8(βi) = 0
Pi,a,9 = Pr(y9 = B | βi) = 0.63 ⇒ K9(βi) = 0
Pi,a,10 = Pr(y10 = B | βi) = 0.95 ⇒ K10(βi) = 0
M(βi) =
T=10∑
t=1
Kt(βi) = 1
(3.33)
Thus we see that our subject i has committed one choice error across the T tasks,
the choice error in row #6. This result allows us to calculate equation (3.23) for
values of e ∈ [0, T ]. Equation (3.23) is just an indicator function that signals if
the frequency of choice errors in the choice pattern, given by equation (3.19), is
equal to some scalar e. Thus, if we know the result of equation (3.19), which for
the example shown above is 1, we know that the result of equation (3.23) will be 1
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for e = 1, and 0 for all other values of e.
N(MT (βi) = 1, e = 0) = 0
N(MT (βi) = 1, e = 1) = 1
N(MT (βi) = 1, e = 2) = 0
N(MT (βi) = 1, e = 3) = 0
N(MT (βi) = 1, e = 4) = 0
N(MT (βi) = 1, e = 5) = 0
N(MT (βi) = 1, e = 6) = 0
N(MT (βi) = 1, e = 7) = 0
N(MT (βi) = 1, e = 8) = 0
N(MT (βi) = 1, e = 9) = 0
N(MT (βi) = 1, e = 10) = 0
(3.34)
Next we can calculate the two welfare metrics from equations equations (3.24)
and (3.25), indicating welfare surplus and welfare efficiency respectively. First we
calculate the CE of option A and option B for all T = 10 tasks using equation
(3.5). We note the CE of the chosen and unchosen options for the given choice
pattern, the difference between the two, and the greatest CE of the two options
for each task:
With the CE ’s calculated, we can substitute them in to equations (3.24) and
(3.25). For equation equation (3.24), we take the sum of column 6 in Table 3.2:
∆WiT =
T∑
t=1
(
CE iyt − CEZi1t
)
= 8.92 (3.35)
and for equation (3.25), we take the sum of column 4 and divide it by the sum of
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Table 3.2: Example CE ’s of EUT Agent with HL-MPL
Task CE of A CE of B CE of ChosenOption
CE of Unchosen
Option
CE of Chosen -
CE of Unchosen
Greatest
CE
1 1.64 0.19 1.64 0.19 1.44 1.64
2 1.68 0.33 1.68 0.33 1.35 1.68
3 1.71 0.52 1.71 0.52 1.20 1.71
4 1.75 0.76 1.75 0.76 0.99 1.75
5 1.79 1.07 1.79 1.07 0.72 1.79
6 1.83 1.46 1.46 1.83 −0.38 1.83
7 1.87 1.92 1.92 1.87 0.04 1.92
8 1.92 2.47 2.47 1.92 0.55 2.47
9 1.96 3.11 3.11 1.96 1.15 3.11
10 2.00 3.85 3.85 2.00 1.85 3.85
column 7:
%WiT =
T∑
t=1
CE iyt
T∑
t=1
CE i1t
= 21.3721.74 = .983 (3.36)
Finally, we multiply the welfare metrics derived in equations (3.35) and (3.36) by
the indicator functions derived for e ∈ [0, T ] in equation (3.23):
N(MT (βi) = 1, e = 1)×∆WiT = 1× 8.92 = 8.92
N(MT (βi) = 1, e 6= 1)×∆WiT = 0× 8.92 = 0
(3.37)
N(MT (βi) = 1, e = 1)×%WiT = 1× .983 = .983
N(MT (βi) = 1, e 6= 1)×%WiT = 0× .983 = 0
(3.38)
The indicator functions in equation (3.34) are mutually exclusive, therefore the
product of the indicator functions and the welfare metrics will be 0 for all but one
value of e, and equal to the welfare metrics for the remaining e, in this example,
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for e = 1.
Having derived the results of these equations for one given choice pattern,
we iterate through the remaining 1023 choice patterns for this particular agent,
repeating the numerical exercise described above for each choice pattern. With
metrics defined for this particular agent across all TT = 1024 possible choice
patterns, a new βi vector is drawn from θ, and the entire process repeated. For
the calculations described below, we repeat the process of drawing a βi from θ
and calculating the results of these metrics for all choice patterns S = 2.5 ×
106 times. This process results in a 3 dimensional array with (# of metrics ×
# of choice patterns × S) = 33× 1024× (2.5× 106) = 8.448× 1010 elements.
To arrive at the population level metrics, we take the average of each metric
defined in equations (3.32) through (3.38) across all S simulated agents for each
choice pattern. Since each βi was drawn randomly from the distribution governed
by θ, only a simple average is needed. This averaging leaves us with a dataset that
has 33× 1024 = 33, 792 elements.
This resulting dataset, however, is too large to be usefully displayed in full, so
for now we restrict attention to the 10 choice patterns most likely to be observed in
a population governed by θ, and discuss the metrics calculated in equations (3.21),
(3.26), (3.27), and (3.22) with e = (0, 1). The results of these equations for the 10
most likely choice patterns to be observed in a population governed by θ are given
in Table 3.3.
For the “Choice in Row” column in Table 3.3, 0 indicates a choice of A for the
row, and 1 indicates a choice of B. Note that the choice pattern that is mostly likely
to be observed from a sample drawn from the specified population governed by θ,
shown in the first row where Rank is 1, is the choice pattern we would observe from
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Table 3.3: HL-MPL Welfare and Error Expectations for Choice Patterns with Top
Ten Simulated Likelihoods, EUT
Choice in Row SimulatedLikelihood
Expected
Errors
Welfare
Efficiency
Welfare
Surplus PE(e = 0) PE(e = 1)
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.0360 0.880 0.9861 9.33 0.322 0.489
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.0341 0.950 0.9859 9.32 0.323 0.456
3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.0244 1.454 0.9658 8.56 0.167 0.364
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.0231 1.523 0.9656 8.55 0 0.489
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.0219 1.595 0.9663 8.36 0 0.456
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.0207 1.665 0.9661 8.35 0.134 0.331
7 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.0166 1.787 0.9474 7.93 0 0.364
8 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.0158 1.857 0.9472 7.92 0 0.323
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.0150 1.864 0.9506 7.16 0 0.322
10 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.0148 2.168 0.9460 7.59 0 0.167
an agent described by a deterministic choice process with preferences at the mean
of the distribution of r. The next two most likely choice patterns, where Rank is 2
and 3, correspond to the choice pattern we would observe from agents described
by a deterministic choice process with preferences one standard deviation either
side of the mean of the distribution of r.
Interestingly, for each of the three most likely choice patterns, it is far more
likely than not that an agent displaying these choice patterns made at least one
choice error, and thus did not obtain maximal welfare from her choices. This is
shown by the values in column PE(e = 0), which reference equation (3.22), all being
less than 0.50, indicating that less than 50% of subjects will commit 0 choice errors
for these choice patterns. Note that only 32.2% of agents who display the most
likely choice pattern in row 1 are expected to have not made any choice errors and
therefore obtain maximal welfare. This is despite the fact that any of these choice
patterns can be rationalized by some set of preferences for our assumed model.
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These patterns do, however, produce relatively high expected welfare efficiency and
surplus. The welfare surplus metric is less informative in this comparison: it is
more useful in making absolute rather than relative statements about welfare.
The relatively large values of 1 − PE(e = 0), which imply that most choice
patterns contain at least 1 choice error, is mainly due to the shape and location
of the distribution of r. The mean of r, at 0.65, lies just next to the indifference
boundary between rows 6 and 7 of the HL-MPL instrument, as indicated in the
column “CRRA for Indifference” of Table 3.1. That means that the bulk of
the r values drawn from this distribution define utility values that indicate near
indifference between the A and B lotteries in row 7 of the HL-MPL instrument.
All RE models increase the probability of a choice error the closer an agent is to
being indifferent between 2 options, so it should not be a surprise that with this
particular choice of distribution for r we have a large proportion of choice errors.
Similarly, since many agents in this population would be nearly indifferent between
the A and B lotteries in row 7 of the HL-MPL, the expected cost of the choice
errors in row 1 in welfare terms is realtively low, as can be seen by the value in the
“Welfare Efficiency” being very close to 1.
The fourth and fifth most likely choice patterns in Table 3.3, where Rank is 4
and 5, are not consistent with any deterministic EUT preferences. These patterns
display what we will call “Light MSB”: not including the choice made in row 10,
the agent has “switched” between choosing A and B three times.16 Because MSB
is not consistent with any deterministic EUT preferences, PE(e = 0) = 0 for these
patterns. In fact, the only choice patterns in which PE(e = 0) > 0 will be those
16The reason that row 10 is not included in this definition is because we are making a distinction
between patterns which do and do not include a choice of A in row 10 later.
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which are “Consistent”: displaying a choice pattern that can be rationalized by
some deterministic EUT preferences.
Despite the patterns in rows 4 and 5 of Table 3.3 being obviously inconsistent
with a deterministic EUT process, they both are more likely to be observed from
agents drawn from a population defined by θ, and obtain greater welfare surplus
than the sixth most likely choice pattern which is “Consistent.” The likelihood
of the “Light MSB” choice patterns in rows 4 and 5, displayed in the “Simulated
Likelihood” column, are greater than the likelihood of the choice pattern in row
6, which is consistent. The welfare efficiency metric for row 5, displayed in the
“Welfare Efficiency” column, is greater than that of row 6, and the welfare surplus
metrics for both rows 4 and 5 are greater than for row 6. Since metrics for all
TT = 1024 choice patterns were calculated, we will see in the discussion below
that these two Light MSB patterns are both more likely to be observed and to be
less costly in terms of welfare surplus than 6 out of 10 “Consistent” patterns.
Another interesting aspect of this analysis is the correlation of welfare and the
likelihood of observing a choice pattern. The correlation between the simulated
likelihood of the choice patterns and their expected welfare efficiency is 0.62 across
the whole dataset, while the simulated likelihood and expect welfare surplus has a
correlation of 0.68. These are positive but far from 1. That is, as the likelihood of
observing a choice pattern increases, the expected welfare efficiency and surplus of
the choice pattern generally increases as well, but not always. This is apparent in
rows 8 and 9 of Table 3.3. The choice pattern described in row 8 is more likely to be
observed than the pattern in row 9, but the pattern in row 9 has a higher expected
welfare efficiency than row 8, though not by much. The very large number of draws
employed in these calculations rules out the possibility that this is a statistical
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fluke caused by the random way these statistics were calculated.
This example illustrates how stochastic models are not “welfare ranking” models,
but instead incorporate aspects of the choice process that are considered to be
normatively desirable, while maintaining descriptive power. The example of row
8 and 9 only depicts the most common occurrence where the expected welfare
efficiency of a pattern and its likelihood diverge in this hypothetical population.
The most drastic divergence occurs between the patterns which have violated FOSD
by selecting option A in row 10, and those that have not.
To make this distinction clear, Figure 3.1 plots the log of the SL (SLL) against
the expected welfare efficiency of the choice patterns that:
• are Consistent with deterministic EUT,
• are Consistent other than the choice of A in row 10 (FOSD Only),
• display Light MSB, the agent has “switched” between choosing A and B
three times, with a choice of B in row 10,
• display Light MSB with a choice of A in row 10 (Light MSB + FOSD).
In Figure 3.1 each point represents a unique choice pattern. For any given
point plotted, any other point to the Southeast of that point indicates a pattern
that is both more likely to be produced by an agent drawn randomly from this
population and provides lower expected welfare efficiency. For instance, any point
in the shaded region of Figure 3.1 represents a choice pattern that is both more
likely to be observed and has a lower expected welfare efficiency than pattern Y.
Figure 3.1 shows that the choice of A in row 10 greatly decreases the SLL of the
pattern, but barely decreases the expected ratio of obtained welfare to maximal
welfare, all else being equal. For example, the most likely consistent choice pattern
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Figure 3.1: Consistent and Light MSB, With and Without Row 10 Error
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is the top right-most red dot in Figure 3.1, labeled “X,” which corresponds to row
1 of Table 2 and has a welfare efficiency of 0.986 and a SL of 0.036. The most
likely choice pattern with a choice of A in row 10 is the top right-most green dot,
labeled “Y.” This pattern is identical to the “X” pattern other than the selection
of A in row 10 and has a welfare efficiency of 0.938 and a SL of 0.00246. The ratio
of welfare obtained to maximum welfare differs only by 0.0483, but pattern X is
about 14.63 times more likely to be observed than pattern Y.17 The seventh most
likely consistent pattern, not displayed in Table 1, can be seen as the red dot in
Figure 3.1 labeled “Z” and is about 1.55 times more likely to be observed than
17Probability of X ÷ Probability of Y = 0.036 ÷ 0.00246 = 14.63
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pattern Y and has an expected welfare efficiency that is about 0.065 lower than
pattern Y.
The general implication of this exercise is to make it clear that stochastic models
do not reliably link the likelihood of a choice pattern with its realized welfare as
consumer surplus or efficiency. This is due to the way in which heteroscedastic RE
models disproportionately “punish” FOSD in welfare terms by assigning occurrences
of it a very low likelihood. The choice of A in row 10 is punished in welfare terms
even more by the fact that there is no risk involved.
Empirically, experimental economists rarely observe behavior such as the choice
of A in row 10 because the agents they study are in environments that incentivize
them to reject dominated offers. There is, by definition, no extra benefit to actively
choosing a dominated offer. But just because there is no extra benefit to be had, it
shouldn’t be inferred that the agent doesn’t value the dominated option positively.
Any agent who selected option A in row 10 still receives a $2 benefit from having
had the choice problem presented to her if that choice is selected for payment.
There is a disconnect between how stochastic models map welfare and probabil-
ity when considering individual choices versus patterns of choice. When considering
an individual choice RE models create a perfect mapping of welfare and probability;
an option that is more likely to be chosen from a set of alternatives than another
option always also provides greater welfare. However, as we can see from Figure 3.1
and Table 3.3, when considering patterns of choice, this mapping breaks down, and
it is no longer the case that a more likely pattern of choices also provides greater
welfare.
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3.2.2 Sample Level Analysis with a Mixed EUT-RDU
Population
The above discussion focuses on a population that is entirely composed of EUT
conforming agents. Individual level estimates from Hey and Orme (1994) and
the mixture model estimates from Harrison and Rutström (2009) show that many
populations are likely not composed entirely of EUT agents. We can extend the
example above, defining the population as being composed of some mixture of
EUT agents and RDU agents. By “mixture,” we mean that there will be two
subpopulations of a grand population, with agents employing either the EUT or
RDU functions.
Before beginning the analysis of this mixture population, we can extend the
metrics utilized in equations (3.17) and (3.20) through (3.29) to be defined for
mixed populations. This is implemented in much the same way as mixture models
were defined in equation (3.11); each metric, Qm, for subpopulation m is weighted
by the proportion of the subpopulation in the grand population, M .
QM =
M∑
m
pim ×Qm
st.
M∑
m
pim = 1
(3.39)
where pim is the proportion of subpopulation m in the grand population. For
example, the probability of observing any given choice pattern y × T for a grand
population made of M subpopulations is:
LMiT =
M∑
m
pim × LmiT (θm)
st.
M∑
m
pim = 1
(3.40)
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where LmiT is as described in equation (3.14) for some subpopulation m defined by
θm.
A final metric before considering the example of the mixed population is the
probability that any given choice pattern was produced by population m. Utilizing
equation (3.40) we define the probability that a pattern was produced by population
m as the ratio of the weighted simulated likelihood of observing the pattern from
subpopulation m to the likelihood of observing the pattern in the grand population:
PropmT =
pim × LmiT (θm)
LMiT
(3.41)
With this mixing framework in mind, we can define our grand population. We
assume that 70% of agents in the grand population conform to EUT, while the
remaining 30% conform to RDU. Given that the previous example thoroughly
examined an EUT population, rather than duplicate the analysis, we assume that
the EUT subpopulation is the same as the previous EUT-only example. Thus,
the EUT subpopulation is defined as using a CU stochastic model and CRRA
function with the r parameter normally distributed r ∼ N (0.65, 0.32) and the
λ parameter following a gamma distribution λ ∼ Γ(1.36, 0.26). This results in
θEUT = {0.65, 0.32, 1.36, 0.26}.
For the RDU subpopulation, we employ the flexible 2 parameter decision
weighting function defined by Prelec (1998) as the probability weighting function
to be substituted into equation (3.4):
ω(p) = exp(−β(− ln(p))α) (3.42)
where α > 0 and β > 0. We continue to use the CRRA utility function and CU
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stochastic model for the RDU subpopulation.
The r parameter is assumed to be distributed identically to the r parameter in
the EUT population r ∼ N (0.65, 0.32), and the λ parameter still uses the gamma
distribution, but is distributed λ ∼ Γ(0.563, 0.26), which results in the mean of
the λ distribution at 0.15 and a standard deviation of 0.2.18 Both the α and β
parameters for the decision weight function must be greater than 0, so they will also
be assumed to be distributed with a gamma distribution, α ∼ Γ(169, 7.69× 10−3)
and β ∼ Γ(144, 8.33 × 10−3). Thus the mean of α is ≈ 1.3 and its standard
deviation is ≈ 0.1, and the mean of β is ≈ 1.2 and its standard deviation is ≈ 0.1.
This results in θRDU = {0.65, 0.32, 0.563, 0.26, 169, 7.69× 10−3, 144, 8.33× 10−3}.
Once again, we employ 2.5× 106 draws from this joint distribution times and
calculate the values for equations (3.17) and (3.20) through (3.29) for all TT = 1024
choice patterns and all e ∈ [0, T ] for the RDU subpopulation. With the results of
the calculations for the EUT subpopulation calculated previously, and the results
of the same calculations for the RDU population, we can mix each of these metrics
as described in equation (3.39) with piEUT = 0.7 and piRDU = 0.3. Again, it is
impractical to display the results of all metrics for all 1024 choice patterns, so first,
we recreate Table 3.3 with the results of the RDU metrics.
There is a great deal of similarity between Table 3.4 and Table 3.3. In particular,
the two subpopulations share the same 3 most likely choice patterns, though with
different simulated likelihood, welfare, and error metrics. Again we note that
the choice patterns which display Light MSB, rows 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10, have 0
probability of containing 0 choice errors, and that there are a few examples of the
18With the mass of the λ distribution closer to 0, a priori we should expect fewer choice errors
among the RDU population than the EUT population.
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Table 3.4: HL-MPL Welfare and Error Expectations for
Top Ten Choice Patterns, RDU
Choice in Row SimulatedLikelihood
Expected
Errors
Welfare
Proportion
Welfare
Surplus PE(e = 0) PE(e = 1)
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.1617 0.702 0.9896 1.0403 0.4013 0.4979
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.1135 0.98 0.9831 1.012 0.2941 0.467
3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.0813 1.227 0.9707 0.9687 0.2038 0.434
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.0571 1.505 0.9642 0.9404 0 0.4979
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.0445 1.568 0.9626 0.896 0 0.467
6 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.033 1.635 0.947 0.8881 0 0.434
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.0312 1.845 0.9561 0.8678 0.0656 0.2955
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.0252 1.699 0.9491 0.7724 0 0.4013
9 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.0232 1.912 0.9405 0.8599 0 0.2941
10 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.0224 2.093 0.9437 0.8244 0 0.2038
disconnect between likelihood and welfare. The Light MSB choice pattern in row
8 is expected to contain fewer choice errors than the Consistent pattern in row
7. The Light MSB choice pattern in row 9 is expected to provide greater welfare
surplus than the Consistent pattern in row 7. Additionally, we observe that going
from row 6 to 7 the Simulated Likelihood decreases, but the Welfare Proportion
metric increases.
A major difference between the two subpopulations is that the RDU subpop-
ulation’s most likely choice pattern has a much greater likelihood (0.1617) than
the EUT subpopulation’s most likely choice pattern (0.0360). Much of this is
due to the greater mass of the λ distribution close to 0 in the RDU subpopula-
tion compared to the EUT subpopulation, but it is also because the distributions
chosen for the decision weighting parameters imply greater risk aversion. This
means that although the CRRA coefficients lie near the boundary of row 6 and 7
of the HL-MPL instrument, the way the RDU subpopulation weights probabilities
makes them more risk averse, and therefore more likely to switch at row 7 than
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if they did not weight probabilities. If instead of utilizing the mixture of EUT
and RDU shown here, we utilized a mixture of two EUT subpopulations, with one
subpopulation being more risk averse than the other, we would see similar results.
Agents from a more risk averse population of EUT agents would switch at later
rows than agents from the less risk averse EUT population, just as agents from
the RDU population discussed here switch at later rows than agents from the less
risk averse EUT population. These differences are important when we look at the
grand population metrics.
Table 3.5: HL-MPL Welfare and Error Expectations for
Top Ten Choice Patterns, EUT-RDU Mixture
Choice in Row ProportionEUT
Simulated
Likelihood
Expected
Errors
Welfare
Proportion
Welfare
Surplus PE(e = 0)
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.41 0.0822 0.827 0.9872 0.9648 0.3455
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.48 0.0656 0.959 0.9851 0.9557 0.314
3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.46 0.0451 1.386 0.9673 0.8898 0.1778
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.53 0.0365 1.518 0.9651 0.8807 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.58 0.0314 1.587 0.9652 0.8539 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.64 0.0263 1.719 0.9631 0.8448 0.1137
7 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.57 0.0232 1.741 0.9473 0.8217 0
8 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.64 0.0194 1.873 0.9452 0.8126 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.61 0.0193 1.814 0.9501 0.733 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.62 0.0178 2.146 0.9453 0.7788 0
The grand population metrics displayed in Table 3.5 are barely noteworthy
by themselves. They easily could have been generated by a population composed
entirely of EUT agents with a distribution of λ somewhat closer to 0 than the
EUT subpopulation that actually composes 70% of the agents in this population.
Many of the same features of the two subpopulations are apparent in the mixed
grand population; choice patterns displaying any form of MSB have 0 likelihood of
0 choice errors, and there are some disconnects between simulated likelihood and
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welfare as observed in rows 5-6, and 7-8 for the welfare efficiency metric and rows
9-10 for the welfare surplus metric.
Of greater interest is the “Proportion EUT” column of Table 3.5, defined by
equation (3.41). This metric calculates the unconditional likelihood that a subject
displaying a particular choice pattern belongs to the EUT subpopulation we defined.
For every choice pattern in the top ten most likely to be observed choice patterns,
we observe that the proportion of the agents belonging to the EUT subpopulation
that generated the choice pattern is smaller than the proportion of EUT agents
in the grand population. For the top 3 choice patterns, the difference between
the proportion of EUT agents in the total population and the proportion of EUT
agents that generated the choice pattern is greater than 20 percentage points. In
fact, it is more likely than not that these choice patterns are generated by the
RDU subpopulation. This is despite the fact that the EUT subpopulation makes
up 70% of the grand population, and that the top three most likely to be observed
choice patterns in the grand population all correspond to the same top three choice
patterns in the EUT subpopulation.
It should also be clear from Table 2 and Figure 3.1 that not all choice patterns
that are consistent with EUT should be judged as superior to choice patterns which
are apparently inconsistent with EUT from the perspective of welfare realization
as consumer surplus or welfare efficiency.
3.3 Population Level Analysis of Welfare:
Preferences, Noise, and the Instrument
The proposed characterizations of the welfare of a sample, including the degree
to which certain consistent choice patterns are expected to be more costly in
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welfare terms than inconsistent choice patterns, are ultimately determined by the
distribution of preferences and stochastic parameters in the sample. To analyze
how the welfare characterizations change as the distribution of preferences change
in the sample, we could repeat the computational exercise that led to Table 3.3
for a few different distributions and discuss implications pattern by pattern. This
exercise, however, will produce data only for the populations chosen, and will
be less informative about how expectations of welfare change as the population
changes. Instead, it will be useful to define a few population-level metrics that
allow us to look at the data at the aggregate level. For instance, for each y × T
choice pattern, we can weigh the expected welfare efficiency resulting from equation
(3.27) by the simulated likelihood resulting from equation (3.17) and then sum
across all TT choice patterns to retrieve the sample expected welfare efficiency:
E(%WT (θ)) =
TT∑
tt=1
SLNtt(θ)× E(%Wtt|θ) (3.43)
Similar expectations can be derived for any of the per-choice pattern statistics
defined previously, but we pay particular interest to the statistics derived from
equations (3.21), and (3.22) where e = 0. We are not limited to looking at
expectations however: we can utilize equation (3.43) to derive higher moments of
these statistics, such as the variance:
Var(%WT (θ)) =
TT∑
tt=1
SLNtt(θ)× [E(%Wtt|θ)− E(%WT |θ)]2 (3.44)
Having the means and variances of the statistics described allows us to make
high-level inferences about the welfare implications of an instrument like the HL-
MPL instrument on different populations for a given stochastic model. That is,
we can contribute to answering of our primary question of “what are the welfare
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implications of stochastic models” by solving equations (3.43) and (3.44) for various
values of θ and relating the elements of θ to these results. We can substitute any
y × T statistic derived from equations (3.21), (3.22), (3.27), and (3.29) in place of
%WT in equations (3.43) and (3.44) to describe these statistics on a population by
population basis.
While equations (3.43) and (3.44) may in fact have analytical solutions to
determine these relationships, meaning we could attempt to solve for the partial
derivative of equations (3.43) and (3.44) with respect to each element of θ, any
analytical solution will be unique with respect to so many idiosyncratic factors
that this becomes infeasible and potentially uninformative. These factors include:
• the stochastic model;
• the utility model;
• the location, dispersion and shape of the joint distribution governing the
complete stochastic specification;
• the number of Halton draws used to simulate the probabilities;
• the base prime number used for the Halton sequences; and
• the specific tasks faced by the sample population.
Given these limitations, we instead examine the relationship of the parameters
making up the stochastic specification, i.e. the elements of θ, with the associated
results of equations (3.43) and (3.44) visually and with the use of locally weighted
polynomial regression (LOESS) developed by Cleveland, Grosse, Shyu, Chambers &
Hastie (1992). To conduct this examination, we generate 500,000 unique population
parameter sets, θi, the elements of which are assumed to be uncorrelated, and solve
equations (3.43) and (3.44) for the statistics derived in equations (3.21), (3.22)
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and (3.27) with e = 0 and with each equation solved with 10, 000 draws from each
unique population.
Each population has normally distributed preference parameters and gamma
distributed stochastic error parameters. Thus, each θi is comprised of 4 elements:
the mean of the CRRA parameter and the λ term, µr and µλ, and standard
deviation of the CRRA parameter and the λ term, σr and σλ. Each of the
candidate θi vectors was randomly drawn from a joint uniform distribution of these
elements. The bounds of the marginal distributions of these elements are as follows:
µr ∈ [−1.9, 1.55], σr ∈ [0, 1], µλ ∈ [.05, 2.25], σλ ∈ [.01, .75]. These bounds are
almost arbitrary; the bounds for µr were chosen to be just outside the indifference
bounds of the HL-MPL instrument, but the remaining marginal distributions were
chosen to be broad enough to yield some interesting patterns.
This exercise results in 8 statistics for each θi: the means and variances of the
expected proportion of welfare to the maximum attainable welfare, the expected
welfare surplus, the expected number of choice errors, and the expected proportion
of agents who make no errors. Each statistic can be plotted against the 4 elements
of θi. The result is 32 plots of the raw data and 32 charts of the LOESS lines
associated with the raw data plots. All LOESS lines are plotted along with 95%
confidence intervals.
Each plot and chart also attempts to give information about another parameter
not plotted on the x or y axes by color coding the plotted data with respect to
different values of this “z” parameter. For µr this “z” parameter is σr, for σr it is
µr, for µλ it is σλ and for σλ it is µλ. For each of the charts, the “z” parameter is
split into quartiles and for the LOESS line charts, LOESS lines are calculated for
the “x” and “y” parameter values that belong to each quartile. Additionally, in
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the raw data plots, each point has been given a large degree of transparency. This
means that the density of points in the plot is represented by the density of color
in the plot.
I examine the LOESS line charts of these data. First I discuss the effect on
welfare expectations of the parameters governing the stochastic model, and then
discuss the parameters governing the utility model. Thus, we first look at Figures
3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 demonstrate the effect of the mean of
the distribution of the λ term on welfare and the error frequencies, while Figures
3.4 and 3.5 demonstrate the effect of the standard deviation of the λ term on the
same statistics.
Figure 3.2: Mean of λ Compared to Welfare
C) Mean Expected Welfare Surplus D) Var. of Expected Welfare Surplus
A) Mean Expected Welfare Proportion B) Var. of Expected Welfare Proportion
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Figure 3.3: Mean of λ Compared to Errors
C) Mean Expected Proportion of No Error Choices D) Var. of Expected Proportion of No Error Choices
A) Mean Expected Number of Errors B) Var. of Expected Number of Errors
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The results of the plots of stochastic model parameters are mostly intuitive
and unsurprising. Looking at Figures 3.2 and 3.3, as the mean of the distribution
increases, the expected welfare and expected proportion of 0-error choice patterns
monotonically decreases, while the expected number of choice errors monotonically
increases. Because λ has a gamma distribution, for any given mean, a higher
standard deviation implies that the mass of the distribution shifts closer towards
0. Thus, it is unsurprising that those populations with high standard deviations
of λ tend to exhibit choice patterns with fewer expected choice errors and greater
expected proportions of no error choice patterns. This is because for any given
choice problem, a lower value of λ implies a lower probability of committing a
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choice error.19 This directly translates into greater expected welfare than those
populations with lower standard deviations holding the mean constant.
Figure 3.4: Standard Deviation of λ Compared to Welfare
C) Mean Expected Welfare Surplus D) Var. of Expected Welfare Surplus
A) Mean Expected Welfare Proportion B) Var. of Expected Welfare Proportion
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Looking at Figures 3.4 and 3.5, we can see that σλ is far less influential than µλ.
In the (A) and (C) charts of Figure 3.4, the slopes of the LOESS lines are slightly
positive, but mostly flat other than the line for the lowest quartile of µλ. In the
(A) and (C) charts of Figure 3.5, we see much the same mostly flat lines indicating
very little variation across the parameter space. Again the exception is the line for
the lowest quartile of µλ. This should not be surprising given that the populations
were generated with a CU stochastic model. The third quartile of µλ begins at
19Since λ is in the denominator of each exponential transformation, as λ→ 0, Pr(yt = a)→ 1
for a = 1 and Pr(yt = a)→ 0 for a 6= 1 regardless of the other parameters.
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Figure 3.5: Standard Deviation of λ Compared to Errors
C) Mean Expected Proportion of No Error Choices D) Var. of Expected Proportion of No Error Choices
A) Mean Expected Number of Errors B) Var. of Expected Number of Errors
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1.15, which means that the majority of the mass of the distribution of lambda in
any population will lie above 1 for any value of σλ in the range explored. At these
high levels of lambda, most choice probabilities will converge to something close to
Pr(yt = a)→ 0.5.
In contrast to the monotonic relations of the lambda distribution, the effect
of the CRRA parameters on the expected welfare and expected error statistics
displays influences of the idiosyncratic aspects of the HL-MPL instrument. This
is most apparent in the plots of µr. In interpreting these plots, it is important to
keep in mind that the CRRA parameters used in each population are normally
distributed. Thus, the mean of the distribution always represents the point of the
162
Figure 3.6: Standard Deviation of CRRA Compared to Welfare
C) Mean Expected Welfare Surplus D) Var. of Expected Welfare Surplus
A) Mean Expected Welfare Proportion B) Var. of Expected Welfare Proportion
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distribution with the greatest density, with smaller standard deviations leading to
greater concentration of the mass of the distribution around the mean and larger
standard deviations leading to the reverse.
In Figures 3.8 and 3.9, each tick mark on the x-axis represent the values of the
CRRA parameter at which an agent would be indifferent between lotteries for some
row of the HL-MPL instrument. From left to right, the first tick mark corresponds
to the value of the CRRA parameter that would make an agent indifferent between
the lotteries in the first row of the instrument, the second tick mark corresponds the
second row of the instrument, and so on. There are only 9 ticks because the there
does not exist any CRRA parameter which would set an agent to be indifferent
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Figure 3.7: Standard Deviation of CRRA Compared to Errors
C) Mean Expected Proportion of No Error Choices D) Var. of Expected Proportion of No Error Choices
A) Mean Expected Number of Errors B) Var. of Expected Number of Errors
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between the lotteries in row 10 of the instrument.
I begin by first discussing the effect of µr on choice errors as displayed in
Figure 3.9. Something that is immediately apparent is that the orange LOESS
line, depicting populations with low standard deviations of CRRA parameters, is
much more volatile than the other quartile lines. Interestingly, the orange line
dips downward in plots (B), (C) and (D) and peaks upward in plot (A) at the
values of µr that correspond to the indifference values described previously. From
plots (A) and (C), we draw the conclusion that as the mass of the distribution
of preferences grows around parameter values which correspond to values which
imply indifference in a choice scenario, we see an increase in the number of choice
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Figure 3.8: Mean of CRRA Compared to Welfare
C) Mean Expected Welfare Surplus D) Var. of Expected Welfare Surplus
A) Mean Expected Welfare Proportion B) Var. of Expected Welfare Proportion
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errors in the population.
In the case of the quartile described by the orange line, the idiosyncratic
relationship between µr and the points that represent indifference also holds for the
variance of expected choice errors, as depicted in plots (B) and (D) of Figure 3.9.
That is, the increase in the average number of expected errors at these points is
largely driven by a sharp reduction in the probability of observing a choice pattern
with few expected errors relative to the probability of observing a choice pattern
with a large number of errors.20
20Because Pr(yt = a) = Pr(yt = b)∀a, b as λ→∞, the maximum expected number of errors
that can ever be observed is
∑T
t=1
At−1
At
. That is, since every option is given equal probability in
the limit, and only one option is not an error, the sum of ratio of choice errors to options across
all tasks is the maximum expected number of choice errors in the limit. The maximum in the
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Figure 3.9: Mean of CRRA Compared to Errors
C) Mean Expected Proportion of No Error Choices D) Var. of Expected Proportion of No Error Choices
A) Mean Expected Number of Errors B) Var. of Expected Number of Errors
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The remainder of the quartiles however do not follow this general pattern of
heightened influence around the indifference points. Instead, for plots (B),(C)
and (D) of Figure 3.9, the lines generally decrease until µr = 0.15 and plot (A)
increases until just about the same point. This less volatile pattern is because
the 3 highest quartiles all indicate populations with high standard deviations.
Consider the 3 upper quartile lines around µr = 0.15. The distances between this
point and the two closest indifference points are 0.26 and 0.29. The second lowest
quartile’s lower bound of σr is 0.26, which means that the density of the preference
relation distribution at these points of indifference is much larger than for the
case of the HL-MPL instrument where At = 2 ∀t and T = 10 is therefore 5.
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lowest quartile, relatively. It should be apparent from observing the lowest quartile
line that as the density of the preference distribution increases around these points
of indifference, the frequency of errors will increase. We can attempt to see this
more formally by creating a metric that characterizes how much the distribution
of preferences “sits” on these points of indifference:
D =
R∑
r
f(r)
max f(x) (3.45)
where f(r) is the density of the distribution of CRRA parameters for the population
at point r and R is the set of values for the CRRA parameters at which an
agent would be indifferent between the two options in each choice problem. The
denominator of the ratio is the maximum density of the distribution f(·) for the
population. Since the CRRA parameters were distributed normally, this value is
always equivalent to the density at the mean, µr. The set of R in for the HL-MPL
instrument is:
R ≡ {−1.71,−0.95,−0.49,−0.14, 0.15, 0.41, 0.68, 0.97, 1.37} (3.46)
We evaluate the metric from equation (3.45) against the 8 statistics utilized
in Figures 3.8 through 3.5. Since it can be seen in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 that
the effect of the µλ term asymptotes rapidly as µλ > 1, we restrict our plots to
populations for which µλ < 1. This leaves us with about 150k observations. These
150k observations are first split into deciles of µλ and then the LOESS lines are
calculated for each decile. This splitting of the data helps to make clear the large
effect of the stochastic elements on the statistics explored and also the large amount
of heterogeneity in the effect of preference parameters caused by the stochastic
parameters.
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The metric developed in equation (3.45) is not perfect, we should expect to see
clumping of data points around 0 and 1 where populations will be wholly sitting on
one point or wholly between points, but it does provide a generally good description
of the phenomenon we are concerned with. Looking at Figure 3.10, plots (A) and
(C), we can confirm what was suspected to be driving the shape of the plots in
Figure 3.9. As D increases, and more of the density of the CRRA distribution is
shifted onto the points describing indifference, the greater the expected number of
errors we should observe.
Figure 3.10: D Statistic Compared to Welfare
C) Mean Expected Welfare Surplus D) Var. of Expected Welfare Surplus
A) Mean Expected Welfare Proportion B) Var. of Expected Welfare Proportion
0 2 4 6 0 2 4 6
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.125
0.85
0.90
0.95
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Sum of relative densities
Mean of  λ 0.05 to 0.14
0.14 to 0.24
0.24 to 0.34
0.34 to 0.43
0.43 to 0.52
0.52 to 0.62
0.62 to 0.71
0.71 to 0.81
0.81 to 0.9
0.9 to 1
This effect is remarkably monotonic across every decile of µλ, though the effect
is strongest for lower deciles. What should be no surprise is that for the highest
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Figure 3.11: D Statistic Compared to Errors
C) Mean Expected Proportion of No Error Choices D) Var. of Expected Proportion of No Error Choices
A) Mean Expected Number of Errors B) Var. of Expected Number of Errors
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3 deciles of µλ we observe close to 0% of the populations considered to produce
choice patterns with no choice errors, as can be seen in plot (C). The variance
statistics in plots (B) and (D) are generally monotonic, but not universally so. In
general, the variance in the number of expected errors across populations tends to
decrease as D increases. This is in line with the populations becoming increasingly
error prone.
In Figure 3.11 we see the story of Figure 3.10 interpreted into welfare terms,
but with an interesting and important difference: the expected welfare metrics in
plots (A) and (C) are effectively equal around D = 0 and D = 1. There doesn’t
exist an equality in the error metrics around these values of D in Figure 3.10, nor
169
should there be. D = 0 corresponds to populations which have a µr and σr such
that the entire population sits between the indifference points in R. D = 1 will
generally21 represent the opposite; such a population will have a µr and σr such
that the entire population sits on top of one of the indifference points in R. If
the entire population sits far from an indifference point, holding the stochastic
element constant, we expect there to be fewer errors compared to a population
that sits on top of an indifference point because the average agent will not be close
to indifference for the lottery pair in question. But, this is also precisely why the
welfare metrics are close to equivalent: if a population sits on an indifference point,
it means that agents are mostly indifferent between the options in the lottery pair,
and therefore any errors made for this lottery pair will be relatively less costly in
terms of welfare.
Other than the particular case where D = 0 and D = 1, in Figure 3.11 we
see the general trend that we might expect from looking at Figure 3.10: as the
D metric increases and the relative density of the CRRA distribution increases
around points of indifference, expected welfare decreases monotonically. This is
because, other than the case of D = 1 where errors should be relatively frequent
but not costly in welfare terms, an increasing D not only means that a greater
proportion of agents lie on the indifference points, but also lie around it. It is this
greater proportion of agents lying sufficiently near an indifference point to make an
error relatively likely, but sufficiently far to make it relatively costly which drives
down expected welfare. Similarly to what was seen in Figure 3.10, in Figure 3.11
we see that the effect of D is stronger with populations with µλ in the lower deciles
21Generally because there are multiple ways to get D = 1. A population with µr close to
one and a σr such that there is some density on rj ∈ R s.t. i 6= j can potentially make D → 1.
However, µr → rj ∈ R and σr → 0 is the most frequent scenario.
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and weakest with populations with µλ in the higher deciles.
What is also clear from Figures 3.10 and 3.11 is that the preference aspect of
the utility model, represented by D, contributes far less to expected choice errors
and, more importantly, to expected welfare than is contributed by the stochastic
aspects of the model. Looking at the lowest decile lines in Figures 3.10 and 3.11,
we can see that a relatively large increase in D is needed to cause the same effect
as moving to the next lowest decile. Comparing the lowest decile with the highest
decile reveals tremendous changes in expected errors and expected welfare while
holding D constant for the populations analyzed.
The general analysis of the population level data reveals several somewhat
expected results, and several somewhat unexpected results. Firstly it is clear, and
unsurprising, that the means of both the CRRA and λ distributions individually
drive a great deal of the variation in the number of expected choice errors and
the expected welfare of a population. Specifically, the finding that the effect of
the mean of λ on the expected number of choice errors was large should have
been obvious a priori. The λ parameter directly influences choice probabilities
regardless of the underlying instrument. Similarly, that populations with CRRA
parameters tightly distributed around a point of indifference would have greater
expected number of choice errors is intuitive. That larger numbers of expected
choice errors generally lead to lower welfare was already apparent from previous
analyses.
Somewhat more surprising is just how dominant the stochastic elements of
utility functions are over the preference aspects when deriving expectations around
welfare. Figures 3.10 and 3.11 make clear, despite the potential flaws with the
D metric, that the way the preference parameters interact with the idiosyncratic
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aspects of the instrument matter a great deal, but the stochastic parameters
unambiguously matter more. This result should be important to economists and
policy makers concerned with estimating the potential welfare implications of new
policy instruments.
3.4 Summary of Analyses
In this chapter I analyze the relationship between an experimental instrument and
the preferences of populations of agents. I demonstrate a method for calculating
the unconditional welfare surplus and efficiency for a given pattern of choices from
an experimental instrument and for a given population of agents.
When considering a single hypothetical population of EUT agents several
surprising results emerge. First, it becomes clear that many choice patterns which
are able to be rationalized by either EUT or RDU can be more likely to contain
a choice error than not. Given the hypothetical population chosen for analysis
however, most of the choice errors for the choice patterns most likely to be observed
can be considered to be not costly in welfare terms. Second, there are several
choice patterns that contain obvious violations of EUT that nonetheless are more
likely to be observed and are expected to produce greater welfare surplus than
many choice patterns that do not contain any such apparent violations. Third, and
most interestingly, there is a less than perfect correlation between the likelihood of
a choice pattern being observed and the expected welfare surplus of that choice
pattern. That is, there are many choice patterns that are less likely to be observed
than other choice patterns, but nonetheless provide greater expected welfare.
Of particular note, shown in Figure 3.1, are choice patterns which include a
choice of an option that is dominated by another option. This figure shows that
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patterns of choice which contain FOSD choices are many times less likely to be
observed from this hypothetical population than the equivalent choice pattern
without the dominated choice, but only provide somewhat less expected welfare.
Additionally, choice patterns with FOSD choices can provide greater expected
welfare than consistent choice patterns that are much more likely to be observed.
This is seen in Figure 3.1 by comparing the choice pattern designated “Y,” which
contains a FOSD choice, and the choice patterns designated by red circles in the
shaded area of the same figure. The choice patterns designated by the red circles
in the shaded region are consistent with EUT, more likely to be observed than “Y,”
and provide less welfare efficiency than “Y.”
The extent to which the distribution of preferences in a population influences
the expected unconditional welfare is also assessed. I simulate populations of
agents and map their distributional parameters to expected unconditional welfare,
as well as to the frequency of choice errors. Additionally I construct a metric which
relates the marginal distribution of risk preferences to the “indifference points” of
an instrument called the “D” statistic. These indifference points are the values of
the parameters that would cause an individual agent to be indifferent between the
options in the lottery pair. From this exercise two interesting results arise.
First, as the density of the distribution of preferences increases around any value
that would indicate indifference for a lottery pair in the instrument, the expected
welfare surplus decreases and the rate of choice errors increases. As the density of
the distribution of preferences increases around multiple such indifference points,
and thus the D statistic increases, this increase is even more apparent. This can
be seen in Figures 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11. Secondly, the value of the parameters
governing the stochastic aspects of the model seem to play a larger than expected
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role in the expected welfare surplus for any given population. This can be seen in
Figure 3.2, and in how the slope of the D statistic compares to moving from one
gradient of λ means to another in Figures 3.10, and 3.11.
Theses results should caution economists and policy makers concerned with the
design a policy or experimental instrument. In a warning to those who would wish
to “nudge” the behavior of agents to particular patterns of choice, this exercise
has shown that policy makers should take care about the choice patterns they may
which to nudge a agent into. For many agents, it would be to their detriment
to nudge them from a pattern of choices which contain obvious errors to one
which, on appearance to an informed observer, would contain none. Analyses of
experiments involving risky choice that rely on tests which measure differences in
choice frequencies around certain lottery pairs should note how the frequency of
choice errors and “consistent” choice patterns vary with the distribution of risk
preferences in a population.
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Chapter 4
Welfare Inferences From
Experimental Instruments
In Chapter 1 we described the efforts of economists to account for apparent viola-
tions of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) in economic experiments. Some of these
efforts were directed at the development of alternative deterministic theories of
utility, such as Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Rank Depen-
dent Utility (RDU) by Quiggin (1982), and Regret Theory by Bell (1982), Loomes
and Sugden (1982). Other efforts were focused on the redevelopment of stochastic
models, such as the constant error or “tremble” model by Harless and Camerer
(1994), the Strong Utility model by Hey and Orme (1994), the random preference
model by Loomes and Sugden (1995), along with many derivatives of the Strong
Utility model.
Many of the newly proposed theoretical explanations of the apparent violations
of EUT were tested experimentally. A well known example is that of Hey and
Orme (1994) (HO), who conduct an experiment to test if any of a variety of
generalizations (and one restriction) of EUT can explain experimentally collected
data significantly better than EUT while utilizing the Strong Utility model. HO
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pick “winning” models for each subject on the basis of their estimates for each
model and whether each model can be operationally distinguished different from
EUT. They conclude that “our study indicates that behavior can be reasonably
well modelled (to what might be termed a ‘reasonable approximation’) as ‘EU plus
noise.’” However, HO note:
The inferences that can be drawn [. . .] about the adequacy or otherwise
of EU are not, however, clear cut - mainly because of the large number of
generalizations of EU under consideration. As this research has evolved,
and the number of generalizations under consideration has increased,
the number of subjects for whom EU emerges as “the winners” has
declined. This is inevitable, though it is not clear how one should judge
the rate of decline. [. . .] Monte Carlo work would be needed to shed
more accurate light on such issues
The concerns raised by HO can largely be considered as referring to statistical
power, and to the weight economists should place on type I versus type II identi-
fication errors. That there are asymmetries in the probability of type I and type
II errors should be of little surprise to most econometricians, but the degree of
asymmetry in the cost of these errors, I argue, is more important. In this chapter, I
analyze the experimental instruments utilized by Harrison and Ng (2016) (HN) for
recovering the utility functions of agents. The HN experiment, detailed in depth
below, is utilized for this analysis because it links the econometric classification
of individual subjects and the measurement of their risk preferences directly with
welfare evaluation for the decision maker. Estimation of the welfare consequences
of a subject’s choices allows economists to make a judgement about how much
the individual gains or loses, in expectation, about any given choice. In the case
of the HN experiment, the focus is on how much the subject gains or loses when
purchasing, or not purchasing, an insurance policy. Harrison (1989, 1992), in what
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has become known as the “Flat Maximum” or “Payoff Dominance” critique, argues
that as the difference in utility between two options approaches zero, the subject
cares less and less about choosing one option over the other, and so economists
should care less and less about the choices over options where the utility difference
approaches zero. In a similar vein, I argue that we should care less about classifica-
tion accuracy if the implied difference in welfare consequences between alternative
models is minimal.
The following analysis focuses firstly on the capacity of the HN procedure to
correctly classify an agent as employing one of two different utility models, and
secondly on the welfare consequences of this characterization. Thus I attempt to
remove some uncertainty about the power of the instrument, and propose metrics
to address the question of how much economists should care about statistical power
issues by linking them directly with welfare evaluations. To begin this analysis,
I describe and replicate the classification and welfare calculation exercises of HN.
Next I conduct a simulation analysis of the lottery instrument used in HN to
determine the frequency of misclassification for two of the four models utilized by
HN, and the welfare consequences of this misclassification. I next propose two
ways to potentially alleviate the welfare concerns of misidentification.
4.1 Estimating a Benchmark using Harrison
and Ng (2016)
HN report the results of an experiment intended to evaluate the welfare conse-
quences of individuals’ decisions to purchase insurance. This is in part a response
to the large literature cited by HN (2016, p. 92) which evaluates insurance on the
basis of “take-up”: the rate at which individuals purchase insurance. They argue
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that although a take-up metric is transparent and easy to measure, it doesn’t allow
for behaviorally general statements about whether an individual should have taken
up the insurance product, and it does not quantify the consumer surplus from
making the correct insurance purchase decision. These are, however, precisely the
kind of normative welfare statements that economists should be making about the
economic choices of agents. They are also the kind of normative welfare statements
that can be made from estimating the utility functions of individuals and evaluating
their choices with respect to these functions.
HN address the problem of evaluating the welfare consequences of the decision
to purchase insurance or not by conducting a 2-part experiment. In the first part
each subject is presented with a battery of 80 lottery pairs and asked to select
one lottery from each pair that will be played out for payment. This part will be
referred to as the “lottery task” throughout. The responses of each subject to the
lottery task are used to estimate utility functions for that individual. In the second
part each subject is endowed with $20 and presented with 24 choices where they
are asked to choose between a lottery which will result in a loss of $15 with some
probability p or no loss of the initial endowment with probability (1− p), and a
certain amount of money between $15.20 and $19.80. The choice of the certain
amount of money is framed as the purchase of insurance against the risk of loss in
the lottery option. This part will be referred to as the “insurance task” throughout.
Both of these instruments are detailed in full in Appendix C of HN.
For each individual, HN use the data recovered in the lottery task to estimate
four models, 1 Expected Utility Theory (EUT) model and 3 models in the Rank
Dependent Utility framework first proposed by Quiggin (1982). Since EUT is a
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special case of RDU, we can describe all 4 models in the framework of RDU:
RDU =
C∑
c=1
[wc(p)× u(xc)] (4.1)
where c indexes the outcomes, xc, from {1, . . . , C} with c = 1 being the smallest
outcome in the lottery and c = C being the greatest outcome in the lottery, u(·)
is a standard utility function, wc(·) decision weight function applied to outcome
c given the distribution of probabilities in the lottery ranked by outcome, p. The
decision weight function, wc(·), takes the form:
wc(p) =

ω
(
C∑
k=c
pk
)
− ω
 C∑
k=c+1
pk
 for c < C
ω(pc) for c = C
(4.2)
where the probability weighting function, ω(·), can take a variety of parametric
or non-parametric forms. In the special case of EUT, the probability weighting
function is just the identity of the objective probabilities:
ω(pc) = pc (4.3)
HN estimate 3 probability weighting functions for the RDU models. The first pwf
is the power function (RDUPow) used by Quiggin (1982):
ω(pc) = pγc (4.4)
where γ > 0. The second pwf is the “Inverse-S” shaped function (RDUInvs)
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popularized by Tversky and Kahneman (1992):
ω(pc) =
pγc(
pγc + (1− pc)γ
) 1
γ
(4.5)
where γ > 0. The third pwf is the flexible function proposed by Prelec (1998)
(RDUPrelec):
ω(pc) = exp(−β(− ln(pc))α) (4.6)
where α > 0 and β > 0.
For all three RDU probability weighting functions there exist values for the
probability weighting parameters which allow wc(p) = pc, the special case of EUT.
For all four models HN use the CRRA utility function:
u(x) = x
(1−r)
(1− r) (4.7)
where r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion proposed by Pratt (1964).
I continue to use the notation used in chapters 2 and 3 to describe a choice
scenario by a subject, but limit it to a binary choice between two options, a and
b. In this framework a choice of option a in task t is indicated by the function
yt = a, where yt = 1 ≥i yt = 2. The values of a and b do not indicate the order or
frame with which the options in task t were presented to the subject, but rather
the ordinal rank the subject’s utility function assigns to the options, with 1 always
being the option of greatest utility. This notation is useful when describing the
welfare consequences of choices below.
HN also use Contextual Utility (CU), as defined by Wilcox (2008), as the
stochastic model. Thus for the models utilized, the probability that option a is
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chosen is given by:
Pr(yt = a) = Pr
(
t ≥ 1
λi
[G(βi, Xbt)−G(βi, Xat)]
)
= 1− F
(
G(βi, Xbt)−G(βi, Xat)
D(βi, Xt)λi
) (4.8)
where t is a mean 0 error term, F is a symmetric cumulative distribution function
(cdf), meaning 1− F (x) = F (−x), G(·) is the RDU utility model that takes the
parameters βi to calculate the utility of lottery a or b in task t comprised of
outcomes and probabilities Xat, and λi is a precision parameter. The function D(·)
separates contextual utility from a Strong Utility model:
D(βi, Xt) = max [u(xct)]−min[u(xct)]
st. wc(xct) 6= 0
(4.9)
Usually, the Normal or Logistic cdf is chosen for F . HN utilized the Logistic cdf
and I employ the Logistic cdf for all calculations throughout. Given that each choice
considered here only involves two lottery options, we can define the probability of
choosing option a given a particular model, parameter set βi, precision parameter
λi, and outcomes and probabilities of option a, Xat, as
Pr(ytaj) =
exp
(
G(βi, Xat)
D(βi, Xt)λi
)
exp
(
G(βi, Xat)
D(βi, Xt)λi
)
+ exp
(
G(βi, Xbt)
D(βi, Xt)λi
) (4.10)
These choice probabilities in turn are logged and summed to produce a log-likelihood
function for each of the four different models:
LLi =
T∑
t
ln [Pr(yt)] (4.11)
As a metric of welfare, HN primarily use the consumer surplus (CS) of each
181
choice. The CS of each choice is defined as the difference between the certainty
equivalent (CE) of the chosen option and the certainty equivalent of the unchosen
option. Since the CRRA utility function defined in equation (4.7) is used for all
models discussed, we can define the CE as:
C∑
c=1
wc(p)
x(1−r)ca
(1− r) =
CE (1−r)a
(1− r)
CEa =
(
(1− r)×
C∑
c=1
wc(p)
x1−rca
(1− r)
)1/(1−r)
,
(4.12)
and the welfare surplus metric derived from this CE for any choice as:
∆Wit = CE iyt − CEZi1t, (4.13)
and the accumulated welfare surplus as:
∆WiT =
T∑
t=1
(
CE iyt − CEZi1t
)
(4.14)
where the y subscript indicates the option chosen (either 1 or 2 in the binary
scenario we consider here), and the Z superscript indicates the remaining, unchosen
options, of which the CE with the greatest value, designated by the subscript 1,
is considered the foregone opportunity. HN (2016, p. 106) consider an additional
metric of forgone welfare surplus as the difference between the maximal CE for
every choice and the CE of the option actually chosen by the subject
∆Fit = −1× (CE i1t − CE iyt) , (4.15)
and the accumulated forgone welfare surplus
∆FiT =
T∑
t=1
−1× (CE i1t − CE iyt) (4.16)
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With these metrics, the best possible value for any subject is 0, which would
indicate that all choices made were optimal, whereas any positive value indicates
the amount of welfare surplus forgone by the subject due to choice errors. These
metrics line up easily with the metrics defined in equations (4.13) and (4.14), as
should yt 6= 1, CEZi1t = CE i1t.
HN estimate values of the CRRA utility parameter, r, the probability weighting
parameters, γ, α, β, and the stochastic parameter λ, for each of the models presented
above via maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) using the choices made by the
subjects in the lottery task. HN (2016, pp. 107,110) initially calculate the welfare
consequences of the choices made by each subject by using only the point estimates
from the MLE, and then employ a bootstrap method which incorporates the
covariance matrix of the standard errors.
For the bootstrap method, a multivariate normal distribution of parameter sets
is bootstrapped from the estimates using the point estimates of these parameters
as the means of the marginal distributions, and the covariance matrix of standard
errors used as the covariance matrix of standard deviations. For each subject’s
parameter estimates 500 draws of parameter sets were taken, the welfare metrics
calculated for each set of parameters, and then the values of the metrics averaged
across the 500 draws. Since the covariance matrix used in the bootstrap method
draws parameters from the joint distribution with respect to their density in the
joint distribution, only a simple average is needed.
The experimental subjects consisted of 111 undergraduate students enrolled in
several different colleges at Georgia State University, USA. Every subject received,
and expected to receive, a guaranteed $5 show up fee, but no specific information
about the experiment or expected earnings was communicated to the subjects
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before the experiment HN (2016, p. 98). The full set of instructions delivered to
the subjects is available in Appendix C of HN.
4.1.1 Individual Level Estimation
HN employ a multi-step process for picking a “winning” model for each subject.
First, all four models models cited in equations (4.3), (4.4), (4.5), (4.6) are estimated
for each subject. Next, data are dropped from analysis on the basis of an ex ante
defined set of “exclusionary rules” applied to every model estimated on the subjects.
Finally, a “classification process” is employed to choose a model with which to
categorize the subject.
HN propose 4 exclusionary rules:
• Any estimate for which the optimizer did not return a convergence code
indicating both a gradient near 0 and a negative definite Hessian.
• Any model with a CRRA coefficient estimated to be greater than 15 or less
than -15.
• RDUPow and RDUInvs models where the γ parameter was estimated to be
greater than 5.
• Any model with a CRRA coefficient estimated to be greater than .99 and
less than 1.01.
The gradient and Hessian conditions indicate that the estimates are at a local
maximum of a concave portion of the likelihood function. The next two rules
indicate parameter values that, although mathematically possible for the given
functionals, are nonetheless considered to be extreme to the point of not being reli-
able. Wakker (2008) details how the CRRA utility function has certain asymptotic
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unattractive properties around 1. These properties may create numerical issues for
the optimizer, and so estimated values very near 1 are viewed as less credible and
are excluded from the analysis.
The classification process proposed by HN applies to all the remaining, non-
excluded data. For 9 subjects, no model passed the exclusionary rules. The
log-likelihood function given in equation (4.11) is equally applicable to all four
models considered by HN, and seems a natural metric to declare a “winning”
model among the 4 alternatives proposed. However, since the RDU models nest
EUT as a special case (noted in equation 4.3), a priori we would expect RDU
models to produce greater log-likelihoods than an EUT model on any given dataset,
numerical issues aside. HN (2016, p. 102) note this issue and propose the additional
qualification on RDU models that the probability weighting function implied by the
estimated model must be statistically significantly different from a linear function,
the special case of EUT, at the 10, 5, or 1 percent significance levels.
The EUT null hypothesis for the RDUPow and RDUInvs models is H0 : γ = 1,
and the null hypothesis for the RDUPrelec model is H0 : α = β = 1. Non-linear
Wald tests are used to test these hypotheses. Any RDU model that fails to reject
the null hypothesis is removed from consideration as a “winning” model. If the
EUT model did not converge for the subject in question, the models considered
will only consist of the RDU models which tested as different to EUT. If the EUT
model did not converge and no RDU model tested as different to EUT, then all
of the converged RDU models will be considered. The “winning” model for each
subject is chosen from among the models which have met criteria derived from the
Wald test. The winning model is then used to calculate the welfare consequences
of the subject’s choices on the insurance task.
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When I utilize the same classification processes employed by HN on their data,
we see a somewhat different distribution of subjects classified to the four models in
Figure 4.1. These differences are relatively minor, showing somewhat more RDU
subjects and fewer EUT subjects than reported by HN. I do however, replicate in
Figure 4.2 the distribution of per-choice consumer surplus presented in Figure 10
of HN (Harrison and Ng 2016, p. 108). Figure 10 of HN and Figure 4.2 are not
visually distinguishable, and the mean welfare surplus metric is the same.
Figure 4.1: Classifying Subjects as EUT or RDU
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4.2 Individual Classification and Welfare
Estimation Accuracy
Whether the results presented in Figure 4.1 provide an accurate estimation of the
proportions of subjects belonging to those models depends on our confidence in
the classification process to correctly classify a subject as one of these four models,
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Consumer Surplus, Using Data from Harrison and Ng
(2016)
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as well as our confidence that the subjects in the experiments actually belong to
one of the four models we test for. Our confidence that the classification process
can correctly classify a subject in turn depends on the nature of the experimental
instrument presented to the subject.
The degree of confidence in the classification process, and indeed most statistical
tests in the economics literature, can be assessed through power analysis.1 However,
power analyses are rarely conducted in parallel with econometric estimations.
McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) find that only 4.4% of the 181 papers published
in The American Economic Review reported the power of the test they were
performing. Zhang and Ortmann (2013, p. 6) review all papers published in the
journal Experimental Economics for the years 2010-2012, and find that no paper
1A “power analysis” is a process for assessing the probability of type II errors for a given
econometric test on data. This usually involves simulating independent variables, specifying an
effect size, simulating a dependent variable given the independent variables and the effect size,
and then testing how frequently the effect size can be recovered from tests on multiple repetitions
of the simulated data.
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stated the optimal sample size for their analyses, and only one paper mentions
power as an issue.
There are some examples of experimental economists utilizing power calculations
to inform their analysis or experimental designs. Rutström and Wilcox (2009)
conduct a power analysis by simulating agent behavior in a Matching Pennies
games and choosing payoffs that would result in the best chance of identifying
the effect they sought to identify if it were there. Brown and Healy (2016, p. 2)
conduct a power analysis to inform the choice of sample size for their experiments.
In this instance, Rutström and Wilcox (2009) and Brown and Healy (2016) conduct
a power analysis in order to influence the design of their experiment.
Wilcox (2015, p. 8) conducts Monte Carlo simulations of agents responding to a
lottery battery, all of which employ the CRRA utility function, the RDUPrelec prob-
ability weighting function, and the CU stochastic model. Wilcox (2015) designates
four data generating processes (DGP) by specifying four parametrizations of these
models and uses them to generate choice data, with each DGP making choices on
the instrument 1000 times. He then estimates non-parametric RDU models for
each of the 1000 choice realizations per DGP and classifies the resulting estimates
into one of 5 categories, one for each of the DGPs and an additional “unclassified”
category. This is an example of using power analysis to lend support to a methods
and conclusions of the research. Both a priori power analysis, as done by Rutström
and Wilcox (2009) and Brown and Healy (2016), and ex post power analysis, as
done by Wilcox (2015), are useful for understanding the statistical support for
experimental research as well as its limitations.
There are also theoretical aspects of experimental design that may increase
statistical power. Loomes and Sugden (1998) (LS) utilize multiple Marshack
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Machina (MM) triangles to construct lottery pairs that “provide good coverage
of the space within each triangle, and also span a range of gradients sufficiently
wide to accommodate most subjects’ risk attitudes.” Since a lottery is a point
in the MM triangle, if an agent conforms to EUT and is indifferent between two
lotteries, a straight line can be connected between the two lotteries in the triangle
with every point on the line indicating a lottery that the agent would also be
indifferent to. Thus by varying the gradient of the lines connecting lottery pairs, a
wide range of risk attitudes, at least for agents employing the EUT functional, can
potentially measured. Additionally, the use of lottery pairs on the “bottom-edge”
of the MM triangle can theoretically increase the statistical power of an instrument
to discriminate between subjects employing the EUT or RDU functional. Lotteries
on the edges of a MM triangle space indicate that one or more outcomes have a low
probability. LS (1998, p. 595) note the conclusion of Harless and Camerer (1994,
p. 1285) that “nonlinear weighting of small probabilities is an important factor in
explaining observed choices.” These techniques of varying the gradient of lottery
pairs in the MM triangle and constructing lottery pairs closer to the edges of the
triangle were adopted by HN to inform the construction of their lottery battery
(2016, p. 99), both to increase the precision of estimates of risk aversion parameters,
and to help discern between agents employing the EUT or RDU functionals.
I interrogate the statistical power of the instrument and classification process
to correctly classify subjects in HN, and the accuracy of the welfare calculations
given classifications. I conduct this analysis via simulation methods similar to
those defined by Feiveson (2002), which resemble an extension of the Monte Carlo
analysis performed by Wilcox (2015). Feiveson (2002, p. 108) briefly describes a
simulation method for determining the power of an experiment:
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[W]e contemplate a hypothetical scenario in which the identically sized
experiment could be run over and over, each time collecting new data
and doing a new hypothesis test. If this scenario can be adequately
modeled, we may thus estimate power by simulating data from multiple
replications of the experiment and simply calculate the proportion of
rejections [of the null hypothesis] as an estimate of the power.
Feiveson (2002, p. 109) outlines this method in more detail, and concludes by
noting “ The estimated power for a [specified significance level] test is simply the
proportion of observations (out of [some large number of replications]) for which
the p-value is less than [the specified significance level]. ”
In this framework, and given the nature of the classification process defined
previously, should an EUT subject be classified as employing an RDUPrelec model,
this would constitute a type I error (a “false positive” of probability weighting), and
should an RDUPrelec subject be classified as employing an EUT model this would
constitute a type II error (a “false negative” of no probability weighting). The
probability of a type II error is called the “power” of the test and when researchers
engage in ex ante power analysis, they typically aim for a power of 80% (Cohen
1988; Gelman and Loken 2014), and significance level (“p-value”) of either 1, 5,
or 10%. These values are based on convention, though Ronald Fisher and others
disagreed with picking the same level significance for every analysis: “[. . .] no
scientific worker has a fixed level of significance at which from year to year, and in
all circumstances, he rejects hypotheses; he rather gives his mind to each particular
case in the light of his evidence and his ideas.” (Fisher 1956)
I simulate subjects conforming to the EUT and RDUPrelec models, have these
simulated subjects respond to both the lottery and insurance task, estimate the
subjects’ parameter sets given their responses to the lottery task, classify each
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subject based on the classification process employed by HN as described in the
previous section, and calculate the welfare surplus for each subject based on the
winning model.2 A simulated subject is represented by a single parameter set
and an assigned model. For each model, we employ the CRRA utility function
defined in (4.7) and the CU stochastic model defined in equations (4.8) and (4.9).
For EUT subjects, the parameter set consists of {r, λ}, and for RDUPrelec subjects
{r, α, β, λ}. The r parameter in every set is the CRRA parameter from equation
(4.7) and λ is the precision parameter defined in equation (4.8). The remaining α,
and β parameters relate to the probability weighting parameters of the RDUPrelec
model defined in equation (4.6).
For each model, we draw parameter sets from a joint uniform distribution
over the parameters needed for that model, where the marginal distributions
are uncorrelated.3 For both models, the marginal distribution for r is where
r ∈ [−1, 0.95] and for λ is λ ∈ [0.01, 0.30]. For the RDUPrelec model the marginal
distribution for α and β is where α ∈ [0.10, 2] and β ∈ [0.10, 2].
I draw 250,000 parameter sets for each model for a total of 500,000 simulated
subjects. The number of draws from these joint distributions was chosen in an
attempt to fill as much of the relevant parameter space as possible.4 Each simulated
2I restrict the analysis and discussion in this chapter to only EUT and RDUPrelec subjects
and estimated models to improve the clarity of the discussion. However, the analysis can easily
be extended to all four models considered by HN.
3To create uncorrelated joint uniform distributions, uncorrelated normal distributions were
generated using a Gaussian copula process. The inverse normal cumulative distribution function
was then applied to each marginal distribution to get uncorrelated uniformly distributed variables
in the [0, 1] space. These uniformly distributed variables were then stretched and shifted to fit
the uniform spaces described here while retaining the 0 correlation coefficient. This process was
employed to ensure that the (admittedly low) probability of accidental correlation that might
occur from simply drawing from a uniform distribution directly was minimized.
4A limitation of choosing the same number of draws for each model is that the square uniform
space for the EUT model will have smaller gaps than the hypercubic space of the RDUPrelec
model. The smaller the gaps between parameter sets in their joint space, the better the prediction
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subject uses the parameter set and model assigned to it to calculate the choice
probabilities for each option in each lottery pair of the lottery task and the insurance
task. A random number is drawn from a univariate uniform distribution, and if
the choice probability calculated for the A option was greater than the random
number, the subject chooses A, otherwise they choose B. This process ensures that
subjects’ choices are made probabilistically with respect to the subjects’ model and
parameter set.5
After the subjects have made choices, each of the models we consider is estimated
for each subject on the choices made in the lottery task. Any model which didn’t
converge with a gradient close to 0 and a negative definite Hessian matrix or
converged on parameters outside of exclusionary rules defined in the previous
section was dropped from consideration. Each subject was then classified based
on the classification process defined in the previous section using a 5% significance
level. If no model met the consideration criteria, the subject was classified “NA”.
The welfare surplus of the choices made on the insurance task are then calculated
using the parameters of the winning model.
This process of classification simulation differs from that employed by Wilcox
(2015) in that I simulate a total of 500,000 DGP, each producing a single set of
choice data, whereas Wilcox (2015) simulates 4 DGP, each producing 1000 sets
of choice data. The approach of Wilcox (2015) allows for individual DGP to be
characterized by multiple sets of choices, while the approach I employ allows us to
see how the power of the instrument changes with resect to a wide range of DGP.
accuracy of classifying subjects for the parameter sets that exist in the empty space.
5Consider a choice probability for option A calculated to be 0.90, and therefore the choice
probability for option B is 0.10. A random number drawn from a univariate uniform distribution
has a 90% chance of being below or equal to 0.90, so option A would be chosen 90% of the time
by the simulated subject.
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The limitation of the approach I employ of only generating one choice data set per
DGP is mitigated by the large number of simulated subjects and the statistical
methods employed to predict classification probabilities described below.
4.2.1 Harrison and Ng (2016) Classification Power
Consider a simulated subject X which employs the EUT model with a CRRA
parameter of 0.5 and a λ value of 0.1. Additionally consider the 2-dimensional pa-
rameter space Z, where CRRA ∈ (0.475, 0.525), λ ∈ (0.09, 0.11) and the parameters
are uncorrelated in the space. There is only one choice dataset for subject X, but
there are 430 datasets in the space Z given the number of simulations conducted.
We could calculate the average number of subjects in space Z that are classified
as employing the EUT model, and use this statistic as an approximation of the
probability of correctly classifying subject X. This approach to approximating the
classification probabilities for a single set of parameter values based on an average
of some number of “nearest neighbor” parameter values is useful if the range of
parameter values chosen to average over is small and there are many data points in
the range. We could potentially improve this approach by fitting a probit or logit
model to the data in Z with the classification as EUT being the dependent variable,
and the parameter values as the independent variables, and predict a classification
probability for subject X. We could then consider a different subject Y with a new
Z space distributed around its parameters and repeat the process.
These approaches are naïve versions of other “smoothing” approaches such as
local regressions (LOESS) due to Cleveland (1979) and Cleveland, Grosse, Shyu,
Chambers and Hastie (1992), and generalized additive models (GAM) due to Hastie
and Tibshirani (1986). These approaches account for certain edge cases which
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makes them more attractive than the naïve approaches.6
Both the LOESS and GAM approaches would allow for predictions of classifi-
cation probabilities for any set of parameters covered by the range of parameters
simulated, but the GAM approach is utilized throughout. The GAM approach
allows us to predict the probability that a subject employing a particular model is
classified as EUT, RDUPrelec, or unable to be classified.7 First we separate the data
into subsets based on the models the simulated subjects actually employ, either
EUT or RDUPrelec. For each pooled group we fit a GAM model predicting whether
the subjects were classified as EUT, RDUPrelec, or unclassified.
(winner = N |A = EUT ) = s(r) + s(λ)
(winner = N |A = RDUPrelec) = s(r) + s(α) + s(β) + s(λ)
(4.17)
where N is one of EUT, RDUPrelec, or “NA” and s(·) indicates some smooth,
potentially non-linear function of its arguments.
The dependent variable in each of the GAM models in equation (4.17) is either
1 if the subject was classified as model N , or 0 if the subject was not. The
independent variables in each model are smooth functions of the actual parameter
6Given that the parameter space is very dense, with 250,000 points per model, and that
the parameters are uncorrelated in the space, the naïve averaging approach is likely to make
predictions similar to that of the LOESS and GAM approaches for most of the data. However,
there are several reasons to prefer either the LOESS or GAM approaches over the naïve simple
averaging approaches for our purposes. The properties of “smoothers” at the edges of the
parameter space are of particular interest. The naïve averaging approach works well when the
point of interest X is close to the midpoint of the range Z, but as X approaches the edge of the
full parameter space, a Z space can no longer be constructed with X as the midpoint, leading
to estimates for X being biased towards (or equal to) the estimates of the actual midpoint of Z.
The LOESS and GAM approaches handle these cases, in part by weighting parameters based on
their distance to the point X. Since the λ, α and β parameters must all be greater than 0, and
we simulate parameter sets close to these limits, we need an approach that is useful at the edges
of parameter spaces.
7If neither the EUT nor the RDUPrelec model passed the exclusionary rules defined in the
previous section, no model would be declared the winner and the subject would be classified as
“NA.”
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values the subject employs. For every model, each parameter gets its own smooth
function. Thus, 3 GAM models are fitted for each of the two model types in the
population, resulting in 6 fitted models in total. I then repeat this process but
drop subjects that were unclassified from the data before fitting the models. This
results in 4 additional models. Given the fitted models and a parameter set for
a model type, we can use a fitted GAM model to predict the probability that a
subject with the given parameter set will be classified as any of the N models. The
results of this fitting process are presented in Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5.
Figure 4.3: Probability of “Winning” for Given λ Values
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In Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 the X-axis is the simulated subjects’ values of the
parameter for that plot, and the Y-axis is the probability that a given model was
declared the winner. In each Figure the solid red line indicates the estimates for the
195
Figure 4.4: Probability of “Winning” for EUT subjects
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EUT model, the short dashed green line indicates the estimates for the RDUPrelec
model, and the long dashed blue line indicates the estimates for non-convergence
or exclusion. In all figures, the 95% confidence interval is given by the dotted
lines surrounding the lines given above. In each Figure, the second row contains
estimates derived from all the subjects, while the first row only contains estimates
derived from subjects that were classified as either EUT or RDUPrelec.
In Figure 4.3 the first column contains estimates for EUT subjects, while the
second column contains estimates for RDUPrelec subjects. The X-axis of this figure
is the value of the λ parameter. Thus, the top-left plot shows the probability of an
EUT subject with a converged model being classified as either EUT or RDUPrelec
for a range of λ values. In Figures 4.4 and 4.5, the column titles indicate the
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Figure 4.5: Probability of “Winning” for RDUPrelec subjects
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parameter given on the X-axis. Thus, in Figure 4.4, the top-left plot shows how
the probability of an EUT subject with a converged model is classified as either
EUT or RDUPrelec for a range of CRRA values. In Figure 4.5, the bottom-right
plot shows how the probability of an RDUPrelec subject is classified as either EUT,
RDUPrelec, or “NA” for a range of β values.
In Figure 4.4 and in the left column of Figure 4.3, the red solid line shows the
probability of EUT subjects being correctly classified as EUT. In Figure 4.5 and
in the right column of Figure 4.3, the green dotted line shows the probability of
RDUPrelec subjects being correctly classified as RDUPrelec.
The results presented in Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 offer both surprising and
intuitive results. In Figure 4.3 we see that the probability of EUT subjects being
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misclassified as RDUPrelec, RDUPrelec subjects being misclassified as EUT, and
either type of subject being unclassified, increases with λ. This is intuitively
reasonable. As the λ parameter increases, the likelihood that a subject makes
a choice error increases. For EUT subjects, these choices errors can present as
probability weighting when there is none, and for RDUPrelec subjects these choice
errors can present as linear probability weighting. Another way to characterize
this effect is to say that as λ increases, the noise in the data increases. Indeed, as
λ→∞ choice probabilities for every option are equal, resulting in totally random
data. The more noise there is in the data, the lower the likelihood of the optimizer
converging on reasonable, or any, estimates, and the greater the likelihood that
any latent process will be identified as another.
In the third and fourth columns of Figure 4.5 we have additional intuitive
results. We can see in these columns that the probability of an RDUPrelec subject
being classified as EUT peaks when the probability weighting parameters approach
the value of 1, and diminishes as these parameter values move away from 1. Since
the RDUPrelec model nests EUT when α = β = 1, we should expect the likelihood of
misclassification to increase around these values. It appears the α parameter plays a
more decisive role in the classification probability for the range of parameter values
we consider; the probability of a RDUPrelec subject being classified as RDUPrelec
drops at a greater rate as the α parameter approaches 1 than as the β parameter
approaches 1 from either the left or the right.
In Figure 4.4 we see that the probability of an EUT subject being classified
as EUT is greater for values of CRRA > 0 than for values of CRRA < 0, though
only modestly so. Values of CRRA > 0 indicate risk aversion in an EUT model,
and the design of the HN lottery instrument placed more emphasis on identifying
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degrees of risk aversion than identifying degrees of risk seeking (CRRA values < 0)
in EUT subjects. Similarly, in Figure 4.5 we see that the CRRA parameter has
very little effect on the probability of a RDUPrelec subject being correctly classified
as RDUPrelec. Since it is the probability weighing function that defines RDUPrelec as
being different from EUT, it should not be surprising that the utility parameter has
little effect on on the probability of RDUPrelec subjects being correctly classified.
However, the relatively low probability with which RDUPrelec subjects are cor-
rectly classified as RDUPrelec over a wide range of parameters is surprising. Looking
at Figure 4.5 we see that for most of the parameter values considered, the proba-
bility of an RDUPrelec subject being correctly classified as RDUPrelec is below 50%
and that for most of these values, it is more likely that an RDUPrelec subject is
classified as EUT than as RDUPrelec.
The statistical results presented here generally show wide variation of the power
of the HN instrument to correctly classify subjects as employing either the EUT
or RDUPrelec functionals across parameter spaces. This wide variation in power
for different DGP suggests that power analysis conducted on only several DGP,
as is done in Wilcox (2015) for example, should be extended to incorporate more
DGP across the ranges of parameters an experimenter may expect real subjects to
employ.
4.2.2 Harrison and Ng (2016) Insurance Task Welfare
Expectations
The probabilities provided in Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 are useful for describing the
degree of success of the classification process has in correctly identifying the model
employed by a subject if the subject employs one of the two models considered
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here. The classification process itself, however, is only useful to economists insofar
as it provides us with a model that allows us to make normative characterizations
of subjects’ choices. Given our simulation process, we can measure the success of
the classification process in normative terms by calculating the difference in the
estimated welfare surplus of the choices made in the HN insurance task against
actual welfare surplus for each subject.
Utilizing the definition of accumulated welfare surplus given by equation (4.14),
we follow HN (2016, pp. 110-111) and bootstrap the estimated welfare surplus of the
subjects. We generate 500 random draws from a multivariate normal distribution
using the point estimates of the parameters of the winning model as the means of
the marginal distributions, and the inverse of the estimated Hessian matrix as the
covariance matrix.8 With each draw we calculate equation (4.14) and define the
estimated welfare surplus as the average of these 500 calculations. Therefore the
difference between the estimated welfare surplus, given by this bootstrap method,
and real welfare surplus, which we can observe directly for the simulated subjects,
is given by:
WSDN = ∆WiT (ΩˆN)−∆WiT (Ω) (4.18)
where N is the model the subject has been classified as employing, Ω is the set
of parameters that define the utility function actually employed by subject i, and
ΩˆN is the set of estimated parameters for model N for subject i. Values of 0 for
equation (4.18) indicate that the subject’s estimated welfare surplus equals the
8All the probability weighing parameters and the λ parameter are restricted mathematically
to be greater than 0. In the estimation process, this was accomplished by exponentiating the
raw parameter values passed by the optimizer to the likelihood function. When generating the
multivariate normal distribution described, we use the raw parameter estimates to generate the
distribution and exponentiated the marginal distributions of the parameters that are restricted
to be greater than 0. Thus, these resulting marginal distributions are actually log-normal
distributions.
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subject’s real welfare surplus, and thus the welfare estimates are “accurate” in
terms of their approximation of the real welfare surplus. Since equation (4.18) is
based on equation (4.14), and this equation is based on the CE of the lotteries
in a lottery pair, the units of the welfare surplus difference (WSD) are the same
monetary units as the CEs of the lotteries. If the subject has been misclassified, Ω
and ΩˆN will not represent the same set of parameters.
Just as we predicted probabilities of classification in equation (4.17), we can
predict the difference in estimated welfare surplus and real welfare surplus given
by equation (4.18). GAM models are utilized once more to allow predictions
across the range of parameter values simulated. The data are first separated into
subsets based on the models the simulated subjects actually employ, either EUT
or RDUPrelec, and then for each pooled group we fit a GAM model predicting the
WSD given by equation (4.18) as a function of the parameters the subject actually
employs.
(WSDN,M |M = EUT ) = s(r) + s(λ)
(WSDN,M |M = RDUPrelec) = s(r) + s(α) + s(β) + s(λ)
(4.19)
where N indicates the model that the subject was classified as, M indicates the
model the subject actually employs, and s(·) indicates some smooth, potentially
non-linear function of its arguments. A model is fitted for each combination of the 2
M models and 2 N models, and so 4 models are fitted in total. Additionally, given
our estimates of the probability of EUT and RDUPrelec subjects being classified as
employing EUT or RDUPrelec respectively, we can calculate point estimates for the
expected WSD by multiplying the probabilities presented in the top row of Figures
4.4 and 4.5 with the predicted WSD given by equation (4.19). The WSD predictions
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for subjects that were classified as either EUT or RDUPrelec, as well as the expected
WSD, are presented in Figures 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8. Since the subjects which didn’t
converge on either EUT or RDUPrelec (labeled “NA” previously) didn’t produce
estimates with which we can make welfare calculations, they are not plotted.
Figure 4.6: Welfare Surplus Difference of “Winning” Models for Given λ Values
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Figure 4.7: Welfare Surplus Difference of “Winning” Models for EUT subjects
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The solid red line again represents subjects that were classified as EUT, and
the short dashed green line represents subjects that were classified as RDUPrelec.
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Figure 4.8: Welfare Surplus Difference of “Winning” Models for RDUPrelec subjects
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In these figures, however, the long dashed blue line represents the expected WSD.
Assessment of how the classification process relates to the welfare surplus of
the subject being classified is in many ways more important than the accuracy of
the process itself. This is because economists distinguish themselves from decision
theorists by making normative statements about how an individual’s choices relate
to their economic well-being. The accuracy of the classification process is valuable
only because it can aid in the accuracy of the normative statements we can construct
using this process. Leamer (2012, p. 25) makes a similar statement when discussing
the general fallibility of macroeconomic models: “[O]ur goal as economists is not
soundness, but usefulness.”
Looking at Figure 4.7, which depicts EUT subjects, for values of CRRA greater
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than 0.5, shown in the left plot, the confidence intervals of subjects classified as
EUT or RDUPrelec overlap, indicating that there isn’t a noticeable difference in
WSD between correctly classified and misclassified subjects in this range. In Figure
4.8, which depicts RDUPrelec subjects, we see that for values of α just greater than
1 or just less than 1, shown in the bottom left plot, the lines showing the predicted
WSD of subjects classified as either EUT or RDUPrelec overlap briefly. These two
cases indicate that for some parameter values employed by subjects of either model,
misclassification is costless in terms of WSD. Additionally, in Figure 4.8 we can
see that of the RDUPrelec subjects that have α values very close to 1, shown in
the bottom left plot, the subjects that have been classified as EUT instead of
RDUPrelec have WSD that are somewhat closer to 0 than the subjects that had
been classified as RDUPrelec. The finding that misclassified subjects in these cases
have WSD relatively close to 0, or closer to 0 than for correctly classified subjects,
indicates that even though the classification process has not been accurate for these
subjects, it nonetheless can be useful when used to characterize the welfare surplus
of subjects’ choices in the insurance task. This conclusion will be revisited later.
However, we can also see that for wide ranges of parameter values, misclassified
subjects have a WSD that is significantly different from 0 and is farther from 0 than
for correctly classified subjects. The cost of misclassification is particularly great
for RDUPrelec subjects. In Figure 4.6, comparing RDUPrelec subjects misclassified
as EUT, shown in the right plot as the solid red line, to EUT subjects misclassified
as RDUPrelec, shown in the left plot as the dotted green line, we can see that the
WSD is more negative for misclassified RDUPrelec subjects than for misclassified
EUT subjects across the entire range of λ. Looking at the bottom left plot of
Figure 4.8, we can see that as the α parameter approaches 0, RDUPrelec subjects
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that have been misclassified as EUT have WSD values that increasingly diverge
from 0, indicating an increasing cost of misclassification. Looking at the bottom
right plot of Figure 4.8, we see generally that as β increases past 1, the subjects
that have been incorrectly classified as employing an EUT model also have WSD
values that increasingly differ from 0, but this divergence is of roughly the same
magnitude seen bottom left plot of Figure 4.8 as α increases above 1.
That subjects actually employing a RDUPrelec model are badly characterized by
an EUT model when they have probability weighting parameters that differ greatly
from 1 should not be surprising. Probability weighting is what distinguishes RDU
models from EUT models, and so when this is ignored by classifying an RDUPrelec
subject as EUT, the consequences in terms of welfare surplus estimates can be
meaningful. On the other hand, RDU models nest EUT as a special case, and so
when EUT subjects are misclassified as RDUPrelec there is the possibility that even
though the estimated probability weighting parameters are statistically significantly
different from 1, the magnitude of this difference is small enough to not matter as
much in terms of welfare surplus.
4.3 Alternative Approaches for Welfare
Prediction
The analyses thus far constitute ex post power analyses of the experimental instru-
ment and classification process employed by HN, and an analysis of the expected
welfare characterizations that can be made with this classification process. The
power analysis aspect of this process constitutes a statistical inquiry into an exper-
imental protocol and is similar to other ex ante and ex post power analyses. The
welfare characterization aspect of this analysis constitutes the economic inquiry
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into this experimental protocol. Both inquires are important, but making accurate
predictions or characterizations about the welfare consequences of choices by eco-
nomic agents should be of greater importance to economists than the descriptive
accuracy of the model used to derive these calculations.9
The two inquiries are related as noted by HN (2016, p. 105). A model is needed
in order to make calculations of consumer surplus and thus we need a reasonable
method for selecting a model on which to base these calculations. However, if
our objective is to generate accurate welfare characterizations, and not necessarily
accurate model classifications, then we should explore how different experimental
designs, model specifications, and model selection processes influence the accuracy
of welfare characterizations. For instance, the selection of the number and type
of lottery pairs should be influenced by how they result in more accurate welfare
predictions in the choice domain that is welfare relevant to the experimenter; the
insurance task in the case of HN.
These kind of enquires into how differing experimental methods affect the
accuracy of welfare characterizations are themselves experiments of a kind. In this
section we propose two modifications to the experimental protocol employed by
HN and investigate how they differ in terms of expected welfare surplus predictions.
The first of these proposals is a recommendation that would be familiar to any
statistician: increase the sample size per subject by increasing the number of lottery
pairs in the lottery instrument used in estimation. The second proposal is to forego
any attempt to accurately classify subjects as EUT or RDU and instead use the
fitted RDUPrelec models when they have passed the exclusionary rules set by HN,
and use non-excluded EUT models otherwise.
9I make this argument against the Random Preferences stochastic model in Chapter 2.
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For the second proposal, we utilize the choice data and model estimations from
the simulation process described previously and simply change the critical value
for the non-linear Wald test of linear probability from 0.05 to 1 so that the null
hypothesis of equivalence with EUT is rejected in every case. This proposal will
be referred to as the “Default” approach. For the first proposal, however, we use
the same simulated subjects used in all the analyses thus far, but have them each
respond to the HN lottery instrument 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 13 times instead of once.
This results in 240, 400, 560, 720, 880, and 1040 choices per subject, respectively.
The estimation procedure, application of exclusionary rules, and classification
process is then applied to these new choice data to select a winning model for each
subject. This proposal will be referred to as the HNC approach, and when referring
to individual repetitions the “C” will be replaced by the number of lottery pairs
for the given repetition. Thus HN240 refers to the instrument where the subject
made 240 choices, HN400 to the instrument where the subject made 400 choices,
and so on. I additionally refer to the original lottery instrument proposed by HN
as the HN80 instrument, as it has 80 choices per subject.
The parameter estimates of the winning model from each approach are used
to calculate the welfare surplus of the subject in the insurance task as before.
Thus, the HNC approach changes the experimental instrument used to estimate
models, leaving the exclusionary rules and classification process unchanged, while
the Default approach leaves the experimental instrument and exclusionary rules
unchanged and alters the classification process. The results of the classification
process for the HN1040 instrument are presented in Figures 4.9, 4.10, and the
estimated WSD results are presented in Figures 4.13 and 4.14. The probability
of correctly classifying subjects for each of the HNC instruments is presented in
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Figures 4.11 for EUT subjects and 4.12 for RDUPrelec subjects. The estimated
WSD for the Default approach are given in Figures 4.15 and 4.16. The plots of
the expected WSD for the Default approach, and the HNC for all C are given in
Figures 4.17 and 4.18.
Figure 4.9: Probability of “Winning” for EUT subjects
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I initially present the HN1040 instrument as a potential limiting case of a sample
size increase. Clearly, 1040 choices per subject lies beyond the feasible number of
lottery pairs to present to subjects in any one session, but this large number of
lottery pairs has attractive statistical properties. Looking first at the classification
power of the HN1040 instrument in Figures 4.9 and 4.10, we see that this instrument
has significantly improved power overall, and that the variation of power over the
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Figure 4.10: Probability of “Winning” for RDUPrelec subjects
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range of parameter values follows much the same pattern as the original HN80
instrument. In Figure 4.9 we see that classification power is largely uniform
across the entire range of parameters considered, with some small increase in the
probability of EUT subjects classified as RDUPrelec as λ values increase, as seen
in the right tail of the lines in the right column plots, and small increase in the
probability of EUT subjects being classified as EUT as the CRRA value increases,
as seen in the right tail of the left column plots. The probability of correctly
classifying EUT subjects as EUT is greater under the HN1040 instrument than the
HN80 instrument across the entire range of parameters considered. The rate of
non-convergence in the HN1040 instrument, however, is also noticeably different in
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the HN1040 instrument; it is not perceptibly different from 0 across the entire range
of parameters considered.
In Figure 4.10 we see that classification power of the HN1040 instrument follows
the patterns of the original HN instrument, but more rapid changes in the slopes
of the lines for each parameter except the CRRA parameter. The probability
of an RDUPrelec subject being misclassified as EUT increases rapidly as the λ
parameter increases, as seen in the second column, and as either of the probability
weighting parameters approach 1 from either side, as seen in the third and fourth
columns. The probability of correctly classifying RDUPrelec subjects however is
again universally higher under the HN1040 instrument, and the probability of non-
convergence is nearly 0 for almost the entire range of parameters considered. The
probability of non-convergence increases somewhat as λ increases, as α and the
CRRA parameters decrease, and increases rapidly as the β parameter goes below
0.5.
It should not be a surprise that we should generally see the same patterns as
before, but with significantly greater probabilities of correctly classifying subjects
across the whole ranges of parameter values considered. The probabilities of type
I and type II errors generally decrease with sample size in econometric tests with
consistent estimators, and so we should expect this result when we increase the
per-subject sample size 13-fold. The patterns of how the probabilities change with
parameters values are much the same as before is due to the lottery pairs, considered
models, and classification process being identical. With a different composition
of the type of lottery pairs, we would expect to see different probability patterns,
perhaps even seeing increasing power in the parameter ranges we would expect to
see from real subjects.
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Figure 4.11: Probability of Correct Classification for EUT subjects
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Figure 4.12: Probability of Correct Classification for RDUPrelec subjects
HNC Approaches
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In Figures 4.11 and 4.12 we see the point estimates of the predicted probability
of correctly classifying EUT subjects and RDUPrelec subjects, respectively, for
each of C ∈ {80, 240, 400, 560, 720, 880, 1040}. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show correct
classification probabilities (CCP) among converged subjects only. In Figure 4.11 we
can see that as the number of lottery pairs in the instrument increases, given by the
different colored lines in the plots, the CCP for EUT subjects increases across the
entire range of parameters considered. Just as we saw for the HN1040 instrument
in Figure 4.9, and the HN80 instrument in Figure 4.4, for all C instruments, the
CCP decreases with the λ parameter, shown in the right plot, and increases with
the CRRA parameter, shown in the left plot. Interestingly, for instruments with
C ≥ 240, given by the lines that are not solid and red, there does not appear to be
much difference in the CCP for values of λ less than 0.1, as seen in the right plot,
and values of CRRA greater than 0.75, in the left plot.
In Figure 4.12 we again see that as the number of lottery pairs in the instrument
increases, given by the different colored lines in the plots, the probability of cor-
rectly classifying RDUPrelec subjects increases across the entire range of parameters
considered. However, the differences across the C instruments in the CCP for
RDUPrelec subjects is more exaggerated than for EUT subjects. The difference in
CCP across the C instruments is particularly pronounced for values of λ < 0.15,
given in the top right plot, and increasingly pronounced as values of α and β
diverge from 1, as shown in the bottom left and right plots, respectively. Although,
as the α and β parameters approach the value of 0, the limit of the RDUPrelec
function, the CCP begins to converge for C ≥ 240.
The value of this increase in classification power, as stated earlier, lies in the
superior leverage we gain for making better welfare characterizations. We can
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Figure 4.13: Welfare Surplus Difference of “Winning” Models for EUT subjects
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Figure 4.14: Welfare Surplus Difference RDUPrelec subjects
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see the estimates of welfare surplus given the classification based on the HN1040
instrument in Figures 4.13 and 4.14. In Figure 4.13 we see that for EUT subjects
classified correctly as EUT, given by the solid red line, the expected WSD is
imperceptibly different from 0 across much of the range of parameters considered.
In addition, even though EUT subjects classified as RDUPrelec have generally
worse WSD estimates, given the high likelihood of EUT subjects being correctly
classified, the expected WSD is also very close to 0 for much of the parameter
ranges considered. This indicates that not only is the classification process much
more accurate, but the parameter estimates for the models are likely to be more
accurate as well. We see that as the CRRA value goes below −0.5 and the λ value
increases, the WSD becomes more negative for subjects classified as either model.
In Figure 4.14 we see that for RDUPrelec subjects classified correctly the expected
WSD is also very close to 0 across much of the range of parameters considered. As
α parameter gets close to 0, seen in the bottom left plot, we see the WSD deviates
more from 0 than for the rest of the range.
Figure 4.15: Welfare Surplus Difference for EUT subjects
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Figure 4.16: Welfare Surplus Difference for RDUPrelec subjects
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In Figures 4.15 and 4.16 we can see the WSD estimates for the Default approach,
where subjects are classified as employing an RDUPrelec model if it hasn’t been
excluded, and EUT otherwise. In 4.15 we see that the WSD for EUT subjects
classified as either model approaches 0 as the CRRA parameter increases, and
the WSD generally becomes more negative as λ increases. For both the CRRA
and λ parameters, there is little difference in the welfare estimates of subjects
classified as either EUT or RDUPrelec. In 4.16, on the other hand, we see there is
generally a large gap between RDUPrelec subjects classified as either model, with
subjects classified as RDUPrelec, given by the green line, being significantly better
characterized than those classified as EUT, given by the red line. However, since
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the probability of an RDUPrelec subject being correctly classified is so great under
this approach, the expected WSD does not deviate very much from the WSD given
by the RDUPrelec model.
The results presented in Figures 4.15 and 4.16 should not be surprising. The
RDUPrelec model nests the EUT model, thus EUT subjects can be accurately
represented by an RDUPrelec model by setting α = β = 1. However, the EUT
model does not allow for probability weighting, and thus RDUPrelec subjects that
undertake significant probability weighting and are classified as EUT will have
their welfare surplus significantly mischaracterized.
In Figures 4.17 and 4.18 we can see the expected WSD for the Default approach
and for the HNC approach for all C ∈ {80, 240, 400, 560, 720, 880, 1040}. The
Default approach is given by the solid green line, the original HN80 instrument
is given by dotted yellow line, and remaining lines indicate the remaining C
replications of the HN instrument. In the left plot of Figure 4.17, we see that there
is very little difference in the expected WSD between any of the approaches or
instruments when the CRRA parameter is greater than 0.4. In particular, there is
almost no difference at all between using the classification process employed by HN
vs a classification process that never rejects the RDUPrelec model in this parameter
range. In the right plot of Figure 4.17, depicting λ values, the WSD for the for
the HNC approaches with C ≥ 240 are noticeably closer to 0 than for either the
original HN80 or the Default approach, though the magnitude of this difference is
still relatively small.
In Figure 4.18 on the other hand, we see a noticeable difference between the
different approaches for RDUPrelec subjects. The WSD for the Default approach,
given by the solid red line, is closer to 0 than for the HN80 approach, given by
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Figure 4.17: Welfare Surplus Difference for EUT subjects
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the dotted yellow line, for the entire range of CRRA parameters considered, top
left plot, the entire range of λ parameters considered, top right plot, and for most
of the ranges of the α and β parameters considered, bottom left and right plots
respectively. In particular the Default approach generally performs better when
the α parameter is far from 1, and the β parameter is greater than 0.7. These
differences are also much greater than the differences for the EUT subjects over
any parameter values shown in Figure 4.17. Interestingly, the Default approach
performs as well as the HN240 approach for values of β near 1.25, shown in the
bottom right plot, and better than the HN240 approach for α greater than 0.5 and
less than 0.75. Its clear, however, though that over a wide range of parameters the
HNC approaches for C ≥ 240 provide more accurate WSD estimates. This suggests
that the increased number of lottery pairs not only provides a greater likelihood of
correctly classifying a subject, but also provides more accurate parameter estimates,
which lead to more accurate estimates of the subjects’ welfare surplus.
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Figure 4.18: Expected Welfare Surplus Difference for RDUPrelec subjects
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4.3.1 How Much Does This Matter?
These differences should matter to researchers as a matter of methodological
principle. How much they should matter depends on the population of subjects
the experimenter expects to encounter and how much inaccuracy is tolerable in
the characterization of welfare. If we consider a world that is made up only of
agents employing some parameterization of either the EUT or RDUPrelec models we
consider here, the proportion of the population belonging to either model should
influence how much we care about these differences. If most of the EUT agents
in the population employ a CRRA parameter greater than 0.4, we might not care
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which approach is used to classify EUT subjects. But if a significant proportion
of them are risk seeking (CRRA < 0), we may care. Likewise, if the RDUPrelec
agents in the population don’t undertake significant probability weighting, choosing
between the various approaches presented may not matter a great deal in terms of
welfare characterizations.
We can observe this more cleanly by considering a hypothetical population of
EUT and RDUPrelec agents, and predicting the expected WSD for these populations.
As a basis for the hypothetical population, I first classify the real subjects from the
HN experiments as either EUT or RDUPrelec using the HN classification process,
then fit a pooled EUT model to the subjects classified as EUT and a pooled
RDUPrelec model to the subjects classified as RDUPrelec. I classify 52 subjects as
employing the EUT model, 44 subjects as employing the RDUPrelec model, and
15 subjects remain unclassified. The point estimate of the CRRA parameter for
the EUT subjects is 0.49, and the point estimate of the λ value is 0.10. For the
RDUPrelec subjects, the point estimates of the CRRA parameter is 0.52, the α
parameter is 1.48, the β parameter is 0.74, and the λ parameter is 0.12. Although
these are estimates, and not the real values of parameters which we have been
discussing, they allow us to construct a useful hypothetical scenario.
Consider a population comprised of EUT and RDUPrelec agents that employ the
EUT and RDUPrelec models that have been specified. In this population, suppose
that for both EUT and RDUPrelec agents, the CRRA parameter is distributed
normally with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.11, and the λ parameter
is distributed log-normal with a mean of 0.1 and a standard deviation of 0.02.
For the RDUPrelec agents the α parameter is distributed log-normal with a mean
of 1.50 and a standard deviation of 0.1, and the β parameter is also distributed
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log-normal with a mean of .7 and a standard deviation of 0.1. Assume that for
each model, none of the marginal distributions are correlated. Utilizing the fitted
models from equations (4.17) and (4.19), for each of the two model populations
specified above, we draw 10,000 agents from the hypothetical population and
predict classification probabilities and WSD for the Default approach and HNC
for C ∈ {80, 240, 400, 560, 720, 880, 1040}. Figures 4.19 and 4.20 show the kernel
density plots for the real welfare surplus of these populations, the welfare surplus
estimates of those subjects that are classified as EUT or RDUPrelec, and the expected
welfare surplus estimates given the classification probabilities by population. These
figures show welfare surplus estimates, not the WSD metric, which is shown in the
tables below.
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Figure 4.19: Welfare Surplus, HN80 Instrument
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Figure 4.20: Welfare Surplus, HN80 Instrument
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Table 4.1: Expected Welfare Surplus Difference, Default Approach
p(EUT) p(Prelec) WSDEUT WSDPrelec Expected WSD
EUT Subjects 0.10 0.91 −2.30 −1.54 −1.61
Prelec Subjects 0.09 0.91 −16.51 −4.29 −5.30
Table 4.2: Expected Welfare Surplus Difference, HN80 Approach
p(EUT) p(Prelec) WSDEUT WSDPrelec Expected WSD
EUT Subjects 0.88 0.12 −0.52 −4.50 −0.99
Prelec Subjects 0.63 0.38 −10.09 −4.40 −7.91
Table 4.3: Expected Welfare Surplus Difference, HN400 Approach
p(EUT) p(Prelec) WSDEUT WSDPrelec Expected WSD
EUT Subjects 0.95 0.05 0.07 −0.71 0.02
Prelec Subjects 0.25 0.75 −7.34 −0.19 −1.96
Table 4.4: Expected Welfare Surplus Difference, HN560 Approach
p(EUT) p(Prelec) WSDEUT WSDPrelec Expected WSD
EUT Subjects 0.95 0.05 0.06 −0.04 0.06
Prelec Subjects 0.17 0.84 −6.76 0.05 −1.08
Table 4.5: Expected Welfare Surplus Difference, HN1040 Approach
p(EUT) p(Prelec) WSDEUT WSDPrelec Expected WSD
EUT Subjects 0.95 0.05 0.02 0.40 0.04
Prelec Subjects 0.07 0.93 −6.85 0.20 −0.31
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In Tables 4.1 through 4.5 we see the average of the predictions for the hy-
pothetical population for the Default approach and the HNC approach for C ∈
{80, 400, 560, 1040}. The names of the rows in these tables give the model that the
agents actually employ. In the first two columns of each table, we see the average
probability of an agent employing a model given by the name of the row being
classified as the model given in the column. In the third and fourth columns of
each table, we see the average WSD should the agent be classified as the model
given in the column name. In the fifth column of each table, we see the average
expected WSD for the row population.
In Tables 4.1 through 4.5 we see a snapshot of the patterns depicted in the
Figures presented throughout this chapter. Correctly classified EUT subjects are
better characterized under any of the HNC approaches than under the Default
Approach, as seen by comparing the first row, third column of each table. Correctly
classified RDUPrelec subjects are better characterized under the Default approach
than under the HN80 approach, though just barely so, as seen by comparing the
second row, fourth columns of Tables 4.1 and 4.2. All subjects are more likely to
be correctly classified, and have better a expected WSD for HNC approaches with
C ∈ {400, 560, 1040}. What these tables show more clearly, however, is the cost in
terms of welfare surplus of choosing between these approaches given populations
of agents we might readily encounter in experiments with real subjects.
In terms of correctly classifying subjects, we can see that for this population
the average probability of correctly classifying RDUPrelec subjects in the original
HN80 approach is a surprisingly low 38%. The probability of correctly classifying
EUT subjects with the HN80 is much greater than for RDUPrelec subjects, at 88%,
and rapidly approaches the 95% limit. The RDUPrelec subjects however, are not
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correctly classified 95% of the time for any of the repetitions, as seen in the second
row second column of each plot, and only reach a correct classification probability
of 80% with more than 400 lottery pairs per subject.
In Figures 4.19 and 4.20 we see the differences between the estimated welfare
surplus and the real welfare surplus for the original HN approach and the Default
Approach for the HN80 instrument. The estimated welfare surplus for subjects
classified as EUT is given by the solid red line, the estimated welfare surplus for
subjects classified as RDUPrelec is given by the log-dashed blue line, the expected
welfare surplus given the probabilities of classification for this population is given
by the short-dashed green line, and the real welfare surplus for these subjects is
given by the dot-dashed purple line. These displays provide some distributional
information, as well as show the raw welfare surplus estimates for these two
approaches, whereas Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide metrics for the average and expected
WSD, and classification probabilities for the same approaches. The raw figures
show that the average real welfare surplus for EUT subjects is roughly $15, and
for RDUPrelec is roughly $28. This means that the expected WSD for RDUPrelec
subjects in the HN80 approach of -$7.90, shown in the second row, fifth column of
Table 4.2, is particularly large with respect to the RDUPrelec subjects’ average real
welfare surplus.
Looking at the fifth column of Tables 4.2 and 4.1, we see that going from the
HN80 approach to the Default approach, RDUPrelec subjects have an improvement
in the accuracy of their expected WSD of $2.60, while EUT subjects only have a
decrease of $0.62. That is, the average RDUPrelec subject will have a welfare surplus
estimate that is $2.66 closer to their real welfare surplus under the Default approach,
while the average EUT subject has welfare surplus estimates that are $0.62 farther
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away from their real welfare surplus. This difference is roughly 10% of the real
welfare surplus for RDUPrelec subjects, and only about 4% of the EUT subjects’
real welfare surplus. To put it another way, assume a grand population made up
of the two populations of EUT and RDUPrelec subjects we’ve posited here. The
proportion of EUT subjects in this grand population would have to be greater than
80.7% for the loss of the WSD for EUT subjects to outweigh the gain to RDUPrelec
subjects.10 Thus, if we expect real subjects to employ parameters similar to those
assumed here, and if we expect the proportion of EUT subjects to be lower than
80.7% of the population, the Default approach will produce more accurate welfare
surplus estimates than the HN80 approach. Given the results presented in Figure
4.1 and the power calculations presented throughout this chapter, the evidence
would weigh against a population of real subjects with such a high proportion of
EUT subjects.
Choosing between the Default approach or one of the HNC approaches, however,
requires consideration of more than just the classification or welfare surplus accuracy
in real experiments. In both the HN80 and Default approaches, the experimental
protocol and instruments were identical, and thus comparing the expected WSD
of the two approaches is an appropriate way of choosing between the approaches.
The HN1040 approach, however, changes the size of the experimental instrument
dramatically and would therefore require changes in the experimental protocol.
Even a more modest increase in the number of lottery pairs, to 400 for intance,
to increase the probability of correctly classifying RDUPrelec subjects, can create
new methodological concerns. Unlike our simulated subjects, real subjects may
experience boredom or fatigue should the experiment be conducted in one sitting,
10For p = 0.807, p× 0.62 ≈ (1− p)× 2.6. For p > 0.807, p× 0.62 > (1− p)× 2.6.
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and they may experience changes in the background wealth, risks, or beliefs should
the experiment be conducted over several days. Any of these factors may plausibly
result in a subject employing one functional at the beginning of the experiment
and another functional by the end. Indeed, Hey (2001) test the hypothesis that
subjects change the functional they use when lottery tasks are repeated 5 times
by presenting subjects with a 100 lottery pair battery over 5 days. He concludes
that “Across the repetitions the variablility of responses declines for some subjects
but stays constant for others (and indeed actually increases for a small number of
subjects.)” Experimenters need to weigh these methodological concerns against
their ability to provide more accurate estimates of welfare, and better classification
accuracy.
4.4 Conclusions
This chapter demonstrates a method for conducting a power analysis over a wide
range of potential DGP, shows that conducting individual level classification with
subjects responding to fewer than several hundred lottery pairs is likely to lead to
frequent misclassifications, and that these misclassifications can be costly in terms
of the measurement of subjective welfare surplus. Though inferential objectives
vary greatly across the experimental literature, many researchers estimate multiple
structural models of utility and classify individual subjects as employing one based
on their estimates.
Given the inferential objective of HN of assessing the subjective welfare con-
sequences of the decision to purchase, or not to purchase, a particular insurance
product, I present mixed evidence. The capacity of the classification process to
correctly classify a subject as employing either the EUT or RDUPrelec model is rela-
227
tively low for parameterizations of these models we expect real subjects to employ.
For a hypothetical population parameterized by the point estimates of real subject
data, the average probability of correctly classifying RDUPrelec subjects is shown to
be less than 40%. However, although misclassification results in negative welfare
consequences for the subjects, these negative consequences are not particularly
massive, and the gain of the alternative “Default” approach, in which subjects
are classified as RDUPrelec if feasible and EUT otherwise, averages only several
dollars across the hypothetical population of RDUPrelec subjects. Nonetheless, I
conclude that utilizing the proposed Default approach of classification or increasing
the sample size by several hundred lottery pairs per subject would result in more
accurate subjective welfare estimates in aggregate for populations of EUT and
RDUPrelec subjects we may expect to encounter in experiments.
These two approaches, increasing the sample size and disregarding classification
altogether, are not the only options available to increase the accuracy of the
classification process or the accuracy of welfare surplus estimates. There exists
the possibility of alternative experimental designs and/or econometric procedures.
Econometrically, one can imagine a Baysian approach in which small groups of
subjects are grouped together based on observable characteristics, such as age,
sex and education, and then pooled estimations from these subgroups being used
as priors to inform the individual level estimates of the members of the groups.
Additionally, non-parametric or semi-parametric estimation techniques may fare
better in terms of classification accuracy. These econometric approaches could be
performed on existing data, although power analyses should be performed to test
if they improve classification accuracy or the accuracy of welfare surplus estimates.
In terms of instrument design, there are more than 1 septillion (1023 < 280)
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possible choice patterns in the HN lottery instrument! Reducing this choice space
while maintaining the same number of lottery pairs would require a different ex-
perimental procedure, but this could reduce the chance of choice errors causing a
misidentification, perhaps by explicitly prohibiting subjects from selecting certain
choice patterns which are likely to lead to misclassification. Of course, prohibit-
ing certain choice patterns would require additional econometric restrictions since
choices across individual lottery pairs could no longer be said to be independent.
The task of modifying the experimental design and econometric procedure, while
guarding against other concerns proposed by experimental methodology, is Her-
culean, and this chapter cannot provide much guidance with respect to this task
beyond increasing the sample size.
One of the more difficult questions this chapter hoped to help address is that
of “how much does this matter?” By representing the cost of misclassification as
a function of the difference between estimates of welfare surplus and the known,
“real” welfare surplus of our simulated subjects, we bring the question of “how
much?” into a normative domain that economists are familiar with. However, it
remains unclear by how much estimates of welfare surplus need to deviate from real
welfare surplus before they truly “matter.” Harrison (1989, 1992) argues specifically
that when differences in consumer surplus between choices amount to fractions of a
penny in First Price Auction experiments, the choices presumably didn’t matter to
the subjects, and so conclusions drawn from these choices should not matter much
to economists either. Generally, he argues that the dominance precept of Smith
(1982) needs to be taken into serious consideration when drawing conclusions from
the choice behavior of economic agents. Hey (2001, p. 21) raises similar concerns
about assessing the economic significance of results showing that subjects may
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employ different functionals when faced with the same choice task over 5 days:
The problem with these analyses is that they are essentially statistical
in nature. We as economists, might be more interested in the economic
significance of the results. Given that the EU preference function is
much easier to apply to the economic analysis of behaviour, we might
want to know how far wrong we might be if we use the EU functional
rather than the alternatives in such applications. It is not obvious
how we might answer this question as it depends upon the particular
application. But we could ask how often we would make mistakes in
the prediction of behaviour using the various preference functions. This
depends upon the predictions we are wanting to make. One possibility
is to use the specific questions asked in this experiment — though it
should be noted that the results of this analysis does depend on the
specific questions. It might be better to use some kind of generally-
accepted set of questions — which can be used to test the various
functions — but such a set is not available and is not clear how such a
set could be constructed (and then made generally-acceptable).
This chapter addresses the first of these concerns by demonstrating how much
the cost is in economic terms of using the EUT functional instead of some alternative.
I conclude that the cost can be very high for those subjects who undertake significant
deviations from EUT. I also conclude that doing the reverse, employing an RDU
function when available, results in relatively little cost to EUT subjects and improves
the accuracy of estimates of welfare surplus for subjects employing an RDUPrelec
functional. As for the second point raised by Hey (2001) of using “some kind
of generally-accepted set of questions” to assess the economic significance of a
classification process, I take the insurance policy task of HN as an example to
conduct such an economic analysis. Although this instrument usefully characterizes
the choice domain of interest to HN given their inferential objective, it isn’t clear
that this particular instrument is suitable when assessing the welfare consequences
of misclassification given different inferential objectives, or even that any instrument
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could be suitably constructed to be generally applicable to many different inferential
objectives.
I conclude by agreeing with Gelman and Loken (2013, p. 14): “Criticism is
easy, doing research is hard.” The simulation analysis performed in this chapter
provides valuable insight into the power of a given instrument, but does not make
recommendations on how to design an instrument to achieve a particular level of
statistical power beyond the unsurprising result that power increases with sample
size. It is incredibly difficult to develop an experimental design that allows for the
identification of a model that subjects actually employ, or even to identify if the
subject engages in probability weighting at all. The lottery instrument utilized
by HN (2016, pp. 98-99) is designed to incorporate the experimental findings of
Camerer (1989), Harless (1992) and Loomes and Sugden (1998), among others, that
offer design elements specifically introduced to help identify probability weighting.
The relatively low probability of correctly identifying probability weighting using
this instrument speaks to the difficulty of conducting research in this domain.
231
Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Review of Chapters
I focus broadly on the interpretation of choice behavior that seemingly violates
Expected Utility Theory (EUT). Chapter 1 discusses economists’ responses to the
experimental evidence presented by Grether and Plott (1979), which investigated
apparent violations of transitivity. These responses vary from developing new
theoretical models, to critiques of experimental method and scope, to the promotion
of stochastic models of choice. The remainder of this thesis examines on how
stochastic elements of choice models influence normative statements of welfare.
Chapter 2 discusses the normative coherence of three classes of stochastic
models: the “Tremble” (TR) model developed by Harless and Camerer (1994), the
“Random Error” (RE) model developed by Hey and Orme (1994), and the “Random
Preferences” (RP) model developed by Loomes and Sugden (1998). TR models
require that with some probability, a choice is made as if it was selected entirely at
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random from the set of alternatives. RP models require that subjects choose as if
they had randomly picked a preference relation from some distribution of preference
relations and made a choice deterministically with respect to that preference relation.
RE models generally require that as the difference in expected utility of the options
grows, the choice probability of the option with the greatest expected utility will
approach 1, while the choice probabilities of the other options will approach 0.1 I
propose an extension of the RP model, called the Random Preference Per Option
(RPPO) model, which requires an agent to choose a preference parameter from a
distribution of preferences for each option in the set of alternatives instead of a
single preference relation for the entire set of alternatives. This extension allows
for options which are First Order Stochastically Dominated (FOSD) by another
option to have a positive choice probability, which is prohibited by the stand-alone
RP model. The RE model proposed by Hey and Orme (1994) is similar to a
homoscedastic latent index model, and can be modified in useful ways by making
the latent index heteroscedastic, several examples of which are detailed in Chapter
2. Chapter 2 specifically investigates the Contextual Utility (CU) model proposed
by Wilcox (2008), and the remainder of the thesis utilizes this stochastic model.
Chapter 2 proposes a thought experiment, the Stochastic Money Pump (SMP),
to explore the capacity of stochastic models to support coherent normative state-
ments according to two criteria. The first criterion stipulates that should an agent
be left with strictly fewer assets after a resource allocation, that agent would be said
to be worse off than had she had her previous, greater, stock of assets. The second
criterion stipulates that exposure to market forces should incentivize the agent to
1Some RE models assign a probability of 0 to options which are First Order Stochastically
Dominated by another option, regardless of how great the difference in expected utility is between
the two options.
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behave as if conforming to the theory in question. The SMP allows for a choice
pattern that would leave agents with a strictly smaller stock of assets, deemed an
“extraction.” The probability off an extraction and the welfare consequences of the
extraction are calculated for each of the TR, CU, RP, and RPPO models, as well
as a combination of RP and TR models (RP+TR). The various models can be
parameterized in such a way to produce identical probabilities of extraction.
Of particular concern is the first normative criterion relating strict stocks of
assets to statements about welfare. The TR and RE models usefully characterize
a strict loss of assets as a loss of consumer surplus. However, the RP model, and
the related RPPO and RP+TR models, allow for an extraction event to result
in greater consumer surplus. This is despite the fact that the RP models strictly
prohibit the choice of a lower stock of assets over a greater stock of assets at the
individual choice level. I conclude that the RP model and its derivatives do not
support coherent normative statements, and caution against its use in domains
where individual level welfare is being assessed.
Chapter 3 adopts an unconditional probability and welfare framework to con-
tinue to discuss the relationship between choice probabilities and welfare. The
multiple price list popularized by Holt and Laury (2002) (HL-MPL) is utilized
to illustrate a disconnect between the probability of a pattern of choices and the
expected welfare realization of those choices. The HL-MPL is utilized because it
contains only 10 pairs of lotteries, and thus there are only 1024 possible patterns
of choices, and one of the lottery pairs is a behaviorally obvious case of FOSD.
For a hypothetical, simulated population, the correlation between likelihood and
welfare realization is positive, but not particularly close to 1. As the unconditional
likelihood of a choice pattern increases, the welfare realization of the choice pattern
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generally also increases, but this is not the case across all choice patterns. In par-
ticular, it is shown that most choice patterns which do not exhibit FOSD are many
times more likely to be observed, but which nonetheless provide less welfare than
many choice patterns which do exhibit FOSD. This disconnect between likelihood
and welfare realization is due to the manner in which the CU model is formulated
to make individual choices which exhibit FOSD particularly unlikely, even if the
cost of violating FOSD is relatively small in welfare terms.
Chapter 3 also discusses how the unconditional likelihood of “choice errors”
and the expected unconditional welfare surplus of EUT populations relate to the
distribution of preferences in the population and the instrument on which choices
are made. As the density of preferences in a population increases around a “point
of indifference,” a parameter value for the CRRA function which would indicate
indifference indifferent between the options of some lottery pair, the likelihood of
choice errors increases. Generally, as the density of preferences in a population
increases around multiple points of indifference, the cost of choice errors in a
population also increases. However, the stochastic “noise” parameters employed by
the population seem to drive the welfare costs of choice errors than the preferences
representing the “deterministic core” themselves.
Chapter 4 conducts a power analysis on individual level estimation utilizing the
experimental design and protocol of Harrison and Ng (2016) (HN). HN critique
the “take-up” metric used in the insurance literature to judge the “success” of an
insurance product. They conduct an experiment to demonstrate how the structural
estimation of a utility function at the individual level can be used to calculate the
consumer surplus of decisions to purchase, or not purchase, insurance products.
They presented subjects with two instruments, a lottery task used to estimate the
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structural model of risk preferences, and an insurance policy choice task used to
measure the consumer surplus of the same subject’s choices. This process requires
that a model be selected in order to calculate the consumer surplus. I call this
process the “classification” process, and assess the power of this process, paired
with the lottery task, to correctly identify agents employing either the EUT model
or a Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) model with the flexible probability weighting
function given by Prelec (1998) (RDUPrelec).
I find that the accuracy of the classification process depends on both the model
employed by the simulated subject and the values of the parameters of that model.
The probability of correctly classifying subjects that employed the RDUPrelec model
was found to generally be lower than 50% across the (a priori plausible) parameter
space explored, and was noticeably lower than for EUT subjects, who were generally
correctly classified between 80% and 90% of the time. The cost of misclassification
in terms of the difference between estimated and actual welfare surplus was much
larger for subjects that employed the RDUPrelec model than for EUT subjects.
Given the asymmetry of the accuracy of estimates of welfare surplus between
EUT and RDUPrelec subjects, I propose an approach which classifies every subject
as employing an RDUPrelec model if feasible, and EUT otherwise. This “Default”
approach results in greater accuracy of welfare surplus estimates for RDUPrelec
subjects and slightly worse accuracy for EUT subjects. For a given hypothetical
population, the proportion of subjects employing the EUT model would have to be
greater than 81% for the improvement in average welfare accuracy for RDUPrelec
subjects to be outweighed by the average loss of accuracy for EUT subjects. I
additionally show that increasing the number of lottery pairs per subject from the
80 used in HN to up to 1040 results in greater classification accuracy, and more
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accurate welfare surplus estimates. Even small increases in the number of lottery
pairs results in greater classification accuracy, but more than 400 lottery pairs
per subject would be needed to increase the probability of correctly classifying
RDUPrelec subjects to greater than 80% for the hypothetical population considered.
5.2 Limitations
This thesis has several limitations. In Chapter 2 the example used to make the
argument that RP models do not make perfectly coherent statements about welfare
relies on a parameterization of the RP model that makes the “extraction” event
relatively rare and small in expected value terms compared to the expected value of
the lotteries concerned. If the difference between the RP and RE models in terms
of expected welfare realization is small for choice domains that economists are
concerned about, then descriptive concerns may outweigh the lack of coherence of
the RP model and its derivatives. Additionally, Chapter 2 assesses the normative
coherence of the stochastic models on the basis of the two normative criteria
referenced above. Economists may find other criteria to be of greater value in
making normative prescriptions. However, any gain in normative coherence for
the RP model on the basis of additional or different criteria would still have to be
weighed against the criteria considered in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 3 the analysis conducted is a numerical approximation of proposed
statistics for given distributions of risk preferences. These analyses do not address
the difficulty of identifying these distributions of preferences experimentally. These
analyses also center on the HL-MPL, which has fewer lottery pairs than many mod-
ern experimental instruments, and may not constitute a choice domain economists
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are presently concerned with. Additionally, the “D statistic,” proposed as a way
to describe how the distribution of risk preferences interacts with the instrument,
would have to be extended to include probability weighting parameters in order to
be applicable to RDU populations.
In Chapter 4 the power analysis is constrained to only two different types of
utility models, the EUT and RDUPrelec model. Additionally, both models utilized
the same risk response function, the CRRA function, and the same stochastic
model, the CU model. There are many possible response functions and stochastic
models that can be employed with either the EUT or RDUPrelec framework. Real
subjects may employ one of these different response functions or stochastic models,
while still conforming to EUT or RDUPrelec in general. Subjects may also employ a
probability weighting function that does not closely resemble any parameterization
of the RDUPrelec model, but nonetheless is permissible under the general RDU
framework. It may be the case that if subjects employ these different response
functions, probability weighting functions, and stochastic models, their welfare is
more accurately characterized under the classification process proposed by HN
than under the “Default” approach proposed in Chapter 4. One should therefore
be cautious when extending the conclusions drawn here to more general inferential
objectives. Power analyses utilizing a wider range of EUT and RDU models can
help ease this concern.
Additionally, although the “Default” approach proposed in Chapter 4 achieves
greater accuracy of welfare surplus estimates for populations made up of both
EUT and RDUPrelec subjects in aggregate, it does so at the cost of the accuracy of
classifying subjects as employing one model or the other. There are reasons why in-
creased likelihood of correct classification would be useful normatively. Economists
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should be concerned if agents routinely violate the axioms they ascribe to rational
behavior. In proposing RDU as an extension of EUT, behavior which was pre-
viously considered normatively unacceptable can be rationalized as resulting in
gains in welfare. Having experimental and econometric methods that can accu-
rately identify whether or not probability weighting is a real phenomena guides
economists in determining whether choices made by agents are welfare optimal,
or made in error. The HNC approach proposed in Chapter 4 suggests that one
way to improve classification accuracy is to increase the number of lottery pairs
presented to subjects. However, there are experimental methodology concerns
about increasing the number of task presented to subjects that need to be weighed
against the increase in statistical power.
It should also be clear that the results of these power analyses are limited by
the scope of the objective under investigation. While these results are useful for
experiments where the objective is to classify subjects as employing either the EUT
or RDUPrelec models at the individual level, these results should not be construed
to suggest that similar experiments with different inferential objectives have the
same strengths or weaknesses. For instance, these analyses cannot make any claims
concerning inferences at the sample level from pooled data, even if the experimental
protocol was identical.
This thesis offers cautions and insights for the experimental economics literature,
as that literature starts to contribute rigorously to normative evaluations. It
cautions that some models of choice may be useful in facilitating description, but
less useful for supporting the kind of normative assessments that economists care
about. It offers insights into the power of economic experiments to identify whether
subjects employ probability weighting.
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